| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: pm8001: Fix use-after-free in pm8001_queue_command()
Commit e29c47fe8946 ("scsi: pm8001: Simplify pm8001_task_exec()") refactors
pm8001_queue_command(), however it introduces a potential cause of a double
free scenario when it changes the function to return -ENODEV in case of phy
down/device gone state.
In this path, pm8001_queue_command() updates task status and calls
task_done to indicate to upper layer that the task has been handled.
However, this also frees the underlying SAS task. A -ENODEV is then
returned to the caller. When libsas sas_ata_qc_issue() receives this error
value, it assumes the task wasn't handled/queued by LLDD and proceeds to
clean up and free the task again, resulting in a double free.
Since pm8001_queue_command() handles the SAS task in this case, it should
return 0 to the caller indicating that the task has been handled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Only allow act_ct to bind to clsact/ingress qdiscs and shared blocks
As Paolo said earlier [1]:
"Since the blamed commit below, classify can return TC_ACT_CONSUMED while
the current skb being held by the defragmentation engine. As reported by
GangMin Kim, if such packet is that may cause a UaF when the defrag engine
later on tries to tuch again such packet."
act_ct was never meant to be used in the egress path, however some users
are attaching it to egress today [2]. Attempting to reach a middle
ground, we noticed that, while most qdiscs are not handling
TC_ACT_CONSUMED, clsact/ingress qdiscs are. With that in mind, we
address the issue by only allowing act_ct to bind to clsact/ingress
qdiscs and shared blocks. That way it's still possible to attach act_ct to
egress (albeit only with clsact).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/674b8cbfc385c6f37fb29a1de08d8fe5c2b0fbee.1771321118.git.pabeni@redhat.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cc6bfb4a-4a2b-42d8-b9ce-7ef6644fb22b@ovn.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the
DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which
reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty.
Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the
same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries
from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers
while the list head is reset to {self, self}.
The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly
initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to
reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions.
Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct
assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which
properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering
without touching the waitqueue or spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap
Syzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning
in perf_mmap.
The issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup
and a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output
redirection).
In perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to
event->rb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to
perform map_range().
If map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up.
However, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to
this event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire
the mutex, observe the valid event->rb pointer, and attempt to
increment its reference count. If the cleanup path has already
dropped the reference count to zero, this results in a
use-after-free or refcount saturation warning.
Fix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the
map_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization
and mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively,
preventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or
dying ring buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix use-after-free in nf_tables_addchain()
nf_tables_addchain() publishes the chain to table->chains via
list_add_tail_rcu() (in nft_chain_add()) before registering hooks.
If nf_tables_register_hook() then fails, the error path calls
nft_chain_del() (list_del_rcu()) followed by nf_tables_chain_destroy()
with no RCU grace period in between.
This creates two use-after-free conditions:
1) Control-plane: nf_tables_dump_chains() traverses table->chains
under rcu_read_lock(). A concurrent dump can still be walking
the chain when the error path frees it.
2) Packet path: for NFPROTO_INET, nf_register_net_hook() briefly
installs the IPv4 hook before IPv6 registration fails. Packets
entering nft_do_chain() via the transient IPv4 hook can still be
dereferencing chain->blob_gen_X when the error path frees the
chain.
Add synchronize_rcu() between nft_chain_del() and the chain destroy
so that all RCU readers -- both dump threads and in-flight packet
evaluation -- have finished before the chain is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free
Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations
without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem.
For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this:
```
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
---- ---- ----
vidi_connection_ioctl()
if (vidi->connection) // true
drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid
...
ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid;
...
drm_mode_getconnector()
drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes()
vidi_get_modes()
if (ctx->raw_edid) // true
drm_edid_dup(ctx->raw_edid);
if (!drm_edid) // false
...
vidi_connection_ioctl()
if (vidi->connection) // false
drm_edid_free(ctx->raw_edid); // free drm_edid
...
drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid->edid)
kmemdup(edid); // UAF!!
...
```
To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related
to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx->lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add chann_lock to protect ksmbd_chann_list xarray
ksmbd_chann_list xarray lacks synchronization, allowing use-after-free in
multi-channel sessions (between lookup_chann_list() and ksmbd_chann_del).
