| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: fbcon: fix out-of-bounds read in err_out of fbcon_do_set_font()
When fbcon_do_set_font() fails (e.g., due to a memory allocation failure
inside vc_resize() under heavy memory pressure), it jumps to the `err_out`
label to roll back the console state. However, the current rollback logic
forgets to restore the `hi_font` state, leading to a severe state machine
corruption.
Earlier in the function, `set_vc_hi_font()` might be called to change
`vc->vc_hi_font_mask` and mutate the screen buffer. If `vc_resize()`
subsequently fails, the `err_out` path restores `vc_font.charcount`
but entirely skips rolling back the `vc_hi_font_mask` and the screen
buffer.
This mismatch leaves the terminal in a desynchronized state. Because
`vc_hi_font_mask` remains set, the VT subsystem will still accept
character indices greater than 255 from userspace and write them to the
screen buffer. Subsequent rendering calls (e.g., `fbcon_putcs()`) will
then use these inflated indices to access the reverted, 256-character
font array, leading to a deterministic out-of-bounds read and potential
kernel memory disclosure.
Fix this by adding the missing rollback logic for the `hi_font` mask
and screen buffer in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE
header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it
never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain
num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.
CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the
sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header,
so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero
sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for
i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local
comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid()
result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls
the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID
base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.
A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of
the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up
to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd
allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()
into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in
ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The
malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL
is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and
the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this
reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.
Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the
identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and
smb_inherit_dacl(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access
only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking
skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is
0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns
skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads
dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.
This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls
dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET
with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still
unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).
Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already
uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with
skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected;
valid ones are dumped as before.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
Call Trace:
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265) |
| The affected product is vulnerable to an Out-of-bounds read, which may allow an attacker to crash the parsing process and cause a denial of service. |
| GNU coreutils uniq is vulnerable to an out‑of‑bounds read due to incorrect handling of multibyte input when the -w (--check-chars) option is used. The find_field() function miscalculates the byte length of characters by repeatedly processing a fixed pointer instead of advancing through the input, resulting in an inflated length value.
This incorrect length is later used in a memcmp operation, causing reads beyond the allocated buffer when processing crafted multibyte input.
When running GNU coreutils uniq with attacker-provided arguments, this behavior leads to a crash and potential adjacent heap memory exposure.
This issue has been fixed in the commit d64e35a8a4c0e4608321433e0d84d917e4e36371. |
| Data::ReqRep::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated arena offset and length in reqrep_recv_locked.
The attach-time validator reqrep_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. reqrep_recv_locked does memcpy(copy_buf, req_arena + arena_off, len) with arena_off and len read raw from the mmap'd segment and never bounded against the arena capacity (req_arena_cap).
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a request slot's offset and length, so receiving the request copies a file-controlled offset and length out of the arena, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. |
| HTML::Bare versions through 0.04 for Perl have an unbounded character lookahead.
The parserc_parse function attempts to check for multicharacter strings such as "<![CDATA" or element terminators such as ">" without checking that the offsets are within the buffer.
Truncated strings such as "<a/" can trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Note that the latest version available on CPAN is version 0.02. Newer versions are available on the git repository. |
| XML::Bare versions through 0.53 for Perl have an unbounded character lookahead.
The parserc_parse function attempts to check for multicharacter strings such as "<![CDATA" or element terminators such as ">" without checking that the offsets are within the buffer.
Truncated strings such as "<a/" can trigger an out-of-bounds read. |
| rz-libdemangle is a Rizin library for demangling symbols. Prior to 6bf56d3, the Rust demangler in src/rust/rust_v0.c can perform an out-of-bounds read when the demangler structure is not yet initialized. This issue is fixed in commit 6bf56d3. |
| Data::SortedSet::Shared versions before 0.03 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via unvalidated node indices in the rank and min/max query paths.
