| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_hfsc: fix divide-by-zero in rtsc_min()
m2sm() converts a u32 slope to a u64 scaled value. For large inputs
(e.g. m1=4000000000), the result can reach 2^32. rtsc_min() stores
the difference of two such u64 values in a u32 variable `dsm` and
uses it as a divisor. When the difference is exactly 2^32 the
truncation yields zero, causing a divide-by-zero oops in the
concave-curve intersection path:
Oops: divide error: 0000
RIP: 0010:rtsc_min (net/sched/sch_hfsc.c:601)
Call Trace:
init_ed (net/sched/sch_hfsc.c:629)
hfsc_enqueue (net/sched/sch_hfsc.c:1569)
[...]
Widen `dsm` to u64 and replace do_div() with div64_u64() so the full
difference is preserved. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_flow: fix NULL pointer dereference on shared blocks
flow_change() calls tcf_block_q() and dereferences q->handle to derive
a default baseclass. Shared blocks leave block->q NULL, causing a NULL
deref when a flow filter without a fully qualified baseclass is created
on a shared block.
Check tcf_block_shared() before accessing block->q and return -EINVAL
for shared blocks. This avoids the null-deref shown below:
=======================================================================
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
RIP: 0010:flow_change (net/sched/cls_flow.c:508)
Call Trace:
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2432)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6980)
[...]
======================================================================= |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_fw: fix NULL pointer dereference on shared blocks
The old-method path in fw_classify() calls tcf_block_q() and
dereferences q->handle. Shared blocks leave block->q NULL, causing a
NULL deref when an empty cls_fw filter is attached to a shared block
and a packet with a nonzero major skb mark is classified.
Reject the configuration in fw_change() when the old method (no
TCA_OPTIONS) is used on a shared block, since fw_classify()'s
old-method path needs block->q which is NULL for shared blocks.
The fixed null-ptr-deref calling stack:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
RIP: 0010:fw_classify (net/sched/cls_fw.c:81)
Call Trace:
tcf_classify (./include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860)
tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4401)
__dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4535 net/core/dev.c:4790) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ipset: drop logically empty buckets in mtype_del
mtype_del() counts empty slots below n->pos in k, but it only drops the
bucket when both n->pos and k are zero. This misses buckets whose live
entries have all been removed while n->pos still points past deleted slots.
Treat a bucket as empty when all positions below n->pos are unused and
release it directly instead of shrinking it further. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: account for netlink header size
This is a followup to an old bug fix: NLMSG_DONE needs to account
for the netlink header size, not just the attribute size.
This can result in a WARN splat + drop of the netlink message,
but other than this there are no ill effects. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg
ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()`
(local DoS).
The core issue is a mismatch between:
- a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type
`__u16`) and
- a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`)
when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided.
- `include/net/ipv6.h`:
- `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible).
(lines 291-307, especially 298)
- `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`:
- Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen`
without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`:
- Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header
sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`:
- Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero.
(lines 1930-1934)
- `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`:
- Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the
pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)
1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator:
- `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`.
2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs
and increments `opt_flen` each time:
- In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`:
- It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);`
- It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922)
- Then it does:
- `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927)
- `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928)
There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy
`IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at
`net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`).
If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps
while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte)
destination-options header.
In the attached PoC (`poc.c`):
- 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048`
- 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8`
- Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8`
- The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header.
3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`:
- `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen +
opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`
With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate
what will be pushed later.
4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from
`dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`:
- `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);`
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes
`dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`.
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does:
- `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
- `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers
`skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`:
- `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`)
- `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`)
- The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target
netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`).
- Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user
namespaces.
- An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged
user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain
namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this).
- Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).
-
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: fix cache_request leak in cache_release
When a reader's file descriptor is closed while in the middle of reading
a cache_request (rp->offset != 0), cache_release() decrements the
request's readers count but never checks whether it should free the
request.
In cache_read(), when readers drops to 0 and CACHE_PENDING is clear, the
cache_request is removed from the queue and freed along with its buffer
and cache_head reference. cache_release() lacks this cleanup.
The only other path that frees requests with readers == 0 is
cache_dequeue(), but it runs only when CACHE_PENDING transitions from
set to clear. If that transition already happened while readers was
still non-zero, cache_dequeue() will have skipped the request, and no
subsequent call will clean it up.