Adds rw_semaphore chann_lock to struct ksmbd_session and protects
all xa_load/xa_store/xa_erase accesses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix UAF issue for file-backed mounts w/ directio option
[ 9.269940][ T3222] Call trace:
[ 9.269948][ T3222] ext4_file_read_iter+0xac/0x108
[ 9.269979][ T3222] vfs_iocb_iter_read+0xac/0x198
[ 9.269993][ T3222] erofs_fileio_rq_submit+0x12c/0x180
[ 9.270008][ T3222] erofs_fileio_submit_bio+0x14/0x24
[ 9.270030][ T3222] z_erofs_runqueue+0x834/0x8ac
[ 9.270054][ T3222] z_erofs_read_folio+0x120/0x220
[ 9.270083][ T3222] filemap_read_folio+0x60/0x120
[ 9.270102][ T3222] filemap_fault+0xcac/0x1060
[ 9.270119][ T3222] do_pte_missing+0x2d8/0x1554
[ 9.270131][ T3222] handle_mm_fault+0x5ec/0x70c
[ 9.270142][ T3222] do_page_fault+0x178/0x88c
[ 9.270167][ T3222] do_translation_fault+0x38/0x54
[ 9.270183][ T3222] do_mem_abort+0x54/0xac
[ 9.270208][ T3222] el0_da+0x44/0x7c
[ 9.270227][ T3222] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x5c/0xf4
[ 9.270253][ T3222] el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0
EROFS may encounter above panic when enabling file-backed mount w/
directio mount option, the root cause is it may suffer UAF in below
race condition:
- z_erofs_read_folio wq s_dio_done_wq
- z_erofs_runqueue
- erofs_fileio_submit_bio
- erofs_fileio_rq_submit
- vfs_iocb_iter_read
- ext4_file_read_iter
- ext4_dio_read_iter
- iomap_dio_rw
: bio was submitted and return -EIOCBQUEUED
- dio_aio_complete_work
- dio_complete
- dio->iocb->ki_complete (erofs_fileio_ki_complete())
- kfree(rq)
: it frees iocb, iocb.ki_filp can be UAF in file_accessed().
- file_accessed
: access NULL file point
Introduce a reference count in struct erofs_fileio_rq, and initialize it
as two, both erofs_fileio_ki_complete() and erofs_fileio_rq_submit() will
decrease reference count, the last one decreasing the reference count
to zero will free rq. |
| An attacker might be able to trigger a use-after-free by sending crafted DNS queries to a DNSdist using the DNSQuestion:getEDNSOptions method in custom Lua code. In some cases DNSQuestion:getEDNSOptions might refer to a version of the DNS packet that has been modified, thus triggering a use-after-free and potentially a crash resulting in denial of service. |
| Use after free in Dawn in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add proper RCU protection to /proc/net/ptype
Yin Fengwei reported an RCU stall in ptype_seq_show() and provided
a patch.
Real issue is that ptype_seq_next() and ptype_seq_show() violate
RCU rules.
ptype_seq_show() runs under rcu_read_lock(), and reads pt->dev
to get device name without any barrier.
At the same time, concurrent writers can remove a packet_type structure
(which is correctly freed after an RCU grace period) and clear pt->dev
without an RCU grace period.
Define ptype_iter_state to carry a dev pointer along seq_net_private:
struct ptype_iter_state {
struct seq_net_private p;
struct net_device *dev; // added in this patch
};
We need to record the device pointer in ptype_get_idx() and
ptype_seq_next() so that ptype_seq_show() is safe against
concurrent pt->dev changes.
We also need to add full RCU protection in ptype_seq_next().
(Missing READ_ONCE() when reading list.next values)
Many thanks to Dong Chenchen for providing a repro. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: tegra210-quad: Protect curr_xfer check in IRQ handler
Now that all other accesses to curr_xfer are done under the lock,
protect the curr_xfer NULL check in tegra_qspi_isr_thread() with the
spinlock. Without this protection, the following race can occur:
CPU0 (ISR thread) CPU1 (timeout path)
---------------- -------------------
if (!tqspi->curr_xfer)
// sees non-NULL
spin_lock()
tqspi->curr_xfer = NULL
spin_unlock()
handle_*_xfer()
spin_lock()
t = tqspi->curr_xfer // NULL!
... t->len ... // NULL dereference!
With this patch, all curr_xfer accesses are now properly synchronized.
Although all accesses to curr_xfer are done under the lock, in
tegra_qspi_isr_thread() it checks for NULL, releases the lock and
reacquires it later in handle_cpu_based_xfer()/handle_dma_based_xfer().
There is a potential for an update in between, which could cause a NULL
pointer dereference.
To handle this, add a NULL check inside the handlers after acquiring
the lock. This ensures that if the timeout path has already cleared
curr_xfer, the handler will safely return without dereferencing the
NULL pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in kerberos authentication
Setting sess->user = NULL was introduced to fix the dangling pointer
created by ksmbd_free_user. However, it is possible another thread could
be operating on the session and make use of sess->user after it has been
passed to ksmbd_free_user but before sess->user is set to NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_sessions_deregister()
In multichannel mode, UAF issue can occur in session_deregister
when the second channel sets up a session through the connection of
the first channel. session that is freed through the global session
table can be accessed again through ->sessions of connection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix session use-after-free in multichannel connection
There is a race condition between session setup and
ksmbd_sessions_deregister. The session can be freed before the connection
is added to channel list of session.
