| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw has been found in vanna-ai vanna up to 2.0.2. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component FastAPI/Flask Server. Executing a manipulation can lead to permissive cross-domain policy with untrusted domains. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak's OIDC component in the "checkLoginIframe," which allows unvalidated cross-origin messages. This flaw allows attackers to coordinate and send millions of requests in seconds using simple code, significantly impacting the application's availability without proper origin validation for incoming messages. |
| Inappropriate implementation in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, ManagedWebAccessUtils.getServer() uses String.startsWith() to match request URLs against configured server URLs for authentication credential dispatch. Because configured server URLs (e.g., http://tx.fhir.org) lack a trailing slash or host boundary check, an attacker-controlled domain like http://tx.fhir.org.attacker.com matches the prefix and receives Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or API keys when the HTTP client follows a redirect to that domain. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4. |
| Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.66 and 9.7.0-alpha.10, the GraphQL API endpoint does not respect the allowOrigin server option and unconditionally allows cross-origin requests from any website. This bypasses origin restrictions that operators configure to control which websites can interact with the Parse Server API. The REST API correctly enforces the configured allowOrigin restriction. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.66 and 9.7.0-alpha.10. |
| A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.4, iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, visionOS 26.4. A malicious website may be able to access script message handlers intended for other origins. |
| Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for AI. The current implementation of attested TLS (aTLS) in CoCoS is vulnerable to a relay attack affecting all versions from v0.4.0 through v0.8.2. This vulnerability is present in both the AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX deployment targets supported by CoCoS. In the affected design, an attacker may be able to extract the ephemeral TLS private key used during the intra-handshake attestation. Because the attestation evidence is bound to the ephemeral key but not to the TLS channel, possession of that key is sufficient to relay or divert the attested TLS session. A client will accept the connection under false assumptions about the endpoint it is communicating with — the attestation report cannot distinguish the genuine attested service from the attacker's relay. This undermines the intended authentication guarantees of attested TLS. A successful attack may allow an attacker to impersonate an attested CoCoS service and access data or operations that the client intended to send only to the genuine attested endpoint. Exploitation requires the attacker to first extract the ephemeral TLS private key, which is possible through physical access to the server hardware, transient execution attacks, or side-channel attacks. Note that the aTLS implementation was fully redesigned in v0.7.0, but the redesign does not address this vulnerability. The relay attack weakness is architectural and affects all releases in the v0.4.0–v0.8.2 range. This vulnerability class was formally analyzed and demonstrated across multiple attested TLS implementations, including CoCoS, by researchers whose findings were disclosed to the IETF TLS Working Group. Formal verification was conducted using ProVerif. As of time of publication, there is no patch available. No complete workaround is available. The following hardening measures reduce but do not eliminate the risk: Keep TEE firmware and microcode up to date to reduce the key-extraction surface; define strict attestation policies that validate all available report fields, including firmware versions, TCB levels, and platform configuration registers; and/or enable mutual aTLS with CA-signed certificates where deployment architecture permits. |
| Mattermost versions 11.3.x <= 11.3.0, 11.2.x <= 11.2.2, 10.11.x <= 10.11.10 fail to sanitize client-supplied post metadata which allows an authenticated attacker to spoof permalink embeds impersonating other users via crafted PUT requests to the post update API endpoint.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2025-00569 |
| A cross-origin issue in the Navigation API was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in Background Security Improvements for iOS, iPadOS, and macOS, Safari 26.4, iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, visionOS 26.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may bypass Same Origin Policy. |
| Cryptomator encrypts data being stored on cloud infrastructure. Prior to version 1.19.1, an integrity check vulnerability allows an attacker to tamper with the vault configuration file leading to a man-in-the-middle vulnerability in Hub key loading mechanism. Before this fix, the client trusted endpoints from the vault config without host authenticity checks, which could allow token exfiltration by mixing a legitimate auth endpoint with a malicious API endpoint. Impacted are users unlocking Hub-backed vaults with affected client versions in environments where an attacker can alter the vault.cryptomator file. This issue has been patched in version 1.19.1. |
