| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus) Fix passing events to regulator core
Sashiko reports:
Commit 754bd2b4a084 ("hwmon: (pmbus/core) Protect regulator operations with
mutex") introduced a worker to batch regulator events over time using
atomic_or(). The delayed worker then passes the combined bitmask unmodified
to regulator_notifier_call_chain().
The core regulator subsystem's regulator_handle_critical() function
evaluates the event parameter using a strict switch statement. If
multiple distinct faults occur before the worker runs (e.g.,
REGULATOR_EVENT_UNDER_VOLTAGE | REGULATOR_EVENT_OVER_CURRENT), the combined
bitmask fails to match any case. This leaves the reason as NULL and
completely bypasses the critical hw_protection_trigger().
Fix the problem by passing events bit by bit to the regulator event
handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/core) honor vrm_version in pmbus_data2reg_vid()
pmbus_data2reg_vid() hardcoded the VR11 encoding regardless of the
vrm_version configured by the driver, while pmbus_reg2data_vid()
already switched on it. Any driver that selects a non-VR11 VID mode
and exposes a regulator (or hwmon vout setter) sent dangerously
wrong codes to PMBUS_VOUT_COMMAND -- e.g. an nvidia195mv part asked
for 200 mV got the VR11 clamp to 500 mV encoded as 0xB2, which the
chip interprets as 1080 mV.
Mirror pmbus_reg2data_vid() so writes round-trip with reads. |
| In OpenStack Aodh before 22.0.1, the alarm list API bypasses project scoping when the all_projects query parameter is set to false. The API checks for the presence of the all_projects key rather than its value; a true value enforces the administrator-only policy, but a false value removes the key and skips the branch that normally restricts results to the caller's project. A non-admin user with the reader role can list alarms from all projects, exposing alarm actions containing trust webhook URLs, Heat signal endpoints, project IDs, and user IDs. The parameter can also be combined with a foreign project_id to target a specific project's alarms. A related concern is that OpenStack Watcher does not apply authorization to its webhook trigger endpoint. Any authenticated user who learns an audit's webhook URL, for example from this leaked Aodh alarm metadata, can start an EVENT audit and its associated action plan regardless of their own project or role. The webhook endpoint has lacked policy enforcement since its introduction in the Ussuri release (Watcher 4.0.0). |
| FFmpeg before commit b4c199c contains an incorrect integer narrowing conversion in the AV1 RTP packetizer (libavformat/rtpenc_av1.c). The OBU size is cast to long before comparison against the remaining frame size. On targets where long is 32 bits, including 64-bit Windows, sufficiently large OBU size values are sign-flipped by the narrowing cast, producing a negative value that passes the payload size check. This allows an oversized OBU to bypass the safety bound on affected platforms, leading to out-of-bounds memory access when the oversized value is subsequently used as a copy length. |
| Incorrect calculation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.169 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Date::Manip versions through 6.99 for Perl return corrupted dates via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in check.
The parse regexes capture year, month and day with the `\d` shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode decimal digit property `\p{Nd}` and not just `[0-9]`. Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with numeric comparisons alone (`$y<1 || $y>9999`, `$m<1 || $m>12`, `$d<1 || $d>$days`), and _parse_check stores the numified fields (`$y+0`). Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour, minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes (`0?[0-9]`, `[0-5][0-9]`) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction.
Any caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or Date::Manip::Date->parse() can get back a date that differs from the string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes unnoticed. |
| libvips is a fast image processing library with low memory needs. Prior to version 8.18.3, libvips built without libtiff support but with ImageMagick support can overflow the combined frame height while loading a crafted multi-page TIFF through VipsForeignLoadMagick. The vulnerable calculations in libvips/foreign/magick6load.c and libvips/foreign/magick7load.c multiply the per-page Ysize by n_frames without a checked bound, which can cause a heap buffer over-read and process crash. Most package-manager builds include libtiff and do not use this affected fallback path. This issue is fixed in version 8.18.3. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division
vmw_cmd_draw() computes
maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl);
where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied
command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the
unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum.
Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and
the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command
bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory.
