| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix memory leak in get_file_all_info()
In get_file_all_info(), if vfs_getattr() fails, the function returns
immediately without freeing the allocated filename, leading to a memory
leak.
Fix this by freeing the filename before returning in this error case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix memory and information leak in smb3_reconfigure()
In smb3_reconfigure(), if smb3_sync_session_ctx_passwords() fails, the
function returns immediately without freeing and erasing the newly
allocated new_password and new_password2. This causes both a memory leak
and a potential information leak.
Fix this by calling kfree_sensitive() on both password buffers before
returning in this error case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/poll: correctly handle io_poll_add() return value on update
When the core of io_uring was updated to handle completions
consistently and with fixed return codes, the POLL_REMOVE opcode
with updates got slightly broken. If a POLL_ADD is pending and
then POLL_REMOVE is used to update the events of that request, if that
update causes the POLL_ADD to now trigger, then that completion is lost
and a CQE is never posted.
Additionally, ensure that if an update does cause an existing POLL_ADD
to complete, that the completion value isn't always overwritten with
-ECANCELED. For that case, whatever io_poll_add() set the value to
should just be retained. |
| An out-of-bounds memory access flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s TUN/TAP device driver functionality in how a user generates a malicious (too big) networking packet when napi frags is enabled. This flaw allows a local user to crash or potentially escalate their privileges on the system. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: restore destructor on submit failure
handshake_req_submit() replaces sk->sk_destruct but never restores it when
submission fails before the request is hashed. handshake_sk_destruct() then
returns early and the original destructor never runs, leaking the socket.
Restore sk_destruct on the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd
'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode'
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conncount: fix leaked ct in error paths
There are some situations where ct might be leaked as error paths are
skipping the refcounted check and return immediately. In order to solve
it make sure that the check is always called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: phy: isp1301: fix non-OF device reference imbalance
A recent change fixing a device reference leak in a UDC driver
introduced a potential use-after-free in the non-OF case as the
isp1301_get_client() helper only increases the reference count for the
returned I2C device in the OF case.
Increment the reference count also for non-OF so that the caller can
decrement it unconditionally.
Note that this is inherently racy just as using the returned I2C device
is since nothing is preventing the PHY driver from being unbound while
in use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: defer interrupt enabling until NAPI registration
Currently, interrupts are automatically enabled immediately upon
request. This allows interrupt to fire before the associated NAPI
context is fully initialized and cause failures like below:
[ 0.946369] Call Trace:
[ 0.946369] <IRQ>
[ 0.946369] __napi_poll+0x2a/0x1e0
[ 0.946369] net_rx_action+0x2f9/0x3f0
[ 0.946369] handle_softirqs+0xd6/0x2c0
[ 0.946369] ? handle_edge_irq+0xc1/0x1b0
[ 0.946369] __irq_exit_rcu+0xc3/0xe0
[ 0.946369] common_interrupt+0x81/0xa0
[ 0.946369] </IRQ>
[ 0.946369] <TASK>
[ 0.946369] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[ 0.946369] RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10
Use the `IRQF_NO_AUTOEN` flag when requesting interrupts to prevent auto
enablement and explicitly enable the interrupt in NAPI initialization
path (and disable it during NAPI teardown).
This ensures that interrupt lifecycle is strictly coupled with
readiness of NAPI context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: always drop device refcount in ib_del_sub_device_and_put()
Since nldev_deldev() (introduced by commit 060c642b2ab8 ("RDMA/nldev: Add
support to add/delete a sub IB device through netlink") grabs a reference
using ib_device_get_by_index() before calling ib_del_sub_device_and_put(),
we need to drop that reference before returning -EOPNOTSUPP error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: mpsse: ensure worker is torn down
When an IRQ worker is running, unplugging the device would cause a
crash. The sealevel hardware this driver was written for was not
hotpluggable, so I never realized it.
This change uses a spinlock to protect a list of workers, which
it tears down on disconnect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix use-after-free warning in btrfs_get_or_create_delayed_node()
Previously, btrfs_get_or_create_delayed_node() set the delayed_node's
refcount before acquiring the root->delayed_nodes lock.
Commit e8513c012de7 ("btrfs: implement ref_tracker for delayed_nodes")
moved refcount_set inside the critical section, which means there is
no longer a memory barrier between setting the refcount and setting
btrfs_inode->delayed_node.
