| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.60 and 9.6.0-alpha.54, an attacker who obtains a user's password and a single MFA recovery code can reuse that recovery code an unlimited number of times by sending concurrent login requests. This defeats the single-use design of recovery codes. The attack requires the user's password, a valid recovery code, and the ability to send concurrent requests within milliseconds. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.60 and 9.6.0-alpha.54. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: i801: Revert "i2c: i801: replace acpi_lock with I2C bus lock"
This reverts commit f707d6b9e7c18f669adfdb443906d46cfbaaa0c1.
Under rare circumstances, multiple udev threads can collect i801 device
info on boot and walk i801_acpi_io_handler somewhat concurrently. The
first will note the area is reserved by acpi to prevent further touches.
This ultimately causes the area to be deregistered. The second will
enter i801_acpi_io_handler after the area is unregistered but before a
check can be made that the area is unregistered. i2c_lock_bus relies on
the now unregistered area containing lock_ops to lock the bus. The end
result is a kernel panic on boot with the following backtrace;
[ 14.971872] ioatdma 0000:09:00.2: enabling device (0100 -> 0102)
[ 14.971873] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 14.971880] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 14.971884] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 14.971887] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 14.971894] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 14.971900] CPU: 5 PID: 956 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.14.0-611.5.1.el9_7.x86_64 #1
[ 14.971905] Hardware name: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX BIOS 1.20.10.SV91 01/30/2023
[ 14.971908] RIP: 0010:i801_acpi_io_handler+0x2d/0xb0 [i2c_i801]
[ 14.971929] Code: 00 00 49 8b 40 20 41 57 41 56 4d 8b b8 30 04 00 00 49 89 ce 41 55 41 89 d5 41 54 49 89 f4 be 02 00 00 00 55 4c 89 c5 53 89 fb <48> 8b 00 4c 89 c7 e8 18 61 54 e9 80 bd 80 04 00 00 00 75 09 4c 3b
[ 14.971933] RSP: 0018:ffffbaa841483838 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 14.971938] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9685e01ba568
[ 14.971941] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 14.971944] RBP: ffff9685ca22f028 R08: ffff9685ca22f028 R09: ffff9685ca22f028
[ 14.971948] R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000580 R12: 0000000000000580
[ 14.971951] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff9685e01ba568 R15: ffff9685c222f000
[ 14.971954] FS: 00007f8287c0ab40(0000) GS:ffff96a47f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 14.971959] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 14.971963] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000168090001 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[ 14.971966] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 14.971968] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 14.971972] Call Trace:
[ 14.971977] <TASK>
[ 14.971981] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 14.971994] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 14.972003] ? acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x16e/0x3c0
[ 14.972014] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[ 14.972021] ? page_fault_oops+0x132/0x170
[ 14.972028] ? exc_page_fault+0x61/0x150
[ 14.972036] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 14.972045] ? i801_acpi_io_handler+0x2d/0xb0 [i2c_i801]
[ 14.972061] acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x16e/0x3c0
[ 14.972069] ? __pfx_i801_acpi_io_handler+0x10/0x10 [i2c_i801]
[ 14.972085] acpi_ex_access_region+0x5b/0xd0
[ 14.972093] acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0x73/0x2e0
[ 14.972100] acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0x8e/0x230
[ 14.972106] acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x23d/0x310
[ 14.972114] acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0xad/0x110
[ 14.972121] acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x321/0x510
[ 14.972127] acpi_ps_parse_loop+0xf7/0x680
[ 14.972136] acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x17a/0x3d0
[ 14.972143] acpi_ps_execute_method+0x137/0x270
[ 14.972150] acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1f4/0x2e0
[ 14.972158] acpi_evaluate_object+0x134/0x2f0
[ 14.972164] acpi_evaluate_integer+0x50/0xe0
[ 14.972173] ? vsnprintf+0x24b/0x570
[ 14.972181] acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x23/0x70
[ 14.972189] get_ac_property+0x4e/0x60
[ 14.972195] power_supply_show_property+0x90/0x1f0
[ 14.972205] add_prop_uevent+0x29/0x90
[ 14.972213] power_supply_uevent+0x109/0x1d0
[ 14.972222] dev_uevent+0x10e/0x2f0
[ 14.972228] uevent_show+0x8e/0x100
[ 14.972236] dev_attr_show+0x19
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (w83791d) Convert macros to functions to avoid TOCTOU
The macro FAN_FROM_REG evaluates its arguments multiple times. When used
in lockless contexts involving shared driver data, this leads to
Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race conditions, potentially
causing divide-by-zero errors.
Convert the macro to a static function. This guarantees that arguments
are evaluated only once (pass-by-value), preventing the race
conditions.
Additionally, in store_fan_div, move the calculation of the minimum
limit inside the update lock. This ensures that the read-modify-write
sequence operates on consistent data.
Adhere to the principle of minimal changes by only converting macros
that evaluate arguments multiple times and are used in lockless
contexts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dst: fix races in rt6_uncached_list_del() and rt_del_uncached_list()
syzbot was able to crash the kernel in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev()
in an interesting way [1]
Crash happens in list_del_init()/INIT_LIST_HEAD() while writing
list->prev, while the prior write on list->next went well.
static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
{
WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list); // This went well
WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list); // Crash, @list has been freed.
