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Search Results (395032 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90033 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_us122l_output() The snd_usbmidi_us122l_output() picks a count of 2 on anything slower than high speed and never relates it to ep->max_transfer. The URB buffer holds exactly max_transfer bytes, so a device declaring a one byte bulk endpoint takes two bytes from snd_rawmidi_transmit(), and the memset that pads the rest computes 1 - 2 in int and wraps to SIZE_MAX. Only 0x800e and 0x800f are pinned to nine bytes. The US-122MKII at 0x0644:0x8021 falls to the default and takes usb_maxpacket(), which the USB core only clamps downward. The akai and novation output ops in this file were given the same guard recently. Do the same here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90031 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb-storage: ene_ub6250: fix race between scan work and probe ene_ub6250_probe() calls usb_stor_probe2(), which starts the usb-storage infrastructure and schedules the delayed scan work. The driver then calls ene_get_card_type(), which sends an ENE command through ene_send_scsi_cmd() and the usb-storage bulk transfer helpers. Both the delayed scan work, through usb_stor_Bulk_max_lun(), and ene_get_card_type() use us->current_urb. The scan work serializes this access with us->dev_mutex, but the ENE card-type probe does not. If the scan work runs while ene_get_card_type() is still using us->current_urb, usb_submit_urb() warns that the URB is already active. Serialize ene_get_card_type() with us->dev_mutex, matching the locking used by the scan path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90028 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: hd3ss3220: track VBUS enable state per consumer regulator_is_enabled() reports the aggregate regulator state, not whether this consumer holds an enable reference. If another consumer enables VBUS first, the driver can skip its own regulator_enable() call and later attempt to drop a reference it never acquired, triggering an unbalanced regulator disable warning. Track successful enable and disable calls locally. Keep the state unchanged when an operation fails so a later role or ID notification retries the operation while this consumer keeps balanced references. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90023 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: fix null pointer dereference in fsg_common_set_num_buffers() Previously fsg_num_buffers_validate() was removed as it was not necessary due to Kconfig setting the limits for n from 2 to 256 with default as 2. However, setting the page content in such a way that kstrtou8() reflects n value as either 0 or 1 bypasses these restrictions leading to a null pointer dereference if n is 0. Fix this by adding a check for n < 2 and returning -EINVAL if n is either 0 or 1 consistent with Kconfig logic. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90020 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: gadget: fix NULL pointer dereference in gadget_dev_ioctl() gadget_dev_ioctl() reads dev->gadget before acquiring dev->lock, but dev->state is checked after acquiring the lock. Therefore a concurrent bind can change the device state between these operations, which can leave ioctl with a stale NULL gadget pointer and causing a NULL pointer dereference at gadget->ops->ioctl. Read dev->gadget while holding dev->lock so that the gadget pointer and device state are sampled consistently. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90019 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: fix null pointer dereference in usb_put_function_instance() usb_put_function_instance() attempts to dereference fd inside fi struct to get mod in uvc_alloc_inst() error path. However, fd is not allocated until later in try_get_usb_function_instance() after allocating fi in uvc_alloc_inst() and thus guranteed to be null in error path. Fix this by adding a null check for fi->fd that returns if fd is null. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90015 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB's buffer. The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped. The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce. Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each. At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted: device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted A reproducer running this under qemu is available at https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity The bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs) already lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track. Keep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on completion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping every segment that still has a pending bounce. Stopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce implies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is always strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started in end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign bounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk correct if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg. [mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.] | ||||
