| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/cdx: Serialize VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with a per-device mutex
vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger() reads vdev->config_msi and operates on the
vdev->cdx_irqs array based on its value, but provides no serialization
against concurrent VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctls. Two callers can race
such that one observes config_msi as set while another clears it and
frees cdx_irqs via vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), resulting in a use-after-free
of the cdx_irqs array.
Add a cdx_irqs_lock mutex to struct vfio_cdx_device and acquire it in
vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(), which is the single chokepoint through
which all updates to config_msi, cdx_irqs, and msi_count flow, covering
both the ioctl path and the close-device cleanup path. This keeps the
test of config_msi atomic with the subsequent enable, disable, or
trigger operations.
Drop the pre-call !cdx_irqs test from vfio_cdx_irqs_cleanup() as part
of this change: the optimization it provided is redundant with the
!config_msi early-return inside vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), and leaving the
test in place would be an unsynchronized read of state the new lock is
meant to protect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/md-llbitmap: skip reading rdevs that are not in_sync
When reading bitmap pages from member disks, the code iterates through
all rdevs and attempts to read from the first available one. However,
it only checks for raid_disk assignment and Faulty flag, missing the
In_sync flag check.
This can cause bitmap data to be read from spare disks that are still
being rebuilt and don't have valid bitmap information yet. Reading
stale or uninitialized bitmap data from such disks can lead to
incorrect dirty bit tracking, potentially causing data corruption
during recovery or normal operation.
Add the In_sync flag check to ensure bitmap pages are only read from
fully synchronized member disks that have valid bitmap data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()
In the remove callback, if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue() is
called, but before sock_release(), the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback will
try to queue the work, causing use-after-free issue.
Fix this issue by saving the default 'sk_data_ready' callback during
qrtr_ns_init() and use it to replace the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback at
the start of remove(). This ensures that even if a packet arrives after
destroy_workqueue(), the work struct will not be dereferenced.
Note that it is also required to ensure that the RX threads are completed
before destroying the workqueue, because the threads could be using the
qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure
If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in
rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread())
will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to
trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event()
calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to
that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the
call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the
pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer. |
| Issue summary: A specially crafted PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message could
trigger a use-after-free during PKCS#7 signature verification.
Impact summary: A use-after-free may result in process crashes, heap
corruption, or potentially remote code execution.
When processing a PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message, if the SignedData
digestAlgorithms field is present as an empty ASN.1 SET, OpenSSL may
incorrectly free a caller-owned BIO during PKCS7_verify(). A subsequent
use of the BIO by the calling application results in a use-after-free
condition.
In the common case this occurs when the application later calls
BIO_free() on the BIO originally passed to PKCS7_verify(). Depending
on allocator behavior and application-specific BIO usage patterns, this
may result in a crash or other memory corruption. In some application
contexts this may potentially be exploitable for remote code execution.
Applications that process PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed messages using OpenSSL
PKCS#7 APIs may be affected. Applications using the CMS APIs for this
processing are not affected.
The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this
issue, as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Return proper address for non-zero offsets in insn array
The map_direct_value_addr() function of the instruction
array map incorrectly adds offset to the resulting address.
This is a bug, because later the resolve_pseudo_ldimm64()
function adds the offset. Fix it. Corresponding selftests
are added in a consequent commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF and double free in smb2_open_file()
Zero out @err_iov and @err_buftype before retrying SMB2_open() to
prevent an UAF bug if @data != NULL, otherwise a double free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: use READ_ONCE() to read struct ublksrv_ctrl_cmd
struct ublksrv_ctrl_cmd is part of the io_uring_sqe, which may lie in
userspace-mapped memory. It's racy to access its fields with normal
loads, as userspace may write to them concurrently. Use READ_ONCE() to
copy the ublksrv_ctrl_cmd from the io_uring_sqe to the stack. Use the
local copy in place of the one in the io_uring_sqe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Stop job scheduling across aie2_release_resource()
Running jobs on a hardware context while it is in the process of
releasing resources can lead to use-after-free and crashes.
Fix this by stopping job scheduling before calling
aie2_release_resource() and restarting it after the release completes.
Additionally, aie2_sched_job_run() now checks whether the hardware
context is still active. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path
The inline data buffer head (dibh) is being released prematurely in
gfs2_iomap_begin() via release_metapath() while iomap->inline_data
still points to dibh->b_data. This causes a use-after-free when
iomap_write_end_inline() later attempts to write to the inline data
area.