Add the same cleanup logic from cache_read() to cache_release(): after
decrementing readers, check if it reached 0 with CACHE_PENDING clear,
and if so, dequeue and free the cache_request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization
Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in
nd_async_device_register().
Commit b6eae0f61db2 ("libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while
scheduling async init") correctly added a reference on the parent device
to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete. However, if
device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the
device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed. Thus
resulting in use after free.
The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix. Save a reference to the
parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the
outcome of device_add(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix OOM ->tfm_count leak
If memory allocation fails, decrement ->tfm_count to avoid blocking
future reads. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: Avoid boot crash in RedBoot partition table parser
Given CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y and a recent compiler,
commit 439a1bcac648 ("fortify: Use __builtin_dynamic_object_size() when
available") produces the warning below and an oops.
Searching for RedBoot partition table in 50000000.flash at offset 0x7e0000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1035 at 0xc029e04c, CPU#0: swapper/0/1
memcmp: detected buffer overflow: 15 byte read of buffer size 14
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 NONE
As Kees said, "'names' is pointing to the final 'namelen' many bytes
of the allocation ... 'namelen' could be basically any length at all.
This fortify warning looks legit to me -- this code used to be reading
beyond the end of the allocation."
Since the size of the dynamic allocation is calculated with strlen()
we can use strcmp() instead of memcmp() and remain within bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: fsl: qbman: fix race condition in qman_destroy_fq
When QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID is set, there's a race condition between
fq_table[fq->idx] state and freeing/allocating from the pool and
WARN_ON(fq_table[fq->idx]) in qman_create_fq() gets triggered.
Indeed, we can have:
Thread A Thread B
qman_destroy_fq() qman_create_fq()
qman_release_fqid()
qman_shutdown_fq()
gen_pool_free()
-- At this point, the fqid is available again --
qman_alloc_fqid()
-- so, we can get the just-freed fqid in thread B --
fq->fqid = fqid;
fq->idx = fqid * 2;
WARN_ON(fq_table[fq->idx]);
fq_table[fq->idx] = fq;
fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL;
And adding some logs between qman_release_fqid() and
fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL makes the WARN_ON() trigger a lot more.
To prevent that, ensure that fq_table[fq->idx] is set to NULL before
gen_pool_free() is called by using smp_wmb(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rose: fix NULL pointer dereference in rose_transmit_link on reconnect
syzkaller reported a bug [1], and the reproducer is available at [2].
ROSE sockets use four sk->sk_state values: TCP_CLOSE, TCP_LISTEN,
TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_ESTABLISHED. rose_connect() already rejects
calls for TCP_ESTABLISHED (-EISCONN) and TCP_CLOSE with SS_CONNECTING
(-ECONNREFUSED), but lacks a check for TCP_SYN_SENT.
When rose_connect() is called a second time while the first connection
attempt is still in progress (TCP_SYN_SENT), it overwrites
rose->neighbour via rose_get_neigh(). If that returns NULL, the socket
is left with rose->state == ROSE_STATE_1 but rose->neighbour == NULL.
When the socket is subsequently closed, rose_release() sees
ROSE_STATE_1 and calls rose_write_internal() ->
rose_transmit_link(skb, NULL), causing a NULL pointer dereference.
Per connect(2), a second connect() while a connection is already in
progress should return -EALREADY. Add this missing check for
TCP_SYN_SENT to complete the state validation in rose_connect().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d00f90e0af54102fb271
[2] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/9e6779e0d13e2c66779b1653fef80516 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: fix use-after-free in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() by reordering teardown
A potential race condition exists in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() where
hwc->caller_ctx is freed before the HWC's Completion Queue (CQ) and
Event Queue (EQ) are destroyed. This allows an in-flight CQ interrupt
handler to dereference freed memory, leading to a use-after-free or
NULL pointer dereference in mana_hwc_handle_resp().
mana_smc_teardown_hwc() signals the hardware to stop but does not
synchronize against IRQ handlers already executing on other CPUs. The
IRQ synchronization only happens in mana_hwc_destroy_cq() via
mana_gd_destroy_eq() -> mana_gd_deregister_irq(). Since this runs
after kfree(hwc->caller_ctx), a concurrent mana_hwc_rx_event_handler()
can dereference freed caller_ctx (and rxq->msg_buf) in
mana_hwc_handle_resp().