| CVE-2026-90004 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: handle region split failure in apply_min_nr_regions() damon_apply_min_nr_regions() repeatedly split each region until its size becomes small enough to meet the user-defined low limit of the number of regions. The loop assumes the split operation (damon_split_region_at()) will always succeed and create the new region. But the operation could silently fail for memory allocation failures, for example. If such failure happens and the region was the last region, the linked list-based next region fetching returns invalid pointer. As a result, invalid memory dereference and corruption could happen. Even if the corner case is handled, it imposes stress to the allocator by trying split regions for other targets. Fix the issue by breaking all the loops for any region split failure. This means there could be a min_nr_regions violation. It will only rarely happen since the allocation is arguably too small to fail. Even if it happens, it is only temporal. damon_apply_min_nr_regions() will be called again after the aggregation interval. The user impact of the issue should be minor, since the allocation is arguably too small to fail. But, it could still theoretically happen, and the consequence is very bad. This issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89993 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: dw-edma: Initialize IRQ data before requesting IRQs dw_edma_irq_request() passes struct dw_edma_irq to request_irq() before dw_edma_channel_setup() fills the back pointer. A shared interrupt can therefore enter the handler with dw_irq->dw still NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference. Set the back pointer before installing each handler. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89989 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: Check for ERR_PTR from dentry_path() in validate_hash_algo() dentry_path() returns ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG) when the path exceeds the buffer. validate_hash_algo() passes the result straight to integrity_audit_msg() without checking. ERR_PTR is not NULL, so integrity_audit_message() sees a valid pointer and calls strlen() on it, which faults: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffdc RIP: 0010:strlen+0x30/0xa0 Call Trace: audit_log_untrustedstring+0x19/0x30 integrity_audit_message+0x366/0x4f0 ima_inode_setxattr+0x512/0x5f0 Check for IS_ERR() and use NULL instead, which makes the audit message skip the name= field instead of crashing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89987 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: transfer the pmd dirty bit to the folio on zap zap_huge_pmd_folio() propagates the pmd young bit to the folio for the file case, but not the dirty bit. The pte path does propagate it, in zap_present_folio_ptes() and so does the pmd split path, in __split_huge_pmd_locked(). For most file mappings the omission is harmless, because writing to a shared file mapping goes through page_mkwrite(), which dirties the folio. tmpfs is different: it has no page_mkwrite(), and vma_wants_writenotify() is false for it, so a *read* fault on a MAP_SHARED tmpfs mapping installs a writable pmd via do_read_fault(). do_read_fault() does not call fault_dirty_shared_page(), so subsequent stores through that mapping set only the hardware dirty bit in the pmd and never call folio_mark_dirty(). A shmem folio allocated by a fault is marked uptodate but not dirty (see the clear: block in shmem_get_folio_gfp()), so PG_dirty is never set at all. Unmapping such a folio - munmap(), or exit_mmap() when the process dies - then loses the only record that it was written, because zap_huge_pmd() drops the pmd without transferring the dirty bit. Reclaim afterwards sees a clean shmem folio: the whole swap-out block in shrink_folio_list() is inside "if (folio_test_dirty(folio))", so pageout() is skipped and the folio falls into __remove_mapping(). There, folio_is_file_lru() is false for a swapbacked folio, so no shadow entry is created and __filemap_remove_folio(folio, NULL) simply empties the i_pages slot. The data is freed without ever being written to swap, and the next fault on that index returns a freshly zeroed folio. This is silent data loss for any process that keeps state in a MAP_SHARED tmpfs segment across an unmap - for example a cache handed from one process generation to the next through /dev/shm. It requires the folio to be PMD-mapped, so it only shows up once shmem THP is enabled (which is what we did in Meta fleet and started noticing crashes); with THP off the pte path transfers the dirty bit correctly. It also only becomes visible when swap is enabled, because with no swap device shmem folios (which are on the anon LRU) are not scanned by reclaim at all, so the clean folio is never dropped. Reproduced on x86_64 with a tmpfs mounted huge=within_size: read-fault a 2MB-backed region, write a known pattern through the resulting mapping, munmap, force reclaim of the cgroup, then re-map and read back. Without this patch the region reads back as zeros and vmstat shows zswpout 0 - the data was discarded rather than swapped. With this patch the region reads back correctly and the pages are swapped out as expected. With huge=never, or when the first touch is a write, the test passes either way. