| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: aiu: Validate written enum values
The AIU HDMI and internal codec mux put callbacks use the written enum
value with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() before checking whether the value is
valid for the enumeration.
Reject out-of-range values before converting the enum item, matching the
validation already done by the G12A HDMI and internal codec mux controls. |
| A flaw was found in Undertow, an HTTP server, within its HTTP response header writing path. The `writeString()` method performs a silent narrowing cast from 16-bit Unicode characters to 8-bit bytes when writing HTTP response header values. A remote attacker can exploit this by supplying specific Unicode characters in user-controlled input that an application places into response headers. This can lead to the truncation of these characters into ASCII control characters or special symbols, potentially resulting in limited integrity impact or information disclosure if the application does not properly sanitize user input. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
MIPS: DEC: Ensure 32-bit stack location for o32 prom_printf()
In 64-bit configurations calling any firmware entry points from a kernel
thread other than the initial one will result in a situation where the
stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment.
Consequently the stack pointer is no longer a 32-bit value and when the
32-bit firmware code called uses 32-bit ALU operations to manipulate the
stack pointer, the calculated result is incorrect (in fact in the 64-bit
MIPS ISA almost all 32-bit ALU operations will produce an unpredictable
result when executed on 64-bit data) and control goes astray.
This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the
configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used
late into bootstrap, or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs
driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console
handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been
started, and the kernel will hang at:
pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
or somewhat later, but always before:
cblist_init_generic: Setting adjustable number of callback queues.
has been printed.
It seems that only the prom_printf() entry point is affected. Of all
the other entry points wired only rex_slot_address() and rex_gettcinfo()
are called from a kernel thread other than the initial one, specifically
kernel_init(), and they are leaf functions that do no business with the
stack, having worked with no issue ever since 64-bit support was added
for the platform back in 2002.
To address this issue then, arrange for the stack to be switched in the
o32 wrapper as required for prom_printf() only, by supplying call_o32()
with a pointer to a chunk of initdata space, which is placed in the
CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that prom_printf() is
only called from console output handler and therefore with the console
lock held, implying no need for this code to be reentrant.
Other firmware entry points may be called with interrupts enabled and no
lock held, and may therefore require that call_o32() be reentrant. They
trigger no issue at this point and "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," so
just leave them alone. |
| As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco IOS XE Software engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in software hardening releases that address multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-20270 are related to incorrect calculation issues that are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Pillar CWE-682. |
| llama.cpp builds b1283 through b9058 contain an integer overflow vulnerability in the llama_batch_init() function where unchecked multiplications in malloc() calls can wrap past INT32_MAX when computing allocation sizes. Attackers can pass specially crafted parameters to trigger integer overflow, causing heap corruption and potentially achieving arbitrary code execution through subsequent batch operations that write past allocated buffer boundaries. |
| Ledger Bitcoin app versions 2.1.0 and 2.1.1 contain an address derivation vulnerability that allows attackers to cause incorrect Bitcoin addresses to be displayed by exploiting improper handling of miniscript policies containing the a: fragment. Attackers can craft malicious miniscript policies that cause the device to derive and display incorrect receiving addresses, potentially leading to funds being sent to unintended addresses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: BPF: Zero-extend signed ALU32 div/mod results
ALU32 operations write a 32-bit result and leave the upper 32 bits of
the BPF register zero. The LoongArch JIT sign-extends the result of
signed ALU32 BPF_DIV and BPF_MOD (off=1), so a negative 32-bit quotient
or remainder leaves bits 63:32 set in JITted code while the verifier
and interpreter model those bits as zero.
Keep sign-extension on the operands, which signed divide needs, and
zero-extend the ALU32 result after the divide or modulo instruction,
matching the unsigned ALU32 div/mod paths and every other ALU32
operation in this JIT. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Fix address space mismatch in kexec command line lookup
When searching the loaded segments for the "kexec" command line marker,
the kexec_load(2) path (file_mode == 0) passes the user-space segment
buffer straight to strncmp() through a bogus (char __user *) cast. This
dereferences a user pointer in kernel context, which is wrong and is
flagged by sparse:
arch/loongarch/kernel/machine_kexec.c:84:51: sparse: incorrect type in
argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const * @@ got
char [noderef] __user *
Here copy the marker-sized prefix of each segment into a small on-stack
buffer with copy_from_user() before comparing, and skip segments that
fault. The subsequent copy_from_user() that stages the full command line
into the safe area is left unchanged. |
| Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Samsung Open Source rlottie allows Overflow Buffers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: fix incorrect inheritable capability in CAPSET records
__audit_log_capset() records the effective capability set into the
inheritable field due to a copy-paste error. Every CAPSET audit
record therefore reports cap_pi (process inheritable) with the value
of cap_effective instead of cap_inheritable.
This silently corrupts audit data used for compliance and forensic
analysis: an attacker who modifies inheritable capabilities to
prepare for a privilege-escalating exec would have the change masked
in the audit trail.
The bug has been present since the original introduction of CAPSET
audit records in 2008. |
| A vulnerability in the hardware-based SSL/TLS cryptography functionality of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software for Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Appliances could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.
This vulnerability is due to an implementation error within the cryptographic functions for SSL/TLS traffic processing when they are offloaded to the hardware. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted stream of SSL/TLS traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an unexpected error in the hardware-based cryptography engine, which could cause the device to reload. |
| A type mismatch vulnerability was found in QEMU's vhost inflight migration VMState handling. The destination buffer size is stored as a uint64_t but read by the VMS_VBUFFER load path as a signed int32_t. On little-endian hosts, a crafted incoming migration state with bit 31 set causes the value to be interpreted as negative and then implicitly converted to a very large size_t, leading qemu_get_buffer() to copy migration-stream data beyond the bounds of the mmap-backed inflight region.
