| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rockchip: rga: Fix possible ERR_PTR dereference in rga_buf_init()
rga_get_frame() can return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) when buffer type is
unsupported or invalid. rga_buf_init() does not check the return value
and unconditionally dereferences the pointer when accessing f->size.
Add proper ERR_PTR checking and return the error to prevent
dereferencing an invalid pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Skip vcn poison irq release on VF
VF doesn't enable VCN poison irq in VCNv2.5. Skip releasing it and avoid
call trace during deinitialization.
[ 71.913601] [drm] clean up the vf2pf work item
[ 71.915088] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 71.915092] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1079 at /tmp/amd.aFkFvSQl/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_irq.c:641 amdgpu_irq_put+0xc6/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 71.915355] Modules linked in: amdgpu(OE-) amddrm_ttm_helper(OE) amdttm(OE) amddrm_buddy(OE) amdxcp(OE) amddrm_exec(OE) amd_sched(OE) amdkcl(OE) drm_suballoc_helper drm_display_helper cec rc_core i2c_algo_bit video wmi binfmt_misc nls_iso8859_1 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common input_leds joydev serio_raw mac_hid qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 hid_generic crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel usbhid 8139too sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 hid psmouse bochs i2c_i801 ahci drm_vram_helper libahci i2c_smbus lpc_ich drm_ttm_helper 8139cp mii ttm aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd
[ 71.915484] CPU: 3 PID: 1079 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G OE 6.8.0-87-generic #88~22.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 71.915489] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS 1.16.3-2.el9_5.1 04/01/2014
[ 71.915492] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_irq_put+0xc6/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 71.915768] Code: 75 84 b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 44 89 ea 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 fd fc ff ff 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 5d 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff e9 55 30 3b c7 <0f> 0b eb d4 b8 fe ff ff ff eb a8 e9 b7 3b 8a 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
[ 71.915771] RSP: 0018:ffffcf0800eafa30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 71.915775] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff891bda4b0668 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915777] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915779] RBP: ffffcf0800eafa50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915781] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff891bda480000
[ 71.915782] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915792] FS: 000070cff87c4c40(0000) GS:ffff893abfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 71.915795] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 71.915797] CR2: 00005fa13073e478 CR3: 000000010d634006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 71.915800] PKRU: 55555554
[ 71.915802] Call Trace:
[ 71.915805] <TASK>
[ 71.915809] vcn_v2_5_hw_fini+0x19e/0x1e0 [amdgpu] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panel: Fix a possible null-pointer dereference in jdi_panel_dsi_remove()
In jdi_panel_dsi_remove(), jdi is explicitly checked, indicating that it
may be NULL:
if (!jdi)
mipi_dsi_detach(dsi);
However, when jdi is NULL, the function does not return and continues by
calling jdi_panel_disable():
err = jdi_panel_disable(&jdi->base);
Inside jdi_panel_disable(), jdi is dereferenced unconditionally, which can
lead to a NULL-pointer dereference:
struct jdi_panel *jdi = to_panel_jdi(panel);
backlight_disable(jdi->backlight);
To prevent such a potential NULL-pointer dereference, return early from
jdi_panel_dsi_remove() when jdi is NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Set DMA segment size to avoid debug warnings
When using V3D rendering with CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG enabled, the
kernel occasionally reports a segment size mismatch. This is because
'max_seg_size' is not set. The kernel defaults to 64K. setting
'max_seg_size' to the maximum will prevent 'debug_dma_map_sg()'
from complaining about the over-mapping of the V3D segment length.
