| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt
Since commit b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
l2cap_chan::conn has held reference and remains non-NULL also after the
corresponding hci_conn is deleted. In this state accessing various
fields eg. hci_conn::hdev is invalid, which leads to KASAN crash in
l2cap_sock_setsockopt() access of conn->hcon->hdev.
Check l2cap_chan::conn.hcon corresponds to an alive hci_conn before
trying to use it in l2cap_sock.c. Hold l2cap_chan_lock() in
getsockopt/setsockopt to ensure it stays alive, and to avoid data races
in l2cap_chan fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring
The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid
disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing
was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the
connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT
reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in
fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and
cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and
queue->lock).
The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers
to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only
non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.
Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.
Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a
fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT
is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.
Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.
If there should be a report from any library or application we
probably need to revert this commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access
sparx5_set_rx_mode() runs with netif_addr_lock_bh held and iterates
dev->mc via __dev_mc_sync(), which per address calls sparx5_mc_sync() /
sparx5_mc_unsync() -> sparx5_mact_learn() / sparx5_mact_forget(). These
take sparx5->lock, a mutex, and then poll the MAC access command
register with readx_poll_timeout(). A mutex may block, which is not
allowed from atomic context.
Convert the driver to the new .ndo_set_rx_mode_async callback introduced
in commit 3554b4345d85 ("net: introduce ndo_set_rx_mode_async and
netdev_rx_mode_work"). The async callback is invoked from process
context, so the mutex and sleeping completion poll can remain.
Observed with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK,
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES and CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 217, name: ip
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
Call trace:
__might_resched+0x144/0x248
__might_sleep+0x48/0x7c
__mutex_lock+0x74/0x850
mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
sparx5_mact_learn+0x78/0x100
sparx5_mc_sync+0x40/0x54
__hw_addr_sync_dev+0xc4/0x170
sparx5_set_rx_mode+0x4c/0x58
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x64/0xa4
__dev_open+0x1ec/0x26c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix password encoding bounds check
The password PSWD_ENCODINGS parser reads password_obj[elem + pos_values]
while copying the supported password encodings from the ACPI package.
The outer loop only guarantees that elem is within password_obj_count.
The encoding count is bounded by MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE, but that does not
guarantee that the ACPI package contains enough entries for all
elem + pos_values accesses.
A malformed package can therefore declare a non-zero encoding count
without providing enough string objects, causing the parser to read past
the ACPI package array and pass an out-of-bounds string pointer and
length to hp_convert_hexstr_to_str().
Add the same computed-index bounds check used by the other offset-based
package parsing loops before reading password_obj[elem + pos_values]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC
login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is
only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login
response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()
reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not
bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack
hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611
[ 2030.242296]
[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:
[ 2030.242769] <TASK>
[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0
[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200
[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0
[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120
[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00
[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0
[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140
[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0
[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300
[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0
[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280
[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490
[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300
[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110
[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20
[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470
[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910
[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0
[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 2030.243564] </TASK>
[ 2030.243570]
[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:
[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0
[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750
[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340
[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0
[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0
[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930
[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00
[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140
[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470
[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100
[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460
[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2030.305594]
[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640
[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 2030.309595] The buggy address
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Do not skip lock checks for single-byte ranges
check_lock_range() uses inclusive ranges. Its callers pass the end
offset as start + length - 1, so start == end represents a valid
single-byte range rather than an empty range.
The start == end shortcut therefore skips mandatory byte-range lock
checks for one-byte reads, writes, copychunk operations and one-byte
truncate ranges. A conflicting lock covering that byte is not checked
and the operation is allowed to proceed.
