| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A
stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the EasyMesh module of
TP-Link Archer AX55 v4. When Mesh mode is enabled, a LAN attacker may submit
crafted input that causes the easymesh daemon to crash and may potentially
achieve remote code execution on the device.
Successful
exploitation may cause the EasyMesh daemon to crash and may potentially allow
remote code execution when Mesh mode is enabled. This
may result in high impact to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of the affected device. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Azure Data Manager for Energy allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key
ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into
sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even
when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.
With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on
an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire
binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a
bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.
Relevant path:
smb2_sess_setup()
-> conn->binding = true
-> ntlm_authenticate()
-> session_user()
-> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
-> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
-> calc_ntlmv2_hash()
-> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key)
-> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
-> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...)
-> out_err without expiring the binding session
Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to
sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on
authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful
authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: ensure tx headroom in usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb
mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb() pushes a TX descriptor and a USB
header onto every skb and assumes the headroom for them is already
there. That holds for locally generated traffic, where mac80211
reserves hw->extra_tx_headroom, but forwarded frames are sent through
ieee80211_8023_xmit(), which does not reserve it. Bridge a wired
interface to an mt7925u AP and the first forwarded frame that arrives
short panics the kernel:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:415 put:4 tail:0x19b end:0x640 dev:wlan1
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:212!
Call trace:
skb_panic+0x58/0x60 (P)
skb_push+0x58/0x60
mt7925_usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb+0xf8/0x1b8 [mt7925_common]
mt76u_tx_queue_skb+0xa0/0x1f8 [mt76_usb]
__mt76_tx_queue_skb+0x54/0xe8 [mt76]
mt76_txq_schedule.part.0+0x204/0x478 [mt76]
mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x50/0x80 [mt76]
mt792x_tx_worker+0x68/0x100 [mt792x_lib]
__mt76_worker_fn+0x84/0x150 [mt76]
Whether a given setup hits it depends on how much headroom the ingress
netdev leaves in its rx skbs. Reproduced on a Raspberry Pi 5 bridging
onboard ethernet to a Netgear A9000; originally reported on an MT7986
router running OpenWrt. Nick Morrow's testing on a Pi 4 (bcmgenet),
which leaves more headroom, helped narrow the trigger to the ingress
path.
The same bug was fixed on mt7921 by commit 98c4d0abf5c4 ("mt76:
mt7921: don't assume adequate headroom for SDIO headers"), but mt7925
was copied from mt7921 without the fix. Add the same guard here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback
The interrupt URB buffer is allocated in setup_port_interrupt_in() based
on the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize:
buffer_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(epd);
port->interrupt_in_buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
When a USB device declares wMaxPacketSize = 8 on its interrupt IN
endpoint, the buffer is allocated from kmalloc-8 cache (exactly
8 bytes).
If the device sends a short packet (actual_length < wMaxPacketSize),
the URB completes with status == 0 and the callback proceeds to read:
data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)]
which evaluates to data[8], accessing 1 byte beyond the allocated 8-byte
buffer. This results in a slab out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by adding the missing bounds check: first verify that the
actual length is large enough to contain the struct usb_ctrlrequest
header before accessing req_pkt->bRequestType and req_pkt->bRequest,
and then verify that there is an additional byte for the modem signal
state before reading data[sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest)] inside the
conditional. Use sizeof(*req_pkt) instead of sizeof(struct
usb_ctrlrequest) for consistency.
[ johan: use dev_err(); split signals declaration and initialisation ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()
snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at
transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &transfer_buffer[2] together with a
length of ep->max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():
count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep->ports[0].substream,
&transfer_buffer[2],
ep->max_transfer - 2);
ep->max_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via
usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk
OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this
value downwards - so ep->max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument
becomes -1.
snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to
__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where "if (count1 > count) count1 = count"
leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a
byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs
with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which
was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep->max_transfer).
This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
in commit 0970274613fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in
snd_usbmidi_akai_output()"); the novation output routine was left
unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header
plus at least one payload byte. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access
mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source
scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid
and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and
decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when
CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y.
Use the original scatterlist length instead. |
| Reactor Netty HTTP Server, in versions 1.0.11 - 1.0.23, may log request headers in some cases of invalid HTTP requests. The logged headers may reveal valid access tokens to those with access to server logs. This may affect only invalid HTTP requests where logging at WARN level is enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag()
Found with syzkaller and a local syzbot instance running on top of a
netdevsim TLS offload emulation; tls_device.c is otherwise only reachable
on a machine with a NIC that implements the offload.
tls_push_data() only checks whether the open record still has room for
another frag at the bottom of its loop, and the MSG_MORE early break
skips that check. The record survives to the next syscall with the frag
count it already had, and tls_append_frag() does not check either, so
with TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO every splice(SPLICE_F_MORE) of a byte or two adds
a non-coalescing pipe page and num_frags walks off the end of
tls_record_info.frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]. Once the record is pushed,
tls_push_record() runs the same index over sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] and
the sg_set_page() writes land on the destruct_work that follows it, which
the workqueue then calls.
The byte limit is fine because copy drops to 0 and the loop falls through
to the same check; the frag count has no such feedback.