Without that barrier, the stores to node->refs and
btrfs_inode->delayed_node may become visible out of order. Another
thread can then read btrfs_inode->delayed_node and attempt to
increment a refcount that hasn't been set yet, leading to a
refcounting bug and a use-after-free warning.
The fix is to move refcount_set back to where it was to take
advantage of the implicit memory barrier provided by lock
acquisition.
Because the allocations now happen outside of the lock's critical
section, they can use GFP_NOFS instead of GFP_ATOMIC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible
Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in
nft_chain_validate():
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547]
[..]
RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables]
[..]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables]
[..]
Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting
from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths
(chain jumps). But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation.
Consider:
1 input -> j2 -> j3
2 input -> j2 -> j3
3 input -> j1 -> j2 -> j3
Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3,
because this was already checked during validation of the first rule.
We need to validate it only for rule 3.
This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed
the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump
might now exceed the allowed stack size. We also need to update all
reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth.
Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an
issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from
invalid base chains. For example, the masquerade expression can only be
called from NAT postrouting base chains.
Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type,
hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different
hook location. |
| Use after free in Aura in Google Chrome prior to 139.0.7258.127 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| IBM Security QRadar 3.12 EDR uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt sensitive credential information. |
| .NET Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7 could allow a local user to execute privileged commands due to the improper handling of permissions. |
| .NET, .NET Framework, and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix racy bitfield write in btrfs_clear_space_info_full()
From the memory-barriers.txt document regarding memory barrier ordering
guarantees:
(*) These guarantees do not apply to bitfields, because compilers often
generate code to modify these using non-atomic read-modify-write
sequences. Do not attempt to use bitfields to synchronize parallel
algorithms.
(*) Even in cases where bitfields are protected by locks, all fields
in a given bitfield must be protected by one lock. If two fields
in a given bitfield are protected by different locks, the compiler's
non-atomic read-modify-write sequences can cause an update to one
field to corrupt the value of an adjacent field.
btrfs_space_info has a bitfield sharing an underlying word consisting of
the fields full, chunk_alloc, and flush:
struct btrfs_space_info {
struct btrfs_fs_info * fs_info; /* 0 8 */
struct btrfs_space_info * parent; /* 8 8 */
...
int clamp; /* 172 4 */
unsigned int full:1; /* 176: 0 4 */
unsigned int chunk_alloc:1; /* 176: 1 4 */
unsigned int flush:1; /* 176: 2 4 */
...
Therefore, to be safe from parallel read-modify-writes losing a write to
one of the bitfield members protected by a lock, all writes to all the
bitfields must use the lock. They almost universally do, except for
btrfs_clear_space_info_full() which iterates over the space_infos and
writes out found->full = 0 without a lock.
Imagine that we have one thread completing a transaction in which we
finished deleting a block_group and are thus calling
btrfs_clear_space_info_full() while simultaneously the data reclaim
ticket infrastructure is running do_async_reclaim_data_space():
T1 T2
btrfs_commit_transaction
btrfs_clear_space_info_full
data_sinfo->full = 0
READ: full:0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:1
do_async_reclaim_data_space(data_sinfo)
spin_lock(&space_info->lock);
if(list_empty(tickets))
space_info->flush = 0;
READ: full: 0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:1
MOD/WRITE: full: 0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:0
spin_unlock(&space_info->lock);
return;
MOD/WRITE: full:0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:1
and now data_sinfo->flush is 1 but the reclaim worker has exited. This
breaks the invariant that flush is 0 iff there is no work queued or
running. Once this invariant is violated, future allocations that go
into __reserve_bytes() will add tickets to space_info->tickets but will
see space_info->flush is set to 1 and not queue the work. After this,
they will block forever on the resulting ticket, as it is now impossible
to kick the worker again.
I also confirmed by looking at the assembly of the affected kernel that
it is doing RMW operations. For example, to set the flush (3rd) bit to 0,
the assembly is:
andb $0xfb,0x60(%rbx)
and similarly for setting the full (1st) bit to 0:
andb $0xfe,-0x20(%rax)
So I think this is really a bug on practical systems. I have observed
a number of systems in this exact state, but am currently unable to
reproduce it.
Rather than leaving this footgun lying around for the future, take
advantage of the fact that there is room in the struct anyway, and that
it is already quite large and simply change the three bitfield members to
bools. This avoids writes to space_info->full having any effect on
---truncated--- |