Remove the shortcut. The truncate size == inode->i_size case is already
handled by only calling check_lock_range() when the new size differs
from the current file size. |
| Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.13.7, ForbiddenListSpec.ExactMatch in pkg/api/forbidden_list.go sorts denied metadata keys case-insensitively and then uses sort.SearchStrings, which assumes byte-order sorting. When an administrator's forbidden list mixes capitalized and lowercase keys or otherwise has different case-insensitive and byte ordering, the binary search can return false for a key that is present. An authenticated tenant owner can then pass the missed key through api.ValidateForbidden and bypass configured namespace, Service, or delegated node metadata restrictions, potentially influencing cluster policies, network exposure, or scheduling outside the tenant boundary. Uniformly lowercase lists whose two orderings coincide are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7. |
| Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, hostnameRegexHandler.OnUpdate in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/hostname_regex.go reverses the new and old Tenant parameters and validates the previous AllowedHostnames.Regex instead of the submitted value. A cluster administrator can therefore store a malformed AllowedHostnames.Regex after the webhook accepts the update based on stale valid state. Subsequent Ingress creation or update reaches validate_hostnames.go, which evaluates the malformed pattern, ignores the regular-expression error, and treats every hostname as unmatched, blocking Ingress operations for the affected tenant until an administrator repairs the Tenant configuration. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7. |
| adm-zip is a JavaScript library for creating and extracting ZIP archives in Node.js. Prior to 0.6.1, getData() in zipEntry.js trusts an entry's central-directory uncompressed size and allocates output memory before validating that value against the actual compressed data and decompression result. A small crafted ZIP can declare a multi-gigabyte uncompressed size, causing Buffer.alloc and decompression handling to commit excessive resident memory before CRC validation reports an error. Applications that read entries from untrusted archives can therefore be terminated by the operating system or suffer service-wide memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.1. |
| WACRM is a self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp. In version 0.7.0 and earlier, the profiles_update row-level security policy in supabase/migrations/017_account_sharing.sql permits authenticated users to modify their own account_role and account_id, allowing a viewer to self-promote or move into another tenant and then access or modify tenant resources. Separately, match_ai_knowledge_fts and match_ai_knowledge_semantic in supabase/migrations/030_ai_knowledge.sql run as SECURITY DEFINER, accept a caller-controlled p_account_id, and omit an is_account_member check, allowing an authenticated non-member to read another tenant's knowledge-base chunks. This vulnerability is fixed with commit e01f7ed37184f972ace8fb2da5c3e37e56a6050f. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq: clamp quantum and initial_quantum in change path
The fq change path accepts TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in [1, INT_MAX] and
TCA_FQ_INITIAL_QUANTUM up to INT_MAX, while fq_init() already clamps to
[1, 1<<20]. A user can override the init clamp via tc qdisc change,
restoring the small-quantum deficit spin that the init clamp prevents.
Narrow iq_range.max to 1<<20 so TCA_FQ_INITIAL_QUANTUM is rejected at
parse time. Clamp TCA_FQ_QUANTUM to [256, 1<<20] in fq_change() and
fq_init() quantum to [256, 1<<20] for tiny-MTU devices.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root fq
tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root fq quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow with keyed discard
Since commit 68c5c42567bc ("dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard
filler with a keyed sector marker"), integrity_metadata computes a
checksum for every discarded block into the "checksums" buffer.
integrity_sector_checksum always writes the whole digest. So if the tag
size is smaller than the digest size, the checksum of the last block
that fits into the buffer is written past the end of it. For example,
with hmac(sha256) and tag size 16, a 4MiB discard writes 16 bytes past
the kmalloc'ed page.
Fix this by subtracting extra_space from the buffer size when computing
max_blocks, like we do for writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops
htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching
to cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on
an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that
points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification
path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic
from a single packet.
Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a
rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is
incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the
TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal
TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr
to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this
qdisc or its parent.
The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than
from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to
TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can
take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane
configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced:
htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a
filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal
root -> inner -> leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not
affect legitimate classification.
htb_classify() can now return NULL irrespective of CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT,
whereas previously every NULL return sat inside that ifdef. The NULL
handler in htb_enqueue() therefore cannot stay conditional either, so
drop the ifdef around it. This matches hfsc_enqueue(), which has always
handled a NULL class unconditionally. Without it, a kernel built
without actions would dereference a NULL class instead of dropping.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB, CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32,
CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR.
- Create an HTB qdisc on a device (e.g. lo), add an inner class
1:1 with a leaf child 1:10, install a root u32 filter selecting
1:1, and an inner-class u32 filter on 1:1 also selecting 1:1.
- Send one packet (ping). On the unfixed kernel the classify loop
spins with the qdisc lock held; with softlockup_panic=1 it panics.