| Cryptomator for IOS offers multi-platform transparent client-side encryption for files in the cloud. Prior to version 2.8.3, an integrity check vulnerability allows an attacker tamper with the vault configuration file leading to a man-in-the-middle vulnerability in Hub key loading mechanism. Before this fix, the client trusted endpoints from the vault config without host authenticity checks, which could allow token exfiltration by mixing a legitimate auth endpoint with a malicious API endpoint. Impacted are users unlocking Hub-backed vaults with affected client versions in environments where an attacker can alter the vault.cryptomator file. This issue has been patched in version 2.8.3. |
| Cryptomator for Android offers multi-platform transparent client-side encryption for files in the cloud. Prior to version 1.12.3, an integrity check vulnerability allows an attacker tamper with the vault configuration file leading to a man-in-the-middle vulnerability in Hub key loading mechanism. Before this fix, the client trusted endpoints from the vault config without host authenticity checks, which could allow token exfiltration by mixing a legitimate auth endpoint with a malicious API endpoint. Impacted are users unlocking Hub-backed vaults with affected client versions in environments where an attacker can alter the vault.cryptomator file. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.3. |
| pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. Prior to version 0.5.0b3.dev97, a Host Header Spoofing vulnerability in the @local_check decorator allows unauthenticated external attackers to bypass local-only restrictions. This grants access to the Click'N'Load API endpoints, enabling attackers to remotely queue arbitrary downloads, leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Denial of Service (DoS). This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0b3.dev97. |
| HCL Traveler is susceptible to a weak default HTTP header validation vulnerability, which could allow an attacker to bypass additional authentication checks. |
| OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.3.11, browser-originated WebSocket connections could bypass origin validation when gateway.auth.mode was set to trusted-proxy and the request arrived with proxy headers. A page served from an untrusted origin could connect through a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-authenticated identity, and establish a privileged operator session. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.3.11. |
| Jenkins 2.442 through 2.554 (both inclusive), LTS 2.426.3 through LTS 2.541.2 (both inclusive) performs origin validation of requests made through the CLI WebSocket endpoint by computing the expected origin for comparison using the Host or X-Forwarded-Host HTTP request headers, making it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks that allow bypassing origin validation. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to version 4.5.2, in Central Browser mode, Glances stores both the Zeroconf-advertised server name and the discovered IP address for dynamic servers, but later builds connection URIs from the untrusted advertised name instead of the discovered IP. When a dynamic server reports itself as protected, Glances also uses that same untrusted name as the lookup key for saved passwords and the global `[passwords] default` credential. An attacker on the same local network can advertise a fake Glances service over Zeroconf and cause the browser to automatically send a reusable Glances authentication secret to an attacker-controlled host. This affects the background polling path and the REST/WebUI click-through path in Central Browser mode. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue. |
| Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, in `next dev`, cross-site protection for internal websocket endpoints could treat `Origin: null` as a bypass case even if `allowedDevOrigins` is configured, allowing privacy-sensitive/opaque contexts (for example sandboxed documents) to connect unexpectedly. If a dev server is reachable from attacker-controlled content, an attacker may be able to connect to the HMR websocket channel and interact with dev websocket traffic. This affects development mode only. Apps without a configured `allowedDevOrigins` still allow connections from any origin. The issue is fixed in version 16.1.7 by validating `Origin: null` through the same cross-site origin-allowance checks used for other origins. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose `next dev` to untrusted networks and/or block websocket upgrades to `/_next/webpack-hmr` when `Origin` is `null` at the proxy. |
| Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, `origin: null` was treated as a "missing" origin during Server Action CSRF validation. As a result, requests from opaque contexts (such as sandboxed iframes) could bypass origin verification instead of being validated as cross-origin requests. An attacker could induce a victim browser to submit Server Actions from a sandboxed context, potentially executing state-changing actions with victim credentials (CSRF). This is fixed in version 16.1.7 by treating `'null'` as an explicit origin value and enforcing host/origin checks unless `'null'` is explicitly allowlisted in `experimental.serverActions.allowedOrigins`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, add CSRF tokens for sensitive Server Actions, prefer `SameSite=Strict` on sensitive auth cookies, and/or do not allow `'null'` in `serverActions.allowedOrigins` unless intentionally required and additionally protected. |