The bug sequence:
1. gfs2_iomap_begin() calls gfs2_meta_inode_buffer() to read inode
metadata into dibh
2. Sets iomap->inline_data = dibh->b_data + sizeof(struct gfs2_dinode)
3. Calls release_metapath() which calls brelse(dibh), dropping refcount
to 0
4. kswapd reclaims the page (~39ms later in the syzbot report)
5. iomap_write_end_inline() tries to memcpy() to iomap->inline_data
6. KASAN detects use-after-free write to freed memory
Fix by storing dibh in iomap->private and incrementing its refcount
with get_bh() in gfs2_iomap_begin(). The buffer is then properly
released in gfs2_iomap_end() after the inline write completes,
ensuring the page stays alive for the entire iomap operation.
Note: A C reproducer is not available for this issue. The fix is based
on analysis of the KASAN report and code review showing the buffer head
is freed before use.
[agruenba: Take buffer head reference in gfs2_iomap_begin() to avoid
leaks in gfs2_iomap_get() and gfs2_iomap_alloc().] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn
During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does
this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can't
assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is
reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It
does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking
the flags of the VMA.
Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe
hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another
mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is
also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.
Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.
Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping
mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write
lock in between and could have changed the VMA.
These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only
available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP
kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that
the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.
Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be
assumed to be on a shadow stack. While reorganizing the function, remove
the optimization to make the tricky code flows more common, such that
issues like this cannot escape detection for so long. |
| Inclusion of functionality from untrusted control sphere in Visual Studio Code allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0561, the Python omni-completion script in python3complete.vim for Vim with the +python3 interpreter enabled (and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim for builds with the +python interpreter) executes the import and from statements found in the current buffer through Python's import machinery. Because the buffer's working directory is on sys.path, opening a hostile .py file with a sibling Python package and invoking omni-completion runs that package's top-level code as the editing user. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0561. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE
The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with
page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that
rxe_set_page() is called with mr->page_size step increments, but the
page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing
PAGE_SIZE of memory.
ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i>=1 either
a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous
or
b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr->page_size aligned.
This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:
1) page_size < PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):
ibmr->iova = 0x181800
sg[0]: dma_addr=0x181800, len=0x800
sg[1]: dma_addr=0x173000, len=0x1000
Access iova = 0x181800 + 0x810 = 0x182010
Expected VA: 0x173010 (second SG, offset 0x10)
Before fix:
- index = (0x182010 >> 12) - (0x181800 >> 12) = 1
- page_offset = 0x182010 & 0xFFF = 0x10
- xarray[1] stores system page base 0x170000
- Resulting VA: 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)
2) page_size > PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 64K, system: 4K):
ibmr->iova = 0x18f800
sg[0]: dma_addr=0x18f800, len=0x800
sg[1]: dma_addr=0x170000, len=0x1000
Access iova = 0x18f800 + 0x810 = 0x190010
Expected VA: 0x170010 (second SG, offset 0x10)
Before fix:
- index = (0x190010 >> 16) - (0x18f800 >> 16) = 1
- page_offset = 0x190010 & 0xFFFF = 0x10
- xarray[1] stores system page for dma_addr 0x170000
- Resulting VA: system page of 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)
Yi Zhang reported a kernel panic[1] years ago related to this defect.
Solution:
1. Replace xarray with pre-allocated rxe_mr_page array for sequential
indexing (all MR page indices are contiguous)
2. Each rxe_mr_page stores both struct page* and offset within the
system page
3. Handle MR page_size != PAGE_SIZE relationships:
- page_size > PAGE_SIZE: Split MR pages into multiple system pages
- page_size <= PAGE_SIZE: Store offset within system page
4. Add boundary checks and compatibility validation
This ensures correct iova-to-va conversion regardless of MR page size
and system PAGE_SIZE relationship, while improving performance through
array-based sequential access.
Tests on 4K and 64K PAGE_SIZE hosts:
- rdma-core/pytests
$ ./build/bin/run_tests.py --dev eth0_rxe
- blktest:
$ TIMEOUT=30 QUICK_RUN=1 USE_RXE=1 NVMET_TRTYPES=rdma ./check nvme srp rnbd
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9XRqE25jyVw9rj9YugffLn5+f=1znaBEnu1usLOciD+g@mail.gmail.com/T/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: Only release RCU read lock after ct_ft
When looking up a flow table in act_ct in tcf_ct_flow_table_get(),
rhashtable_lookup_fast() internally opens and closes an RCU read critical
section before returning ct_ft.
The tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() can complete before refcount_inc_not_zero()
is invoked on the returned ct_ft resulting in a UAF on the already freed ct_ft
object. This vulnerability can lead to privilege escalation.
Analysis from zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com:
When initializing act_ct, tcf_ct_init() is called, which internally triggers
tcf_ct_flow_table_get().
static int tcf_ct_flow_table_get(struct net *net, struct tcf_ct_params *params)
{
struct zones_ht_key key = { .net = net, .zone = params->zone };
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
int err = -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&zones_mutex);
ct_ft = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&zones_ht, &key, zones_params); // [1]
if (ct_ft && refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref)) // [2]
goto out_unlock;
...
}
static __always_inline void *rhashtable_lookup_fast(
struct rhashtable *ht, const void *key,
const struct rhashtable_params params)
{
void *obj;
rcu_read_lock();
obj = rhashtable_lookup(ht, key, params);
rcu_read_unlock();
return obj;
}
At [1], rhashtable_lookup_fast() looks up and returns the corresponding ct_ft
from zones_ht . The lookup is performed within an RCU read critical section
through rcu_read_lock() / rcu_read_unlock(), which prevents the object from
being freed. However, at the point of function return, rcu_read_unlock() has
already been called, and there is nothing preventing ct_ft from being freed
before reaching refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct_ft->ref) at [2]. This interval becomes
the race window, during which ct_ft can be freed.
Free Process:
tcf_ct_flow_table_put() is executed through the path tcf_ct_cleanup() call_rcu()
tcf_ct_params_free_rcu() tcf_ct_params_free() tcf_ct_flow_table_put().
static void tcf_ct_flow_table_put(struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ct_ft->ref)) {
rhashtable_remove_fast(&zones_ht, &ct_ft->node, zones_params);
INIT_RCU_WORK(&ct_ft->rwork, tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work); // [3]
queue_rcu_work(act_ct_wq, &ct_ft->rwork);
}
}
At [3], tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() is scheduled as RCU work
static void tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tcf_ct_flow_table *ct_ft;
struct flow_block *block;
ct_ft = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), struct tcf_ct_flow_table,
rwork);
nf_flow_table_free(&ct_ft->nf_ft);
block = &ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block;
down_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&block->cb_list));
up_write(&ct_ft->nf_ft.flow_block_lock);
kfree(ct_ft); // [4]
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
}
tcf_ct_flow_table_cleanup_work() frees ct_ft at [4]. When this function executes
between [1] and [2], UAF occurs.
This race condition has a very short race window, making it generally
difficult to trigger. Therefore, to trigger the vulnerability an msleep(100) was
inserted after[1] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Reassign nested_mmus array behind mmu_lock
kvm->arch.nested_mmus[] is walked under kvm->mmu_lock, including from the
MMU notifier path (kvm_unmap_gfn_range() -> kvm_nested_s2_unmap()), which
can run at any time. kvm_vcpu_init_nested() reallocates the array and frees
the old buffer while holding only kvm->arch.config_lock, so such a walker
can reference the freed array.
Allocate the new array outside of mmu_lock, as the allocation can sleep.
Under the lock, copy the existing entries, fix up the back pointers and
reassign the array. Free the old buffer after dropping the lock, as
kvfree() can sleep as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/userq: fix access to stale wptr mapping
Use drm_exec to take both locks i.e vm root bo and
wptr_obj bo to access the mapping data properly.
This fixes the security issue of unmap the wptr_obj while
a queue creation is in progress and passing other
bo at same address.
(cherry picked from commit 1fc6c8ab45dbee096469c08c13f6099d57a52d6c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/zone_device: do not touch device folio after calling ->folio_free()
The contents of a device folio can immediately change after calling
->folio_free(), as the folio may be reallocated by a driver with a
different order. Instead of touching the folio again to extract the
pgmap, use the local stack variable when calling percpu_ref_put_many(). |
| Use after free in Cast in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.115 allowed an attacker on the local network segment to potentially perform a sandbox escape via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: High) |