DMA-API: v3d 1002000000.v3d: mapping sg segment longer than device
claims to support [len=8290304] [max=65536]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 493 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1179 debug_dma_map_sg+0x330/0x388
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 493 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.12.53-yocto-standard #1
Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT)
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : debug_dma_map_sg+0x330/0x388
lr : debug_dma_map_sg+0x330/0x388
sp : ffff8000829a3ac0
x29: ffff8000829a3ac0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff8000813fe000
x26: ffffc1ffc0000000 x25: ffff00010fdeb760 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff8000816a9bf0 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000002
x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffff00010185e810 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 69766564206e6168 x16: 74207265676e6f6c x15: 20746e656d676573
x14: 20677320676e6970 x13: 5d34303334393134 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 00000000000000c0 x10: 00000000000009c0 x9 : ffff8000800e0b7c
x8 : ffff00010a315ca0 x7 : ffff8000816a5110 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : 000000000000002b x4 : 0000000000000002 x3 : 0000000000000008
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff00010a315280
Call trace:
debug_dma_map_sg+0x330/0x388
__dma_map_sg_attrs+0xc0/0x278
dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x58
drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt+0xb4/0x140
v3d_bo_create_finish+0x28/0x130 [v3d]
v3d_create_bo_ioctl+0x54/0x180 [v3d]
drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc8/0x140
drm_ioctl+0x2d4/0x4d8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collision
If we attempt to create several files with names that result in the same
hash, we have to pack them in same dir item and that has a limit inherent
to the leaf size. However if we reach that limit, we trigger a transaction
abort and turns the filesystem into RO mode. This allows for a malicious
user to disrupt a system, without the need to have administration
privileges/capabilities.
Reproducer:
$ cat exploit-hash-collisions.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster and require fewer file
# names that result in hash collision.
mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# List of names that result in the same crc32c hash for btrfs.
declare -a names=(
'foobar'
'%a8tYkxfGMLWRGr55QSeQc4PBNH9PCLIvR6jZnkDtUUru1t@RouaUe_L:@xGkbO3nCwvLNYeK9vhE628gss:T$yZjZ5l-Nbd6CbC$M=hqE-ujhJICXyIxBvYrIU9-TDC'
'AQci3EUB%shMsg-N%frgU:02ByLs=IPJU0OpgiWit5nexSyxZDncY6WB:=zKZuk5Zy0DD$Ua78%MelgBuMqaHGyKsJUFf9s=UW80PcJmKctb46KveLSiUtNmqrMiL9-Y0I_l5Fnam04CGIg=8@U:Z'
'CvVqJpJzueKcuA$wqwePfyu7VxuWNN3ho$p0zi2H8QFYK$7YlEqOhhb%:hHgjhIjW5vnqWHKNP4'
'ET:vk@rFU4tsvMB0$C_p=xQHaYZjvoF%-BTc%wkFW8yaDAPcCYoR%x$FH5O:'
'HwTon%v7SGSP4FE08jBwwiu5aot2CFKXHTeEAa@38fUcNGOWvE@Mz6WBeDH_VooaZ6AgsXPkVGwy9l@@ZbNXabUU9csiWrrOp0MWUdfi$EZ3w9GkIqtz7I_eOsByOkBOO'