- Reachable from unprivileged user via unshare -Urn (CAP_NET_ADMIN). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
slip: remove slip_hangup() to fix use-after-free in slip_receive_buf()
Jaeyoung Chung and Eulgyu Kim reported a slab-use-after-free read
in slip_receive_buf() when racing against tty hangup.
tty_ldisc_hangup() calls ld->ops->hangup() while holding only
a read lock on tty->ldisc_sem (via tty_ldisc_ref()).
Because slip_hangup() simply called slip_close(), it ran concurrently
with reader functions such as slip_receive_buf().
slip_close() unregisters and frees the net device and its private
struct slip, causing concurrent reader threads in slip_receive_buf()
to dereference freed memory.
Line discipline close() is already guaranteed to be called under
the write lock of tty->ldisc_sem during hangup processing
(in tty_ldisc_reinit() or tty_ldisc_kill()).
Remove slip_hangup() so teardown is serialized cleanly by slip_close(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: bound qdisc_pkt_len to prevent qdisc soft lockup
qdisc_get_stab() accepts a user-supplied size table, and
__qdisc_calculate_pkt_len() amplifies qdisc_pkt_len() through the
overhead, the size-table data (u16), and size_log (up to
STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX). A crafted stab can therefore set qdisc_pkt_len()
to ~1 GiB for an ordinary skb. Per-flow deficit schedulers such as
DRR and ETS replenish one quantum per loop iteration; with a tiny
quantum (1) they spin billions of times under the qdisc lock,
producing a soft lockup / RCU stall as illustrated by vega@nebusec.ai.
Cap the final qdisc_pkt_len() to QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX so the size-table
amplification cannot drive deficit schedulers into an unbounded loop.
A legitimate size table (e.g. qfq's overhead 999999999, which is
handled by dropping) is still accepted.
Introduce cap QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX (1 << 20) = 1 MiB which is well above
any legitimate single-skb wire length: the largest current skb->len
is GSO_MAX_SIZE (524280), and an ATM-style size table (53/48 cell tax)
amplifies that to ~578 KB, both comfortably below 1 MiB. At the same
time, 1 MiB bounds the deficit refill loop to ~1M iterations per
packet with quantum=1, which completes in a few milliseconds well
under the demonstrated softlockup threshold (~10^9 iterations).
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y (or CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y).
- Attach a DRR (or ETS) root qdisc with a crafted TCA_STAB that
amplifies qdisc_pkt_len to ~1 GiB (e.g. size_log=15, data=[32768]).
- Add a class with a tiny quantum of 1 and send one small packet; the
deficit loop spins billions of times under the qdisc lock and trips
the softlockup detector (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1).
- Reachable as root or from an unprivileged user in a fresh user+net
namespace (unshare -Urn) with namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: release the internal TCP sock on IPPROTO_SMC socket creation failure
IPPROTO_SMC sockets create an internal TCP sock ("clcsock") from the
proto->init hook. When socket creation fails after proto->init has
run - e.g. a cgroup BPF program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE
denies the socket - sk_common_release() only invokes sk_prot->destroy
if it is set, but neither smc_inet_prot nor smc_inet6_prot defines it,
and smc_destruct() returns early unless sk_state is SMC_CLOSED. As a
result, every failing socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) call
leaks one tcp_sock, so an unprivileged task able to attach a deny-all
BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE program to its own cgroup can grow kernel
memory unboundedly.
Add a .destroy hook to both protos that releases the clcsock via
smc_clcsock_release(). smc_sk_init() hashes the sock into the smc
hashinfo before the clcsock is created, and smc_diag dumps walk that
hash dereferencing smc->clcsock without taking clcsock_release_lock,
while sk_common_release() calls .destroy before .unhash. Unhash the
sock before releasing the clcsock, as __smc_release() does, so a
concurrent dump cannot observe the release; the second unhash in
sk_common_release() is a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: do not leak an hci_conn when a second LE connect is rejected
create_le_conn_complete() decides whether the failed connection is
still pending by comparing it against hci_lookup_le_connect(), which
returns the first LE connection in BT_CONNECT. That is the same
connection only while at most one is pending.