The attach-time validator ss_validate_header bounds only the root index against the node pool (node_capacity). The order-statistics and min/max queries then follow children[], leftmost and rightmost node indices read raw from the mmap'd segment without bounding them against node_capacity. A full structural check (ss_validate_tree) exists but runs only via an explicit validate method, not on attach.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the tree links, so the next rank, min or max query dereferences an out-of-bounds node index, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. |
| Data::RadixTree::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via unvalidated node and arena indices in rdx_find_locked.
The attach-time validator rdx_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the node records it then trusts. rdx_find_locked indexes nodes[cur].children[k] and reads each node's label_off and label_len raw from the mmap'd segment, none bounded against the node count or the arena size.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the node records, so a lookup dereferences an out-of-bounds node or arena index, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. |
| Data::HashMap::Shared versions before 0.14 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated arena offset and length in shm_str_copy.
The attach-time validator shm_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. shm_str_copy does memcpy(dst, arena + off, len) with off and len read raw from the mmap'd segment and unbounded, on the each, keys, values, pop, shift, take, swap, drain and cursor paths. The get path bounds off and len separately and is not affected.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a record's offset and length, so iterating or draining the map copies a file-controlled offset and length out of the arena, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. |
| Data::RoaringBitmap::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated container offset and cardinality in rb_contains_locked.
The attach-time validator rb_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the bucket contents it then trusts. rb_contains_locked forms a container pointer as pool + container_off * 8192 from a raw file-stored offset and then searches over a file-stored cardinality, neither bounded against the container pool capacity or the fixed 8192-byte slot size.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a bucket, so the next membership query dereferences a file-controlled wild pointer and scans a file-controlled count, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process. |
| Data::Intern::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via unvalidated slot, reverse and arena indices in si_idx_find.
The attach-time validator si_validate_header is thorough about the header and layout (magic, version, section offsets, total_size, count and arena_used) but does not validate the three arrays it then trusts. Every lookup in si_idx_find walks a triple indirection read straight from the mmap'd segment, arena[reverse[slots[i].id]], with no bound on slots[i].id against count, on the reverse[id] arena offset against arena_used, or on the arena record's length prefix.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a slot id, a reverse offset or an arena length prefix, so an id_of, intern or string lookup dereferences the chain out of bounds; because string() returns a file-controlled length of bytes from the arena, adjacent process memory can be disclosed. |
| Data::SpatialHash::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow out-of-bounds reads and writes via unvalidated bucket, link and free-list indices in sph_walk_cell and sph_alloc_slot.
The attach-time validator sph_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. sph_walk_cell reads entries[buckets[b]] and follows each entry's next link raw, and sph_alloc_slot writes through a file-stored free_head index, none bounded against the entry count (max_entries).
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the bucket chain and free list, so a query reads through an out-of-bounds bucket and next index and an insert writes through an out-of-bounds free-list head, corrupting memory or crashing the process. |
| Data::DisjointSet::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl allow out-of-bounds reads and writes via an unvalidated parent index in dsu_find.
The attach-time validator dsu_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. dsu_find walks and path-compresses parent[x] with x a raw file-stored index never bounded against the node count, so both the read and the compression write-back land out of bounds.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning the parent array, so the next find or union both reads and writes through an out-of-bounds parent index, corrupting memory or crashing the process. |
| Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a parameter value overflows the message buffer. |
| A missing bounds check in the BSON CodeWScope element accessors allows an attacker to trigger an out-of-bounds heap read via a crafted aggregation pipeline. The vulnerability can be exploited by an authenticated user by generating a malformed BSONColumn data containing a CodeWScope element, bypassing wire-level BSON validation. When the forged element is decompressed, the unchecked size value is used in pointer arithmetic, causing either a server crash or disclosure of adjacent heap memory contents. |
| A flaw was found in gdk-pixbuf. When parsing a specially crafted ICO file with pixel values that exceed the defined palette range, an out-of-bounds read can occur due to improper bounds checking against the actual palette size. This vulnerability causes heap bytes to be interpreted as valid palette indices and rendered as RGB pixel values in the output image, allowing an attacker to extract heap content via the generated output, such as a thumbnail. |
| The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf->len (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf->len may exceed a command's len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf->len still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf->len guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf->len in both handlers. |