'Ij%2VlFGXSuPvxJGf5UWy6O@1svxGha%b@=%wjkq:CIgE6u7eJOjmQY5qTtxE2Rjbis9@us'
'KBkjG5%9R8K9sOG8UTnAYjxLNAvBmvV5vz3IiZaPmKuLYO03-6asI9lJ_j4@6Xo$KZicaLWJ3Pv8XEwVeUPMwbHYWwbx0pYvNlGMO9F:ZhHAwyctnGy%_eujl%WPd4U2BI7qooOSr85J-C2V$LfY'
'NcRfDfuUQ2=zP8K3CCF5dFcpfiOm6mwenShsAb_F%n6GAGC7fT2JFFn:c35X-3aYwoq7jNX5$ZJ6hI3wnZs$7KgGi7wjulffhHNUxAT0fRRLF39vJ@NvaEMxsMO'
'Oj42AQAEzRoTxa5OuSKIr=A_lwGMy132v4g3Pdq1GvUG9874YseIFQ6QU'
'Ono7avN5GjC:_6dBJ_'
'WHmN2gnmaN-9dVDy4aWo:yNGFzz8qsJyJhWEWcud7$QzN2D9R0efIWWEdu5kwWr73NZm4=@CoCDxrrZnRITr-kGtU_cfW2:%2_am'
'WiFnuTEhAG9FEC6zopQmj-A-$LDQ0T3WULz%ox3UZAPybSV6v1Z$b4L_XBi4M4BMBtJZpz93r9xafpB77r:lbwvitWRyo$odnAUYlYMmU4RvgnNd--e=I5hiEjGLETTtaScWlQp8mYsBovZwM2k'
'XKyH=OsOAF3p%uziGF_ZVr$ivrvhVgD@1u%5RtrV-gl_vqAwHkK@x7YwlxX3qT6WKKQ%PR56NrUBU2dOAOAdzr2=5nJuKPM-T-$ZpQfCL7phxQbUcb:BZOTPaFExc-qK-gDRCDW2'
'd3uUR6OFEwZr%ns1XH_@tbxA@cCPmbBRLdyh7p6V45H$P2$F%w0RqrD3M0g8aGvWpoTFMiBdOTJXjD:JF7=h9a_43xBywYAP%r$SPZi%zDg%ql-KvkdUCtF9OLaQlxmd'
'ePTpbnit%hyNm@WELlpKzNZYOzOTf8EQ$sEfkMy1VOfIUu3coyvIr13-Y7Sv5v-Ivax2Go_GQRFMU1b3362nktT9WOJf3SpT%z8sZmM3gvYQBDgmKI%%RM-G7hyrhgYflOw%z::ZRcv5O:lDCFm'
'evqk743Y@dvZAiG5J05L_ROFV@$2%rVWJ2%3nxV72-W7$e$-SK3tuSHA2mBt$qloC5jwNx33GmQUjD%akhBPu=VJ5g$xhlZiaFtTrjeeM5x7dt4cHpX0cZkmfImndYzGmvwQG:$euFYmXn$_2rA9mKZ'
'gkgUtnihWXsZQTEkrMAWIxir09k3t7jk_IK25t1:cy1XWN0GGqC%FrySdcmU7M8MuPO_ppkLw3=Dfr0UuBAL4%GFk2$Ma10V1jDRGJje%Xx9EV2ERaWKtjpwiZwh0gCSJsj5UL7CR8RtW5opCVFKGGy8Cky'
'hNgsG_8lNRik3PvphqPm0yEH3P%%fYG:kQLY=6O-61Wa6nrV_WVGR6TLB09vHOv%g4VQRP8Gzx7VXUY1qvZyS'
'isA7JVzN12xCxVPJZ_qoLm-pTBuhjjHMvV7o=F:EaClfYNyFGlsfw-Kf%uxdqW-kwk1sPl2vhbjyHU1A6$hz'
'kiJ_fgcdZFDiOptjgH5PN9-PSyLO4fbk_:u5_2tz35lV_iXiJ6cx7pwjTtKy-XGaQ5IefmpJ4N_ZqGsqCsKuqOOBgf9LkUdffHet@Wu'
'lvwtxyhE9:%Q3UxeHiViUyNzJsy:fm38pg_b6s25JvdhOAT=1s0$pG25x=LZ2rlHTszj=gN6M4zHZYr_qrB49i=pA--@WqWLIuX7o1S_SfS@2FSiUZN'
'rC24cw3UBDZ=5qJBUMs9e$=S4Y94ni%Z8639vnrGp=0Hv4z3dNFL0fBLmQ40=EYIY:Z=SLc@QLMSt2zsss2ZXrP7j4='
'uwGl2s-fFrf@GqS=DQqq2I0LJSsOmM%xzTjS:lzXguE3wChdMoHYtLRKPvfaPOZF2fER@j53evbKa7R%A7r4%YEkD=kicJe@SFiGtXHbKe4gCgPAYbnVn'
'UG37U6KKua2bgc:IHzRs7BnB6FD:2Mt5Cc5NdlsW%$1tyvnfz7S27FvNkroXwAW:mBZLA1@qa9WnDbHCDmQmfPMC9z-Eq6QT0jhhPpqyymaD:R02ghwYo%yx7SAaaq-:x33LYpei$5g8DMl3C'
'y2vjek0FE1PDJC0qpfnN:x8k2wCFZ9xiUF2ege=JnP98R%wxjKkdfEiLWvQzmnW'
'8-HCSgH5B%K7P8_jaVtQhBXpBk:pE-$P7ts58U0J@iR9YZntMPl7j$s62yAJO@_9eanFPS54b=UTw$94C-t=HLxT8n6o9P=QnIxq-f1=Ne2dvhe6WbjEQtc'
'YPPh:IFt2mtR6XWSmjHptXL_hbSYu8bMw-JP8@PNyaFkdNFsk$M=xfL6LDKCDM-mSyGA_2MBwZ8Dr4=R1D%7-mC
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes
Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a
previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a
BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we
can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but
if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send
and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't
require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user
could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system.
