| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: bpf: Fix hid_bpf_get_data() range check
hid_bpf_get_data() returns a pointer into the HID-BPF context data when
the caller-provided offset and size fit inside ctx->allocated_size.
The current check adds rdwr_buf_size and offset before comparing the
result against ctx->allocated_size. Since both values are unsigned, a
very large size can wrap the sum below ctx->allocated_size and make the
helper return a pointer even though the requested range is not contained
in the backing buffer.
Use check_add_overflow() to reject wrapped range ends before comparing
the requested range end against ctx->allocated_size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: guard io_size EOF trim against concurrent truncate underflow
iomap: fix zero padding data issue in concurrent append writes
changed ioend accounting so that io_size tracks only valid data
within EOF. This trims io_size when a writeback range extends
past end_pos:
ioend->io_size += map_len;
if (ioend->io_offset + ioend->io_size > end_pos)
ioend->io_size = end_pos - ioend->io_offset;
However, if end_pos ends up below ioend->io_offset, the subtraction
becomes negative and is stored in size_t io_size, causing an unsigned
wrap to a huge value. This can happen when writeback continues past
byte-level EOF up to a block-aligned range, or when a concurrent
truncate shrinks the file after end_pos was sampled in
iomap_writeback_handle_eof().
A wrapped io_size can mislead append detection and corrupt
completion-time size handling, since filesystem end_io paths consume
io_size for decisions such as on-disk EOF updates and unwritten/COW
completion ranges.
Fix this by clamping io_size to zero when EOF has moved to or before
the ioend start offset. This preserves the original intent of trimming
io_size to valid in-EOF data while avoiding the underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload
before copying it to userspace.
The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds
check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so
the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared
against the response buffer length.
A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount
to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user()
then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer.
Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as
out of bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: fix integer underflow in jbd2_journal_initialize_fast_commit()
jbd2_journal_initialize_fast_commit() validates journal capacity by
checking (journal->j_last - num_fc_blks < JBD2_MIN_JOURNAL_BLOCKS).
Both j_last and num_fc_blks are unsigned, so when num_fc_blks exceeds
j_last the subtraction wraps to a large value, bypassing the bounds
check.
The resulting underflow corrupts j_last, j_fc_first, and j_free,
leading to journal abort.
Fix by checking num_fc_blks against j_last before the subtraction,
returning -EFSCORRUPTED. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV OOB check overflow
A TT unicast TVLV contains the number of VLANs stored in it. This number is
an u16 and gets multiplied by the size of the struct
batadv_tvlv_tt_vlan_data (8 bytes). The size can therefore overflow the u16
used to store the tt_vlan_len. All additional safety checks to prevent
out-of-bounds access of the TVLV buffer are invalid due to this overflow.
Using size_t prevents this overflow and ensures that the safety checks
compare against the actual buffer requirements. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: ti: icssg: guard PA stat lookups
icssg_ndo_get_stats64() unconditionally calls emac_get_stat_by_name()
with FW PA stat names regardless of whether the PA stats block is
present on the hardware. emac_get_stat_by_name() already guards the
PA stats lookup with `if (emac->prueth->pa_stats)`; when that pointer
is NULL the lookup falls through to netdev_err() and returns -EINVAL.
Because ndo_get_stats64 is polled regularly by the networking stack
this produces thousands of log entries of the form:
icssg-prueth icssg1-eth end0: Invalid stats FW_RX_ERROR
A secondary consequence is that the int(-EINVAL) return value is
implicitly widened to a near-ULLONG_MAX unsigned value when accumulated
into the __u64 fields of rtnl_link_stats64, silently corrupting the
rx_errors, rx_dropped and tx_dropped counters reported by `ip -s link`.
Every other PA-aware code path in the driver is already guarded with
the same `if (emac->prueth->pa_stats)` check. Apply the same guard
here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Reject firmware log with size smaller than header
fw_log_from_bo() validates the tracing buffer header_size and that the
log fits within the BO, but never checks that log->size is at least
log->header_size. fw_log_print_buffer() then computes:
u32 data_size = log->size - log->header_size;
which underflows to a near-U32_MAX value when firmware reports a log whose
size is smaller than its header. That huge data_size defeats the
log_start/log_end bounds clamps added by commit dd1311bcf0e6 ("accel/ivpu:
Add bounds checks for firmware log indices"), so fw_log_print_lines() reads
far past the small real data region of the BO. A size of 0 also makes
fw_log_from_bo() advance the offset by 0, causing the callers to loop
forever on the same header.