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89984 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack Before Arch LBR gained CPL filtering support, a user-only branch stack could still contain kernel addresses. As a result, kernel branch records may be exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. For example, on Intel Tiger Lake, the following command can still report SYSRET/ERET entries with kernel-space from addresses: $ ./perf record -e cycles:p -o - --branch-filter any,save_type,u -- \ ./perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ ./perf script -i - --fields brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' Total time: 0.000 [sec] 0.219000 usecs/op 4,566,210 ops/sec [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.551 MB - ] 0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d647/P/-/-/16959/SYSRET/- 0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d5c2/P/-/-/17535/SYSRET/- 0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a2861000/P/-/-/6719/ERET/- 0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a297a000/P/-/-/8575/ERET/- The problem is that intel_pmu_lbr_filter() does not fully validate the privilege level of sampled entries. It filters some mismatches based on the branch type and the to address, but it does not reject entries whose from address violates the requested branch privilege filter. Fix this by extending software filtering to validate both from and to addresses against br_sel. Any LBR entry contains kernel address does not match the requested user filter is dropped. This prevents kernel addresses from appearing in user-only branch stacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89982 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: mux: Fix channel node leak on adapter add failure i2c_mux_add_adapter() takes a reference to the Device Tree channel node before registering the new adapter. If adapter registration fails, the error path frees the private data without dropping that reference. Release the channel node before freeing the private data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89981 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: Don't read GMID_EL1 when MTE is disabled __cpuinfo_store_cpu() gates the GMID_EL1 read on the raw ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, so it reads the register even when the kernel has disabled MTE (CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=n or arm64.nomte). KVM sets HCR_EL2.TID5 in that case, and pKVM injects an UNDEF the host cannot handle: Internal error: Oops - Undefined instruction: 0000000002000000 [#1] SMP pc : __cpuinfo_store_cpu+0xf4/0x264 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! Only pKVM reaches it, and only after a CPU is offlined and brought back online: its CPU_ON relay sets the host HCR before the CPU enters EL1, while plain nVHE sets it at CPUHP_AP_KVM_ONLINE. Gate the read on the CPU's own ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 with the command-line override applied, and on CONFIG_ARM64_MTE, which no register reflects. The boot CPU stores its registers before init_cpu_features() strips an unsafe override, so clamp against the hardware value here too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89978 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: return early from a zero-length flush SYNC_BO does not constrain its size, so a request for zero bytes reaches drm_clflush_virt_range(), which ends with an unconditional clflushopt(end - 1). For an empty range that is the byte before the mapping, and abo->mem.kva comes from vmap(), so the access lands in the guard page below the vmalloc area and faults: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd16fbbc70fff #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 1000 Comm: sync_bo_probe RIP: 0010:drm_clflush_virt_range+0x3c/0x70 Call Trace: amdxdna_drm_sync_bo_ioctl+0x124/0x430 [amdxdna] drm_ioctl+0x301/0x4c0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x115/0x2f0 do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x3d0 Any process that can open the render node can do this. Reproduced 3 of 3 times on a Strix Point NPU (1022:17f0), by calling SYNC_BO with size 0 on an AMDXDNA_BO_SHARE object. The import arm takes the same request but flushes the whole scatterlist, so it survives it. Nothing needs flushing for an empty range, so answer before choosing a path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89976 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ethosu: fix job completion fence cleanup ethosu_ioctl_submit_job() allocates done_fence before validating buffer handles. Errors after allocation call ethosu_job_err_cleanup(), which frees the job but leaks the uninitialized fence. A scheduler dependency error also lets ethosu_job_run() return before dma_fence_init(). Normal cleanup then passes a zeroed refcount to dma_fence_put(). Release done_fence in the common cleanup path and use dma_fence_was_initialized() to distinguish initialized fences from raw allocations. [robh: also fix goto] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89975 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-fabrics: fix DHCHAP secret leak on