| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Jenkins Favorite Plugin 2.1.4 and older does not perform permission checks when changing favorite status, allowing any user to set any other user's favorites |
| Jenkins Favorite Plugin version 2.2.0 and older is vulnerable to CSRF resulting in data modification |
| The SSH Plugin stores credentials which allow jobs to access remote servers via the SSH protocol. User passwords and passphrases for encrypted SSH keys are stored in plaintext in a configuration file. |
| The re-key admin monitor was introduced in Jenkins 1.498 and re-encrypted all secrets in JENKINS_HOME with a new key. It also created a backup directory with all old secrets, and the key used to encrypt them. These backups were world-readable and not removed afterwards. Jenkins now deletes the backup directory, if present. Upgrading from before 1.498 will no longer create a backup directory. Administrators relying on file access permissions in their manually created backups are advised to check them for the directory $JENKINS_HOME/jenkins.security.RekeySecretAdminMonitor/backups, and delete it if present. |
| Parameterized Trigger Plugin fails to check Item/Build permission: The Parameterized Trigger Plugin did not check the build authentication it was running as and allowed triggering any other project in Jenkins. |
| Subversion Plugin connects to a user-specified Subversion repository as part of form validation (e.g. to retrieve a list of tags). This functionality improperly checked permissions, allowing any user with Item/Build permission (but not Item/Configure) to connect to any web server or Subversion server and send credentials with a known ID, thereby possibly capturing them. Additionally, this functionality did not require POST requests be used, thereby allowing the above to be performed without direct access to Jenkins via Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks. |
| The Periodic Backup Plugin did not perform any permission checks, allowing any user with Overall/Read access to change its settings, trigger backups, restore backups, download backups, and also delete all previous backups via log rotation. Additionally, the plugin was not requiring requests to its API be sent via POST, thereby opening itself to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks. |
| GitHub Branch Source provides a list of applicable credential IDs to allow users configuring a job to select the one they'd like to use. This functionality did not check permissions, allowing any user with Overall/Read permission to get a list of valid credentials IDs. Those could be used as part of an attack to capture the credentials using another vulnerability. |
| Role-based Authorization Strategy Plugin was not requiring requests to its API be sent via POST, thereby opening itself to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks. This allowed attackers to add administrator role to any user, or to remove the authorization configuration, preventing legitimate access to Jenkins. |
| Git Plugin connects to a user-specified Git repository as part of form validation. An attacker with no direct access to Jenkins but able to guess at a username/password credentials ID could trick a developer with job configuration permissions into following a link with a maliciously crafted Jenkins URL which would result in the Jenkins Git client sending the username and password to an attacker-controlled server. |
| Poll SCM Plugin was not requiring requests to its API be sent via POST, thereby opening itself to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks. This allowed attackers to initiate polling of projects with a known name. While Jenkins in general does not consider polling to be a protection-worthy action as it's similar to cache invalidation, the plugin specifically adds a permission to be able to use this functionality, and this issue undermines that permission. |
| The default whitelist included the following unsafe entries: DefaultGroovyMethods.putAt(Object, String, Object); DefaultGroovyMethods.getAt(Object, String). These allowed circumventing many of the access restrictions implemented in the script sandbox by using e.g. currentBuild['rawBuild'] rather than currentBuild.rawBuild. Additionally, the following entries allowed accessing private data that would not be accessible otherwise due to script security: groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Closure); groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Object). |
| Arbitrary code execution due to incomplete sandbox protection: Constructors, instance variable initializers, and instance initializers in Pipeline scripts were not subject to sandbox protection, and could therefore execute arbitrary code. This could be exploited e.g. by regular Jenkins users with the permission to configure Pipelines in Jenkins, or by trusted committers to repositories containing Jenkinsfiles. |
| The Details view of some Static Analysis Utilities based plugins, was vulnerable to a persisted cross-site scripting vulnerability: Malicious users able to influence the input to these plugins, for example the console output which is parsed to extract build warnings (Warnings Plugin), could insert arbitrary HTML into this view. |
| The custom Details view of the Static Analysis Utilities based DRY Plugin, was vulnerable to a persisted cross-site scripting vulnerability: Malicious users able to influence the input to this plugin could insert arbitrary HTML into this view. |
| The optional Run/Artifacts permission can be enabled by setting a Java system property. Blue Ocean did not check this permission before providing access to archived artifacts, Item/Read permission was sufficient. |
| Script Security Plugin did not apply sandboxing restrictions to constructor invocations via positional arguments list, super constructor invocations, method references, and type coercion expressions. This could be used to invoke arbitrary constructors and methods, bypassing sandbox protection. |
| The Pipeline: Input Step Plugin by default allowed users with Item/Read access to a pipeline to interact with the step to provide input. This has been changed, and now requires users to have the Item/Build permission instead. |
| The custom Details view of the Static Analysis Utilities based OWASP Dependency-Check Plugin, was vulnerable to a persisted cross-site scripting vulnerability: Malicious users able to influence the input to this plugin could insert arbitrary HTML into this view. |
| The Deploy to container Plugin stored passwords unencrypted as part of its configuration. This allowed users with Jenkins master local file system access, or users with Extended Read access to the jobs it is used in, to retrieve those passwords. The Deploy to container Plugin now integrates with Credentials Plugin to store passwords securely, and automatically migrates existing passwords. |