Reject logs whose size is smaller than the header (which also rejects
size == 0). |
| A flaw was found in open-iscsi. An integer underflow vulnerability in the `iscsiuio` component, specifically during IPv4 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) parsing, allows a remote attacker on the same local network segment to cause a denial of service. By sending a specially crafted IPv4/UDP DHCP reply, the attacker can trigger an out-of-bounds read, leading to the `iscsiuio` process crashing. This issue affects systems where `iscsiuio` is actively handling IPv4 DHCP traffic. |
| A flaw was found in GStreamer gst-plugins-good (avidemux). When parsing FUJIFILM metadata in an AVI strd chunk, gst_avi_demux_parse_strd() decrements a remaining-length counter by fixed offsets (98 and 10 bytes) without verifying sufficient data remains. For crafted strd payloads of exactly 106 or 107 bytes, the counter underflows to a very large unsigned value, causing subsequent null-terminated string scanning to read far beyond the allocated heap buffer. Date-format normalization may also write beyond the buffer end. Confirmed impacts include heap out-of-bounds read, out-of-bounds write, heap information disclosure (adjacent data appearing in parsed metadata), and application crash/denial of service. The avidemux element is auto-plugged by playbin, decodebin, and gst-discoverer, so opening or previewing a crafted AVI is sufficient to trigger the issue. Fixed upstream in gst-plugins-good 1.28.6 (GStreamer-SA-2026-0072). |
| Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. In versions 3.1.19 through 4.4.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in the copydir() function of Netatalk's afpd daemon due to an integer underflow in the calculation of the remaining buffer size used for path construction. copydir() is a utility function called when a file operation crosses a device boundary inside an AFP shared volume, which the standard library's renameat() cannot handle. The function attempts to track available buffer space using srem and drem for source and destination paths. Incorrect arithmetic causes both srem and drem to underflow to SIZE_MAX. Consequently, boundary checks against strlen(de->d_name) always pass, allowing strcpy() to append filenames into nearly full stack buffers. Version 4.4.3 patches the issue. As a workaround, configure each AFP shared volume to be structured as a single file system, in other words no subdirectory of a shared volume should be a mount point for a different file system. |
| Capstone is a disassembly framework. Prior to version 6.0.0-Alpha9, Capstone's public `cs_insn_name()` API forwards caller-supplied instruction IDs directly to the selected architecture backend. Most backends validate the ID before indexing instruction-name tables, but the M68K and RISCV backends have missing or incomplete bounds checks. On a Capstone handle opened for M68K or RISCV, a caller-controlled invalid instruction ID can trigger an out-of-bounds read and crash the process. The demonstrated impact is availability loss in applications or bindings that expose instruction-name lookup to untrusted IDs. No code execution or data disclosure was demonstrated. Version 6.0.0-Alpha9 patches the issue. |
| Capstone is a disassembly framework. Prior to version 6.0.0-Alpha9, Capstone's WebAssembly backend accepts attacker-controlled raw WASM instruction bytes through the public `cs_disasm()` and `cs_disasm_iter()` APIs. For a large but well-formed `br_table` instruction, the WASM decoder accumulates the immediate length in a wider local variable but returns it through a `uint16_t` instruction-size path. When the encoded instruction length is exactly 65,536 bytes, the size wraps to zero and `cs_disasm()` can repeatedly decode the same instruction without advancing. For larger lengths, `cs_disasm_iter()` advances into the middle of the `br_table` payload and decodes target bytes as subsequent instructions. This is an availability and parser-integrity issue. Version 6.0.0-Alpha9 patches the issue. |
| OpenZeppelin Confidential Contracts is an experimental library for developing applications on the Zama fhEVM. Prior to 0.3.1, the ERC7984 contract tracked confidential total supply with an euint64 value, and an overflowing internal _mint operation could fail silently. The wrap and onTransferReceived functions in contracts/token/ERC7984/extensions/ERC7984ERC20Wrapper.sol did not handle that failure, so a user could transfer the underlying token without receiving the corresponding confidential wrapped token. With the default rate(), the wrapper fills after approximately 18.4 trillion tokens, and subsequent wrapping requests can cause loss of funds. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.1. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Reliable Multicast Transport Driver (RMCAST) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over an adjacent network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Storage Port Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| llama.cpp builds b1886 through b7445 contain an integer overflow vulnerability in the LLaMA-Android JNI wrapper where the new_1batch() function multiplies sizeof(llama_seq_id) by an attacker-controlled n_seq_max parameter without overflow validation, causing heap buffer allocation to wrap and allocate insufficient memory. Attackers can exploit this by providing a crafted n_seq_max value through a malicious model file or JNI call to trigger heap corruption and achieve denial of service or arbitrary code execution on Android applications using the LLaMA-Android binding. |
| TimescaleDB through 2.29.1, fixed in commit 517c13e, contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the Gorilla compression reverse row iterator that allows authenticated attackers to cause a denial of service by storing a crafted compressed datum with an internally inconsistent BitArray. Attackers with DML access to a compressed hypertable can trigger an unsigned integer wraparound in the reverse iterator bucket index computation, causing a read beyond the end of the bucket array, resulting in a SIGSEGV crash that can be repeatedly triggered on each subsequent reverse-order scan. |
| FFmpeg versions from 0.5 up to, but not including, 9.0 contain a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the DVB subtitle parser in libavcodec/dvbsub_parser.c that allows attackers to trigger a heap buffer overflow by supplying a crafted WTV file. The overflow causes the bounds-check guard expression to wrap to INT_MIN, bypassing the PARSE_BUF_SIZE comparison and invoking memcpy() with attacker-controlled data into a heap buffer, resulting in an out-of-bounds heap write and potential memory corruption or code execution. |