Reproducer script:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster.
mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send.
btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv
touch $MNT/sv/foo
btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true
# Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv.
mkdir $MNT/snaps
btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps
# Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a
# lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow.
total=500
for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do
echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total"
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null
done
echo
umount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./test.sh
(...)
Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv
At subvol sv
Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type
Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
And in dmesg/syslog:
$ dmesg
(...)
[251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252!
[251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75)
[251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235
[251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...)
[251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
[251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs]
[251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...)
[251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292
[251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3
[251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750
[251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820
[251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0
[251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5
[251067.659019] FS: 00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[251067.660115] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[251067.661972] Call Trace:
[251067.662292] <TASK>
[251067.662653] create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs]
[251067.663413] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs]
[251067.664257] ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs]
[251067.665238] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30
[251067.665837] ? record_root_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: clear page->private in free_pages_prepare()
Several subsystems (slub, shmem, ttm, etc.) use page->private but don't
clear it before freeing pages. When these pages are later allocated as
high-order pages and split via split_page(), tail pages retain stale
page->private values.
This causes a use-after-free in the swap subsystem. The swap code uses
page->private to track swap count continuations, assuming freshly
allocated pages have page->private == 0. When stale values are present,
swap_count_continued() incorrectly assumes the continuation list is valid
and iterates over uninitialized page->lru containing LIST_POISON values,
causing a crash:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000100-0xdead000000000107]
RIP: 0010:__do_sys_swapoff+0x1151/0x1860
Fix this by clearing page->private in free_pages_prepare(), ensuring all
freed pages have clean state regardless of previous use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into
a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane
length.
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key
with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE
has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller
than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled
elsewhere anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix mismatched unlock for DMUB HW lock in HWSS fast path
[Why]
The evaluation for whether we need to use the DMUB HW lock isn't the
same as whether we need to unlock which results in a hang when the
fast path is used for ASIC without FAMS support.
[How]
Store a flag that indicates whether we should use the lock and use
that same flag to specify whether unlocking is needed. |
| Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host versions prior to 22.0.843 and Application prior to 20.0.1923 (macOS/Linux client deployments) contain an arbitrary file write vulnerability via the response file handling. When tasks produce output the service writes response data into files under /opt/PrinterInstallerClient/tmp/responses/ reusing the requested filename. The service follows symbolic links in the responses directory and writes as the service user (typically root), allowing a local, unprivileged user to cause the service to overwrite or create arbitrary files on the filesystem as root. This can be used to modify configuration files, replace or inject binaries or drivers, and otherwise achieve local privilege escalation and full system compromise. This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2023-019 — Arbitrary File Write as Root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate inherited ACE SID length
smb_inherit_dacl() walks the parent directory DACL loaded from the
security descriptor xattr. It verifies that each ACE contains the fixed
SID header before using it, but does not verify that the variable-length
SID described by sid.num_subauth is fully contained in the ACE.
A malformed inheritable ACE can advertise more subauthorities than are
present in the ACE. compare_sids() may then read past the ACE.
smb_set_ace() also clamps the copied destination SID, but used the
unchecked source SID count to compute the inherited ACE size. That could
advance the temporary inherited ACE buffer pointer and nt_size accounting
past the allocated buffer.
Fix this by validating the parent ACE SID count and SID length before
using the SID during inheritance. Compute the inherited ACE size from the
copied SID so the size matches the bounded destination SID. Reject the
inherited DACL if size accumulation would overflow smb_acl.size or the
security descriptor allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: prevent RCU stalls in kasan_release_vmalloc_node
When CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER is enabled, freeing KASAN shadow pages during
vmalloc cleanup triggers expensive stack unwinding that acquires RCU read
locks. Processing a large purge_list without rescheduling can cause the
task to hold CPU for extended periods (10+ seconds), leading to RCU stalls
and potential OOM conditions.