Reject undersized headers up front. |
| Incorrect conversion between numeric types in VC1 codec in libsavsvc.so prior to SMR Aug-2026 Release 1 allows local attackers to write out-of-bounds memory. |
| A wrong lowering instruction in the ARM64 Ion compiler resulted in a wrong optimization result. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 112, Focus for Android < 112, Firefox ESR < 102.10, Firefox for Android < 112, and Thunderbird < 102.10. |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0. |
| Incorrect calculation for some Intel(R) TDX Guest software before version 0.3.1 within Ring 3: User Applications may allow an escalation of privilege. System software adversary with a privileged user combined with a low complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are not present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (low), integrity (low) and availability (low) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
| New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Prior to 1.0.0-rc.18, user-controlled image n, video seconds and duration, max_tokens, max_completion_tokens, maxOutputTokens, audio duration, and billing-expression quantities can overflow conversions in common/quota_math.go and related settlement paths, allowing a low-privileged account with positive balance or an active subscription to turn a negative charge into account credit and potentially drain upstream funds. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-rc.18. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_lookup: fix catchall element handling with inverted lookups
nft_lookup_eval() decides whether a lookup matched (`found`) from the
direct set lookup and priv->invert before falling back to the
catchall element used by interval sets (e.g. nft_set_rbtree) for the
open-ended default range. Since `found` is never recomputed after
`ext` is replaced by the catchall lookup, inverted lookups
(NFT_LOOKUP_F_INV, "!= @set") can wrongly match or wrongly skip the
catchall element, producing the wrong verdict. Fold the catchall
lookup into `ext` before computing `found`, matching the order
already used by nft_objref_map_eval(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: xt_u32: reject invalid shift counts
u32_match_it() executes rule-supplied shift operands on a 32-bit
value. A malformed u32 rule can provide a shift count of 32 or more,
triggering an undefined shift out-of-bounds during packet evaluation.
Validate XT_U32_LEFTSH and XT_U32_RIGHTSH operands in
u32_mt_checkentry() and reject malformed rules before they reach the
packet path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: fix 32-bit integer overflow in qrtr_endpoint_post()
qrtr_endpoint_post() validates an incoming packet with
if (!size || len != ALIGN(size, 4) + hdrlen)
goto err;
where size comes from the wire. On 32-bit, size_t is 32 bits and
ALIGN(size, 4) wraps to 0 for size >= 0xfffffffd, so the check
passes and skb_put_data(skb, data + hdrlen, size) writes past the
hdrlen-sized skb and oopses the kernel. 64-bit is unaffected.
This is the 32-bit residual of ad9d24c9429e2 ("net: qrtr: fix OOB
Read in qrtr_endpoint_post"), which fixed only the 64-bit case.
Reject any size that cannot fit the buffer before the ALIGN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: LAG, Fix off-by-one in single-FDB error rollback
On failure at index i, the reverse cleanup loop in
mlx5_lag_create_single_fdb() starts from i, so the failed index
itself is rolled back. That can operate on uninitialized state or
double-tear-down a rule the add_one path already self-rolled-back.
Start the rollback from i - 1 so only successfully-installed entries
are undone. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: host: max3421: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in max3421_hub_control()
The `max3421_hub_control()` function handles USB hub class requests
to the virtual root hub. In the `default` branches of both the
`ClearPortFeature` and `SetPortFeature` switch statements, it modifies
`max3421_hcd->port_status` by left shifting 1 by the request's `value`
parameter. However, it does not validate whether this shift will exceed
the width of `port_status`.
So if a malicious userspace task with access to the root hub via
/dev/bus/usb/.../001 issues a USBDEVFS_CONTROL ioctl with `wValue`
greater than or equal to 32, the left shift operation invokes
shift-out-of-bounds undefined behavior. This results in arbitrary
bit corruption of `port_status`, including the normally-immutable
change bits, which can bypass internal state checks and confuse the
hub status.
Fix this by rejecting requests whose `value` exceeds the shift width
before performing the shift.
This issue was found using a KLEE-based symbolic execution tool for
kernel drivers that I'm currently developing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: aiu: Validate written enum values
The AIU HDMI and internal codec mux put callbacks use the written enum
value with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() before checking whether the value is
valid for the enumeration.
Reject out-of-range values before converting the enum item, matching the
validation already done by the G12A HDMI and internal codec mux controls. |
| A flaw was found in Undertow, an HTTP server, within its HTTP response header writing path. The `writeString()` method performs a silent narrowing cast from 16-bit Unicode characters to 8-bit bytes when writing HTTP response header values. A remote attacker can exploit this by supplying specific Unicode characters in user-controlled input that an application places into response headers. This can lead to the truncation of these characters into ASCII control characters or special symbols, potentially resulting in limited integrity impact or information disclosure if the application does not properly sanitize user input. |