This patch check reference count of session before freeing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction
Preserve sockets bindings; this includes both resulting from an explicit
bind() and those implicitly bound through autobind during connect().
Prevents socket unbinding during a transport reassignment, which fixes a
use-after-free:
1. vsock_create() (refcnt=1) calls vsock_insert_unbound() (refcnt=2)
2. transport->release() calls vsock_remove_bound() without checking if
sk was bound and moved to bound list (refcnt=1)
3. vsock_bind() assumes sk is in unbound list and before
__vsock_insert_bound(vsock_bound_sockets()) calls
__vsock_remove_bound() which does:
list_del_init(&vsk->bound_table); // nop
sock_put(&vsk->sk); // refcnt=0
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816b46a74c by task a.out/2057
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x4f6
kasan_report+0xb9/0x190
__vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Allocated by task 2057:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450
sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870
__vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2e/0xb60
vsock_create+0xe4/0x420
__sock_create+0x241/0x650
__sys_socket+0xf2/0x1a0
__x64_sys_socket+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 2057:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590
__sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0
__vsock_bind+0x5e1/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
__vsock_bind+0x66d/0x730
vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0
__sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0
__x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
vsock_remove_bound+0x187/0x1e0
__vsock_release+0x383/0x4a0
vsock_release+0x90/0x120
__sock_release+0xa3/0x250
sock_close+0x14/0x20
__fput+0x359/0xa80
task_work_run+0x107/0x1d0
do_exit+0x847/0x2560
do_group_exit+0xb8/0x250
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
x64_sys_call+0xfec/0x14f0
do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netem: Update sch->q.qlen before qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() notifies parent qdisc only if child
qdisc becomes empty, therefore we need to reduce the backlog of the
child qdisc before calling it. Otherwise it would miss the opportunity
to call cops->qlen_notify(), in the case of DRR, it resulted in UAF
since DRR uses ->qlen_notify() to maintain its active list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: Disallow replacing of child qdisc from one parent to another
Lion Ackermann was able to create a UAF which can be abused for privilege
escalation with the following script
Step 1. create root qdisc
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1:0 drr
step2. a class for packet aggregation do demonstrate uaf
tc class add dev lo classid 1:1 drr
step3. a class for nesting
tc class add dev lo classid 1:2 drr
step4. a class to graft qdisc to
tc class add dev lo classid 1:3 drr
step5.
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2:0 plug limit 1024
step6.
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:2 handle 3:0 drr
step7.
tc class add dev lo classid 3:1 drr
step 8.
tc qdisc add dev lo parent 3:1 handle 4:0 pfifo
step 9. Display the class/qdisc layout
tc class ls dev lo
class drr 1:1 root leaf 2: quantum 64Kb
class drr 1:2 root leaf 3: quantum 64Kb
class drr 3:1 root leaf 4: quantum 64Kb
tc qdisc ls
qdisc drr 1: dev lo root refcnt 2
qdisc plug 2: dev lo parent 1:1
qdisc pfifo 4: dev lo parent 3:1 limit 1000p
qdisc drr 3: dev lo parent 1:2
step10. trigger the bug <=== prevented by this patch
tc qdisc replace dev lo parent 1:3 handle 4:0
step 11. Redisplay again the qdiscs/classes
tc class ls dev lo
class drr 1:1 root leaf 2: quantum 64Kb
class drr 1:2 root leaf 3: quantum 64Kb
class drr 1:3 root leaf 4: quantum 64Kb
class drr 3:1 root leaf 4: quantum 64Kb
tc qdisc ls
qdisc drr 1: dev lo root refcnt 2
qdisc plug 2: dev lo parent 1:1
qdisc pfifo 4: dev lo parent 3:1 refcnt 2 limit 1000p
qdisc drr 3: dev lo parent 1:2
Observe that a) parent for 4:0 does not change despite the replace request.
There can only be one parent. b) refcount has gone up by two for 4:0 and
c) both class 1:3 and 3:1 are pointing to it.
Step 12. send one packet to plug
echo "" | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888,priority=$((0x10001))
step13. send one packet to the grafted fifo
echo "" | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888,priority=$((0x10003))
step14. lets trigger the uaf
tc class delete dev lo classid 1:3
tc class delete dev lo classid 1:1
The semantics of "replace" is for a del/add _on the same node_ and not
a delete from one node(3:1) and add to another node (1:3) as in step10.
While we could "fix" with a more complex approach there could be
consequences to expectations so the patch takes the preventive approach of
"disallow such config".
Joint work with Lion Ackermann <nnamrec@gmail.com> |
| Use after free in PDF in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted PDF file. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in CSS in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