Fix this by reordering teardown to reverse-of-creation order: destroy
the TX/RX work queues and CQ/EQ before freeing hwc->caller_ctx. This
ensures all in-flight interrupt handlers complete before the memory they
access is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal
The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev->parent
pointer after the parent device has been freed:
/* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */
if (parent && !parent->power.ignore_children) {
spin_unlock(&dev->power.lock);
spin_lock(&parent->power.lock);
rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC);
spin_unlock(&parent->power.lock);
spin_lock(&dev->power.lock);
}
Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove().
Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint
sporadically:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081
Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310
print_report+0xfd/0x1d7
kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0
__kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60
lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230
lock_acquire+0x70/0x160
_raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50
rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0
rpm_idle+0x578/0x770
pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120
process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410
worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0
kthread+0x37b/0x480
ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Allocated by task 4314:
kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0
__kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990
scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod]
__scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod]
scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod]
scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod]
store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod]
dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
__x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810
do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Freed by task 4314:
kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40
kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80
kfree+0x225/0x6c0
scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod]
device_release+0xa3/0x220
kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
put_device+0x17/0x20
scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod]
device_release+0xa3/0x220
kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0
kobject_put+0x72/0xd0
put_device+0x17/0x20
scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod]
sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod]
dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80
sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670
vfs_write+0x506/0x1470
ksys_write+0xfd/0x230
__x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: kaweth: validate USB endpoints
The kaweth driver should validate that the device it is probing has the
proper number and types of USB endpoints it is expecting before it binds
to it. If a malicious device were to not have the same urbs the driver
will crash later on when it blindly accesses these endpoints. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message
When looking at the data in a USB urb, the actual_length is the size of
the buffer passed to the driver, not the transfer_buffer_length which is
set by the driver as the max size of the buffer.
When parsing the messages in ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() properly check
the size both at the beginning of parsing the message to make sure it is
big enough for the expected structure, and at the end of the message to
make sure we don't overflow past the end of the buffer for the next
message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix NULL pointer deref in ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu()
l3mdev_master_dev_rcu() can return NULL when the slave device is being
un-slaved from a VRF. All other callers deal with this, but we lost
the fallback to loopback in ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc() -> ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu()
with commit 4832c30d5458 ("net: ipv6: put host and anycast routes on
device with address").
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000108-0x000000000000010f]
RIP: 0010:ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc (net/ipv6/route.c:1418)
Call Trace:
ip6_pol_route (net/ipv6/route.c:2318)
fib6_rule_lookup (net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:115)
ip6_route_output_flags (net/ipv6/route.c:2607)
vrf_process_v6_outbound (drivers/net/vrf.c:437)
I was tempted to rework the un-slaving code to clear the flag first
and insert synchronize_rcu() before we remove the upper. But looks like
the explicit fallback to loopback_dev is an established pattern.
And I guess avoiding the synchronize_rcu() is nice, too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Don't log plaintext credentials in cifs_set_cifscreds
When debug logging is enabled, cifs_set_cifscreds() logs the key
payload and exposes the plaintext username and password. Remove the
debug log to avoid exposing credentials. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop
When a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device
(e.g., "ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies
it as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination
prefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback
nexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving
nhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this
nexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and
panics.
Simplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject
routes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback
promotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by
ip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave
as follows:
1. Explicit reject route ("ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64"):
RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init().
No behavior change.
2. Implicit loopback reject route ("ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo"):
RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is
called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject
afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is
harmless.
3. Standalone nexthop object ("ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"):
RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is
called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash
when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ucan: Fix infinite loop from zero-length messages
If a broken ucan device gets a message with the message length field set
to 0, then the driver will loop for forever in
ucan_read_bulk_callback(), hanging the system. If the length is 0, just
skip the message and go on to the next one.
This has been fixed in the kvaser_usb driver in the past in commit
0c73772cd2b8 ("can: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in
command parsers"), so there must be some broken devices out there like
this somewhere. |