The issue manifests in purge_vmap_node() -> kasan_release_vmalloc_node()
where iterating through hundreds or thousands of vmap_area entries and
freeing their associated shadow pages causes:
rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Tasks blocked on level-0 rcu_node (CPUs 0-1): P6229/1:b..l
...
task:kworker/0:17 state:R running task stack:28840 pid:6229
...
kasan_release_vmalloc_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299
purge_vmap_node+0x1ba/0xad0 mm/vmalloc.c:2299
Each call to kasan_release_vmalloc() can free many pages, and with
page_owner tracking, each free triggers save_stack() which performs stack
unwinding under RCU read lock. Without yielding, this creates an
unbounded RCU critical section.
Add periodic cond_resched() calls within the loop to allow:
- RCU grace periods to complete
- Other tasks to run
- Scheduler to preempt when needed
The fix uses need_resched() for immediate response under load, with a
batch count of 32 as a guaranteed upper bound to prevent worst-case stalls
even under light load. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/tests: shmem: Hold reservation lock around madvise
Acquire and release the GEM object's reservation lock around calls
to the object's madvide operation. The tests use
drm_gem_shmem_madvise_locked(), which led to errors such as show below.
[ 58.339389] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1352 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:499 drm_gem_shmem_madvise_locked+0xde/0x140
Only export the new helper drm_gem_shmem_madvise() for Kunit tests.
This is not an interface for regular drivers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: 8822b: Avoid WARNING in rtw8822b_config_trx_mode()
rtw8822b_set_antenna() can be called from userspace when the chip is
powered off. In that case a WARNING is triggered in
rtw8822b_config_trx_mode() because trying to read the RF registers
when the chip is powered off returns an unexpected value.
Call rtw8822b_config_trx_mode() in rtw8822b_set_antenna() only when
the chip is powered on.
------------[ cut here ]------------
write RF mode table fail
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7183 at rtw8822b.c:824 rtw8822b_config_trx_mode.constprop.0+0x835/0x840 [rtw88_8822b]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7183 Comm: iw Tainted: G W OE 6.17.5-arch1-1 #1 PREEMPT(full) 01c39fc421df2af799dd5e9180b572af860b40c1
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: LENOVO 82KR/LNVNB161216, BIOS HBCN18WW 08/27/2021
RIP: 0010:rtw8822b_config_trx_mode.constprop.0+0x835/0x840 [rtw88_8822b]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtw8822b_set_antenna+0x57/0x70 [rtw88_8822b 370206f42e5890d8d5f48eb358b759efa37c422b]
rtw_ops_set_antenna+0x50/0x80 [rtw88_core 711c8fb4f686162be4625b1d0b8e8c6a5ac850fb]
ieee80211_set_antenna+0x60/0x100 [mac80211 f1845d85d2ecacf3b71867635a050ece90486cf3]
nl80211_set_wiphy+0x384/0xe00 [cfg80211 296485ee85696d2150309a6d21a7fbca83d3dbda]
? netdev_run_todo+0x63/0x550
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xfc/0x160
genl_rcv_msg+0x1aa/0x2b0
? __pfx_nl80211_pre_doit+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 296485ee85696d2150309a6d21a7fbca83d3dbda]
? __pfx_nl80211_set_wiphy+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 296485ee85696d2150309a6d21a7fbca83d3dbda]
? __pfx_nl80211_post_doit+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211 296485ee85696d2150309a6d21a7fbca83d3dbda]
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x59/0x110
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x285/0x3c0
? __alloc_skb+0xdb/0x1a0
netlink_sendmsg+0x20d/0x430
____sys_sendmsg+0x39f/0x3d0
? import_iovec+0x2f/0x40
___sys_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0
? refill_obj_stock+0x12e/0x240
__sys_sendmsg+0x8a/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x970
? do_syscall_64+0x81/0x970
? ksys_read+0x73/0xf0
? do_syscall_64+0x81/0x970
? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190
? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690
? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: uvcvideo: Return queued buffers on start_streaming() failure
Return buffers if streaming fails to start due to uvc_pm_get() error.
This bug may be responsible for a warning I got running
while :; do yavta -c3 /dev/video0; done
on an xHCI controller which failed under this workload.