This can result in a crash of the QEMU process or memory corruption. Exploitation requires control of the migration producer or write access to the migration channel, combined with a destination configured to use vhost inflight migration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix integer overflow in tipc_recvmsg() and tipc_recvstream()
In tipc_recvmsg(), the copy length is computed as:
copy = min_t(int, dlen - offset, buflen);
buflen is size_t but min_t(int, ...) casts it to int. When buflen
exceeds INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF via io_uring provided buffers), it
wraps negative, wins the comparison, and the negative copy length
propagates to simple_copy_to_iter() where int-to-size_t promotion
makes it SIZE_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON. tipc_recvstream() has the
same pattern.
Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...
RIP: 0010:simple_copy_to_iter+0x9e/0xd0 (net/core/datagram.c:521)
Call Trace:
__skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0x8b0 (net/core/datagram.c:402)
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x77/0x1a0 (net/core/datagram.c:534)
tipc_recvmsg+0x3d7/0xe80 (net/tipc/socket.c:1934)
io_recvmsg+0x47e/0xda0
Fix by changing min_t(int, ...) to min_t(size_t, ...) in both
functions. The result is always <= (dlen - offset), which is bounded
by TIPC maximum message size (0x1ffff bytes), so the implicit
narrowing on assignment to int copy is always safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_digest_pe_contents
pefile_digest_pe_contents() computes the trailing-data hash length as
pelen - (hashed_bytes + certs_size). A crafted PE can make the addition
exceed pelen, causing the unsigned subtraction to underflow to ~4 GiB.
This is passed to crypto_shash_update() which reads out of bounds and
panics on unmapped vmalloc guard pages.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900038d8000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:sha256_blocks_generic (lib/crypto/sha256.c:152)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sha256_update (lib/crypto/sha256.c:208)
crypto_sha256_update (crypto/sha256.c:142)
verify_pefile_signature (crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:436)
kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig (kernel/kexec_file.c:151)
__do_sys_kexec_file_load (kernel/kexec_file.c:406)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Validate that the addition does not overflow and the result does not
exceed pelen before the subtraction. Return -ELIBBAD on failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Fix SPSR_EL2 restore in kvm_hyp_handle_mops()
kvm_hyp_handle_mops() resets the single-step state machine as part of
rewinding state for a MOPS exception by modifying vcpu_cpsr() and
writing the result directly into hardware.
In the case of nested virtualization, vcpu_cpsr() is a synthetic value
such that the rest of KVM can deal with vEL2 cleanly. That means the
value requires translation before being written into hardware, which is
unfortunately missing from the MOPS handler.
Fix it by directly modifying SPSR_EL2 and avoiding the synthetic state
altogether, which will be resynchronized on the next 'full' exit back
to KVM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: sync_linked_regs() must preserve subreg_def
Range propagation must not affect subreg_def marks, otherwise the
following example is rewritten by verifier incorrectly when
BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 flag is set:
0: call bpf_ktime_get_ns call bpf_ktime_get_ns
1: r0 &= 0x7fffffff after verifier r0 &= 0x7fffffff
2: w1 = w0 rewrites w1 = w0
3: if w0 < 10 goto +0 --------------> r11 = 0x2f5674a6 (r)
4: r1 >>= 32 r11 <<= 32 (r)
5: r0 = r1 r1 |= r11 (r)
6: exit; if w0 < 0xa goto pc+0
r1 >>= 32
r0 = r1
exit
(or zero extension of w1 at (2) is missing for architectures that
require zero extension for upper register half).
The following happens w/o this patch:
- r0 is marked as not a subreg at (0);
- w1 is marked as subreg at (2);
- w1 subreg_def is overridden at (3) by copy_register_state();
- w1 is read at (5) but mark_insn_zext() does not mark (2)
for zero extension, because w1 subreg_def is not set;
- because of BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 flag verifier inserts random
value for hi32 bits of (2) (marked (r));
- this random value is read at (5). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, lsm: Add check for BPF LSM return value
A bpf prog returning a positive number attached to file_alloc_security
hook makes kernel panic.
This happens because file system can not filter out the positive number
returned by the LSM prog using IS_ERR, and misinterprets this positive
number as a file pointer.
Given that hook file_alloc_security never returned positive number
before the introduction of BPF LSM, and other BPF LSM hooks may
encounter similar issues, this patch adds LSM return value check
in verifier, to ensure no unexpected value is returned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fix trampoline for BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG
When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, the trampoline calls
__bpf_tramp_enter() and __bpf_tramp_exit() functions, passing them
the struct bpf_tramp_image *im pointer as an argument in R0.
The trampoline generation code uses emit_addr_mov_i64() to emit
instructions for moving the bpf_tramp_image address into R0, but
emit_addr_mov_i64() assumes the address to be in the vmalloc() space
and uses only 48 bits. Because bpf_tramp_image is allocated using
kzalloc(), its address can use more than 48-bits, in this case the
trampoline will pass an invalid address to __bpf_tramp_enter/exit()
causing a kernel crash.
Fix this by using emit_a64_mov_i64() in place of emit_addr_mov_i64()
as it can work with addresses that are greater than 48-bits. |
| The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array.
The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion.
The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window. |
| GoAccess is a real-time web log analyzer and interactive viewer that runs in a terminal in *nix systems or through the browser. Prior to version 1.11, the built-in WebSocket server narrows a 64-bit extended frame length into the signed 32-bit WSFrame.payloadlen field before enforcing the maximum frame size, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to bypass the guard and force an approximately 18-exabyte allocation request that terminates the process. This issue is fixed in version 1.11. |