Two can be pending. Connections created on the passive scan path sit
in BT_CONNECT with HCI_CONN_SCANNING set and are invisible to
hci_lookup_le_connect() until hci_le_create_conn_sync() clears the
flag when their command is issued, so the -EBUSY guard in
hci_connect_le() does not prevent a second connection from being
queued while the first is still on the scan path. Whenever two
connections are in BT_CONNECT at once, the lookup may return one
connection while create_le_conn_complete() is reporting the failure
of the other; the early exit then drops the error and hci_conn_failed()
never runs on the connection that failed.
The controller also rejects a second HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN issued
while another connection creation is still outstanding, per Core Spec
Vol 4, Part E. The spec calls for Command Disallowed there; the
bcm43438 observed here answers with an LMP/LL error code instead,
which bt_to_errno() maps to the -EPROTO (-71) in the log below.
The leaked connection stays in BT_CONNECT forever, and because
hci_connect_le() refuses to dial while hci_lookup_le_connect() finds
anything, every subsequent attempt to reach any peer fails with
-EBUSY and no command reaches the controller at all.
Seen on a bcm43438 with two BLE peers polled on the same interval
(state 5 is BT_CONNECT; both handles are UNSET ones, allocated from
the ida above HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX):
Bluetooth: hci1: Opcode 0x2013 failed: -71
# hcitool con
< LE 14:9C:EF:03:68:81 handle 3840 state 5 lm CENTRAL
< LE C4:D3:6A:8C:B5:38 handle 3841 state 5 lm CENTRAL
A btmon capture across the next ten minutes of connect attempts
contains no HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN at all; outgoing LE connections
do not recover until the adapter is reset. With this change the same
scenario fails the rejected connection cleanly and further connects
to both peers go through.
Ask about the connection itself instead of about the device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix race l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs. put_chan
For L2CAP sockets without owning sk->sk_socket, reading
l2cap_pi(sk)->chan may race against concurrent l2cap_sock_kill() ->
l2cap_sock_put_chan(). This excludes simultaneous proto_ops callbacks,
but access in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has unsafe lockless read.
[Task 1] [Task 2 (hdev->workqueue)]
l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_disconn_cfm
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen l2cap_conn_del
bt_accept_dequeue l2cap_chan_del
lock_sock(sk) l2cap_sock_teardown_cb
bt_accept_unlink
bt_sk(sk)->parent = NULL
release_sock(sk) ----------------> lock_sock(sk)
parent = /* NULL */
lock_sock(sk) <--------------------- release_sock(sk)
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)
l2cap_sock_close_cb
l2cap_sock_kill(sk)
l2cap_sock_put_chan
chan = READ l2cap_pi(sk)->chan l2cap_pi(sk)->chan = NULL
l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero l2cap_put_chan(chan)
kref_get_unless_zero(&chan->ref)
Task 1 may observe NULL which causes null-ptr-deref.
Fix the race by taking lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_kill() to
synchronize with l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(). hold_unless_zero() is not
needed here, l2cap_pi(sk)->chan owns reference if it is non-NULL.
Clarify code comments vs. locking. |
| Rsyslog is a rocket-fast system for log processing. From 8.2110.0 until 8.2604.0, the optional imhttp module's parse_auth_header function in contrib/imhttp/imhttp.c allocates a zero-byte heap buffer with calloc(0, len) when an HTTP Basic Authorization value exceeds its fixed work buffer, then passes that pointer to apr_base64_decode. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send an oversized encoded credential to an imhttp endpoint configured for Basic Authentication, causing decoded data to overwrite adjacent heap memory before credential validation. Deployments that do not install, load, and use imhttp with Basic Authentication are not affected. The demonstrated impact is a process crash that interrupts log collection, and code execution has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 8.2604.0. |
| Rsyslog is a rocket-fast system for log processing. From 7.5.4 until 8.2606.0, the optional mmpstrucdata plugin's parseSD_PARAM function in plugins/mmpstrucdata/mmpstrucdata.c stores RFC5424 parameter values in a fixed pVal[32 * 1024] stack buffer and calls parsePARAM_VALUE without supplying the destination size. A remote unauthenticated attacker whose crafted RFC5424 message reaches an action using mmpstrucdata can provide a structured-data parameter larger than that buffer when MaxMessageSize permits it, causing an attacker-controlled stack overwrite. Deployments that do not install and use the plugin, or whose effective message-size limit remains below the required threshold, are not affected by this issue. The demonstrated impact is a crash and interruption of log collection; code execution is not demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 8.2606.0. |