Push the record rather than keep a full one open, which is what a plain
TCP socket does - tcp_sendmsg_locked() uses tcp_mark_push() and
new_segment in both the copy and the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES paths, and tls_sw
already sets full_record when the sk_msg ring fills up, MSG_MORE or not.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tls_append_frag ( net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881104d1530 by task tls_oob/450
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 450 Comm: tls_oob Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7+ #329 PREEMPT
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
tls_append_frag (net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
tls_push_data (net/tls/tls_device.c:518)
tls_device_sendmsg (net/tls/tls_device.c:583)
inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:865)
sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 net/socket.c:790 net/socket.c:813)
splice_to_socket (fs/splice.c:884)
do_splice (fs/splice.c:936 fs/splice.c:1349)
__do_splice (fs/splice.c:1431)
__x64_sys_splice (fs/splice.c:1634 fs/splice.c:1616)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK>
and, once the record is pushed:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:300:24
index 18 is out of range for type 'skb_frag_t [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:301:41
index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:302:39
index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:307:38
index 26 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea000411a680
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Workqueue: ktls_device_destruct 0xffffea000411a680
RIP: 0010:0xffffea000411a680
Call Trace:
<TASK>
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3405 kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()
io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:
unsigned long folio_size = 1 << imu->folio_shift;
imu->folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the
folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit
kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the
count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.
Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.
The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.
io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:
max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len >> shift) + 2;
so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while
io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4
bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past
the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per
iteration as well, so imu->bvec is read past its end at the same time.
validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the
registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.
Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a
gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where
CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so
a shift of 30, which still fits in int and is unaffected.
Use 1UL, as the rest of the file does. |
| NIOSSLCertificate._subjectAlternativeNames provides access to the raw bytes for a cert's SANs. NIOSSL provides access to a buffer assumed to be backed by an ASN1_STRING, but not all SANs are backed by ASN1_STRING, so accessing the buffer for such a type can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. This vulnerability is addressed in swift-nio-ssl version 2.37.2. |
| MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 contains a buffer over-read vulnerability in CMOOSCommPkt where a four-byte packet triggers out-of-bounds memory access during deserialization. Attackers can open a TCP connection to the MOOSDB port and send a crafted short packet to read memory before authentication. |
| node-csv is a full-featured CSV parser with a simple API that is tested against large datasets. Prior to 7.0.2, csv-parse with the columns and group_columns_by_name options enabled treats a duplicate __proto__ header as an existing property in packages/csv-parse/lib/api/index.js, assigns an attacker-controlled array through obj['__proto__'], and replaces the parsed record object's prototype. A malicious CSV header can therefore inject inherited array values into the returned record, hide those inherited values from JSON serialization, and affect property enumeration and type or shape checks in applications that process the record. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2. |
| stream-json is a micro-library of stream components for processing JSON and JSONC with a minimal memory footprint. Prior to 3.5.0, the path filters pick, ignore, filter, and replace in src/core/filters/filter-base.js recompute the full path string from the nesting stack for every checkable token. Because the stack length equals the current nesting depth and a checkable token is emitted at every level, a depth D document costs O(D²) rather than O(D) to process. The issue is triggered by nesting depth rather than byte volume, including the documented pick({filter: 'data'}) traversal-until-match path, so an application that sends untrusted JSON through a string or RegExp filter can block the Node.js event loop and cause denial of service with a small deeply nested document. The streamArray, streamObject, and streamValues streamers are not affected because they use the constant-time asm.depth getter. This issue is fixed in version 3.5.0. |
| IBM Cloud Pak for Data System 11.3.0.2 through Interim Fix 001 could allow an unauthorized user to inject data into log messages due to improper neutralization of special elements when written to log files. |
| Spring Boot's ArtemisEmbeddedConfigurationFactory uses a fixed, static path for the embedded Artemis message broker's data directory when no explicit path is configured. A local attacker on the same host can pre-create this predictable directory or place a symlink before the application starts.
Affected versions:
Spring Boot 4.0.0 through 4.0.6; 3.5.0 through 3.5.14; 3.4.0 through 3.4.16; 3.3.0 through 3.3.19; 2.7.0 through 2.7.33. |
| A maliciously crafted PDF file, when parsed through Autodesk Revit, can force an Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a crash, read sensitive data, or execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors
nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and
nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from
the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed
kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated
activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with
activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or
50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid
byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of
kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb.
The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent
protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter
validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter
extractors were not updated at that time.
Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty
region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining
count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually
available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len,
which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in TLV parsers
nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv() contain
three related bugs in their TLV parsing loops:
1. 'offset' is declared u8 but tlv_array_len is u16. When TLV data
advances offset past 255 it silently wraps to zero, causing
infinite loops or double-processing of buffer data.
2. Before reading tlv[0] (type) and tlv[1] (length) there is no
check that offset+2 <= tlv_array_len. A truncated TLV causes
an OOB read of one byte past the buffer end.
3. After reading the length field, the value bytes are accessed
without checking offset+2+length <= tlv_array_len. A crafted
length=0xFF on a short buffer causes up to 255 bytes of OOB
read past the buffer end.
Both functions are reachable without authentication via
nfc_llcp_set_remote_gb() which feeds remote LLCP general bytes
directly into nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() with no additional
validation.
Fix all three issues by widening offset from u8 to u16 and adding
bounds checks for both the TLV header and value field before each
access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: digital: clamp SENSF_RES length to the destination buffer
digital_in_recv_sensf_res() memcpy()s resp->len bytes from a remote
NFC-F device response into the NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE-byte target.sensf_res
field without an upper-bound check. A nearby malicious NFC-F device can
send an oversized SENSF_RES response to overflow the stack-local struct
nfc_target.
Clamp resp->len to NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE before the copy.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