parse failure nvmf_parse_options() duplicates dhchap_secret and dhchap_ctrl_secret with match_strdup() before validating the DHHC-1: representation. If validation fails, the parser returns -EINVAL before the temporary string in p is assigned to opts->dhchap_secret or opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret. nvmf_create_ctrl() subsequently frees opts, but nvmf_free_options() cannot release the unassigned temporary string. Each rejected option therefore leaks one allocation. This is easy to miss because valid secrets transfer ownership to opts and are freed normally, while the malformed-secret path still returns the expected -EINVAL to userspace. With CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH enabled, the leak is reachable before the required-option checks and transport lookup. No NVMe-oF target or working transport connection is required; for example, repeatedly writing dhchap_secret=BAD or dhchap_ctrl_secret=BAD to /dev/nvme-fabrics deterministically takes the leaking parse path. Free the temporary string before leaving both validation error paths. Use kfree_sensitive() because the copied option may contain secret material even when its representation is rejected, matching the sensitive cleanup used for stored DHCHAP secrets. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89966 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb_cma: fix null nodemask dereference in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio_with_mpol() can pass a NULL nodemask to alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio() as a fallback to allocate from all nodes. If order is gigantic, alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio() propagates the NULL nodemask down to hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() via alloc_gigantic_frozen_folio(). Additionally, hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() previously attempted allocation on hugetlb_cma[nid] without verifying if nid is included in the caller's nodemask. Adding a node_isset(nid, *nodemask) check ensures the initial preferred node allocation honors the memory policy / nodemask. However, hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() dereferences the nodemask in node_isset(nid, *nodemask) and for_each_node_mask(node, *nodemask), leading to a null pointer dereference kernel panic when nodemask is NULL. Fix this by checking if nodemask is NULL in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() and defaulting it to cpuset_current_mems_allowed. Enclose the allocation attempts within the cpuset seqcount retry loop so that if the cpuset changes concurrently during allocation, the attempts are retried using the updated nodemask. This ensures that the initial node check and fallback loop safely honor the task's cpuset without violating cpuset constraints or causing NULL pointer dereferences or unexpected allocation failures. From a userspace perspective, this bug allows an unprivileged user to crash the kernel (trigger a panic) by requesting a gigantic hugepage allocation with MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY on a system where CMA is only configured on a subset of NUMA nodes. This can be reproduced by booting a VM with two NUMA nodes, restricting CMA to Node 1 (e.g., hugetlb_cma=1:1G default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=0), and running a program that allocates a 1GB hugepage area without reserving, restricts allocation to Node 0 using mbind() with MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, and triggers a page fault: void *ptr = mmap(NULL, 1UL << 30, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_HUGE_1GB | MAP_NORESERVE, -1, 0); unsigned long nodemask = 1; /* Node 0 */ mbind(ptr, 1UL << 30, MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, &nodemask, sizeof(nodemask) * 8, 0); memset(ptr, 0, 1UL << 30); /* Trigger fault */ This results in a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio+0x75/0x120 Call Trace: <TASK> only_alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x2c/0x160 alloc_surplus_hugetlb_folio+0x6d/0x100 alloc_hugetlb_folio+0x3c5/0x660 hugetlb_no_page+0x3d9/0x650 | ||||
| CVE-2026-89964 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: eisa: Fix infinite loop when parsing invalid IRQ value When an invalid value is passed via the "eisa_irq_edge=" kernel command line parameter (e.g. "eisa_irq_edge=16,5"), eisa_irq_setup() prints an error message and continues without advancing the current position. As a result the same invalid value is parsed again and again, causing an infinite loop while the kernel boots. Advance to the next comma-separated entry, or stop parsing when there is no next entry, before continuing so that the remaining entries are processed normally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89963 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/kexec_file: Fix null-ptr-def in extra size calculation A static Sashiko AI review identified a potential NULL pointer dereference in kexec_extra_fdt_size_ppc64(). On platforms without any reserved memory regions, get_reserved_memory_ranges() can return 0 while leaving 'rmem' unallocated as NULL. Passing it directly leads to a kernel panic when evaluating 'rmem->nr_ranges'. Add a NULL check for 'rmem' to prevent this crash. | ||||