I had no luck reproducing this warning again to confirm.
xhci_hcd 0000:09:00.0: HC died; cleaning up
usb 13-2: USB disconnect, device number 2
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 29386 at drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:1803 vb2_start_streaming+0xac/0x120 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data
Since commit 9c328f54741b ("net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for
packet data") communication with nci nfc chips is not working any more.
The mentioned commit tries to fix access of uninitialized data, but
failed to understand that in some cases the data packet is of variable
length and can therefore not be compared to the maximum packet length
given by the sizeof(struct). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rapidio: replace rio_free_net() with kfree() in rio_scan_alloc_net()
When idtab allocation fails, net is not registered with rio_add_net() yet,
so kfree(net) is sufficient to release the memory. Set mport->net to NULL
to avoid dangling pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: chips-media: wave5: Fix kthread worker destruction in polling mode
Fix the cleanup order in polling mode (irq < 0) to prevent kernel warnings
during module removal. Cancel the hrtimer before destroying the kthread
worker to ensure work queues are empty.
In polling mode, the driver uses hrtimer to periodically trigger
wave5_vpu_timer_callback() which queues work via kthread_queue_work().
The kthread_destroy_worker() function validates that both work queues
are empty with WARN_ON(!list_empty(&worker->work_list)) and
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&worker->delayed_work_list)).
The original code called kthread_destroy_worker() before hrtimer_cancel(),
creating a race condition where the timer could fire during worker
destruction and queue new work, triggering the WARN_ON.
This causes the following warning on every module unload in polling mode:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1034 at kernel/kthread.c:1430
kthread_destroy_worker+0x84/0x98
Modules linked in: wave5(-) rpmsg_ctrl rpmsg_char ...
Call trace:
kthread_destroy_worker+0x84/0x98
wave5_vpu_remove+0xc8/0xe0 [wave5]
platform_remove+0x30/0x58
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: renesas: rz-du: mipi_dsi: fix kernel panic when rebooting for some panels
Since commit 56de5e305d4b ("clk: renesas: r9a07g044: Add MSTOP for RZ/G2L")
we may get the following kernel panic, for some panels, when rebooting:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
Call trace:
...
do_serror+0x28/0x68
el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x50
el1h_64_error+0x6c/0x70
rzg2l_mipi_dsi_host_transfer+0x114/0x458 (P)
mipi_dsi_device_transfer+0x44/0x58
mipi_dsi_dcs_set_display_off_multi+0x9c/0xc4
ili9881c_unprepare+0x38/0x88
drm_panel_unprepare+0xbc/0x108
This happens for panels that need to send MIPI-DSI commands in their
unprepare() callback. Since the MIPI-DSI interface is stopped at that
point, rzg2l_mipi_dsi_host_transfer() triggers the kernel panic.
Fix by moving rzg2l_mipi_dsi_stop() to new callback function
rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_post_disable().
With this change we now have the correct power-down/stop sequence:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
rzg2l-mipi-dsi 10850000.dsi: rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_disable(): entry
ili9881c-dsi 10850000.dsi.0: ili9881c_unprepare(): entry
rzg2l-mipi-dsi 10850000.dsi: rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_post_disable(): entry
reboot: Restarting system |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: hv: Fix double ida_free in hv_pci_probe error path
If hv_pci_probe() fails after storing the domain number in
hbus->bridge->domain_nr, there is a call to free this domain_nr via
pci_bus_release_emul_domain_nr(), however, during cleanup, the bridge
release callback pci_release_host_bridge_dev() also frees the domain_nr
causing ida_free to be called on same ID twice and triggering following
warning:
ida_free called for id=28971 which is not allocated.
WARNING: lib/idr.c:594 at ida_free+0xdf/0x160, CPU#0: kworker/0:2/198
Call Trace:
pci_bus_release_emul_domain_nr+0x17/0x20
pci_release_host_bridge_dev+0x4b/0x60
device_release+0x3b/0xa0
kobject_put+0x8e/0x220
devm_pci_alloc_host_bridge_release+0xe/0x20
devres_release_all+0x9a/0xd0
device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0xa0
really_probe+0x1c5/0x3f0
vmbus_add_channel_work+0x135/0x1a0
Fix this by letting pci core handle the free domain_nr and remove
the explicit free called in pci-hyperv driver. |