}
Issue here is that rt6_uncached_list_del() did not attempt to lock
ul->lock, as list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached) returned
true because the WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list) happened on the other CPU.
We might use list_del_init_careful() and list_empty_careful(),
or make sure rt6_uncached_list_del() always grabs the spinlock
whenever rt->dst.rt_uncached_list has been set.
A similar fix is neeed for IPv4.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880294cfa78 by task kworker/u8:14/3450
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3450 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline]
list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline]
rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline]
rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020
addrconf_ifdown+0x143/0x18a0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3853
addrconf_notify+0x1bc/0x1050 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:-1
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline]
netif_close_many+0x29c/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1785
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xb50/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:12353
ops_exit_rtnl_list net/core/net_namespace.c:187 [inline]
ops_undo_list+0x3dc/0x990 net/core/net_namespace.c:248
cleanup_net+0x4de/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:696
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
Allocated by task 803:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270
dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333
mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entr
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
functionfs: fix the open/removal races
ffs_epfile_open() can race with removal, ending up with file->private_data
pointing to freed object.
There is a total count of opened files on functionfs (both ep0 and
dynamic ones) and when it hits zero, dynamic files get removed.
Unfortunately, that removal can happen while another thread is
in ffs_epfile_open(), but has not incremented the count yet.
In that case open will succeed, leaving us with UAF on any subsequent
read() or write().
The root cause is that ffs->opened is misused; atomic_dec_and_test() vs.
atomic_add_return() is not a good idea, when object remains visible all
along.
To untangle that
* serialize openers on ffs->mutex (both for ep0 and for dynamic files)
* have dynamic ones use atomic_inc_not_zero() and fail if we had
zero ->opened; in that case the file we are opening is doomed.
* have the inodes of dynamic files marked on removal (from the
callback of simple_recursive_removal()) - clear ->i_private there.
* have open of dynamic ones verify they hadn't been already removed,
along with checking that state is FFS_ACTIVE. |
| Versions of the package jsrsasign before 11.1.1 are vulnerable to Division by zero due to the RSASetPublic/KEYUTIL parsing path in ext/rsa.js and the BigInteger.modPowInt reduction logic in ext/jsbn.js. An attacker can force RSA public-key operations (e.g., verify and encryption) to collapse to deterministic zero outputs and hide “invalid key” errors by supplying a JWK whose modulus decodes to zero. |
| The Intel EPT paging code uses an optimization to defer flushing of any cached
EPT state until the p2m lock is dropped, so that multiple modifications done
under the same locked region only issue a single flush.
Freeing of paging structures however is not deferred until the flushing is
done, and can result in freed pages transiently being present in cached state.
Such stale entries can point to memory ranges not owned by the guest, thus
allowing access to unintended memory regions. |
| The JetFormBuilder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read via path traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.5.6.2. This is due to the 'Uploaded_File::set_from_array' method accepting user-supplied file paths from the Media Field preset JSON payload without validating that the path belongs to the WordPress uploads directory. Combined with an insufficient same-file check in 'File_Tools::is_same_file' that only compares basenames, this makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to exfiltrate arbitrary local files as email attachments by submitting a crafted form request when the form is configured with a Media Field and a Send Email action with file attachment. |
| Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage`-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, `auth()` from `@clerk/nextjs/server` returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue. |
| OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain a time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerability in approval-bound system.run execution where the cwd parameter is validated at approval time but resolved at execution time. Attackers can retarget a symlinked cwd between approval and execution to bypass command execution restrictions and execute arbitrary commands on node hosts. |
| OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.1 fail to pin executable identity for non-path-like argv[0] tokens in system.run approvals, allowing post-approval executable rebind attacks. Attackers can modify PATH resolution after approval to execute a different binary than the operator approved, enabling arbitrary command execution. |
| SandboxJS is a JavaScript sandboxing library. Prior to 0.8.35, SandboxJS timers have an execution-quota bypass. A global tick state (`currentTicks.current`) is shared between sandboxes. Timer string handlers are compiled at execution time using that global tick state rather than the scheduling sandbox's tick object. In multi-tenant / concurrent sandbox scenarios, another sandbox can overwrite `currentTicks.current` between scheduling and execution, causing the timer callback to run under a different sandbox's tick budget and bypass the original sandbox's execution quota/watchdog. Version 0.8.35 fixes this issue. |
| Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to 9.6.0-alpha.28 and 8.6.48, the password reset mechanism does not enforce single-use guarantees for reset tokens. When a user requests a password reset, the generated token can be consumed by multiple concurrent requests within a short time window. An attacker who has intercepted a password reset token can race the legitimate user's password reset request, causing both requests to succeed. This may result in the legitimate user believing their password was changed successfully while the attacker's password takes effect instead. All Parse Server deployments that use the password reset feature are affected. Starting in versions 9.6.0-alpha.28 and 8.6.48, the password reset token is now atomically validated and consumed as part of the password update operation. The database query that updates the password includes the reset token as a condition, ensuring that only one concurrent request can successfully consume the token. Subsequent requests using the same token will fail because the token has already been cleared. There is no known workaround other than upgrading. |
| OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.2 contain a race condition vulnerability in ZIP extraction that allows local attackers to write files outside the intended destination directory. Attackers can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race between path validation and file write operations by rebinding parent directory symlinks to redirect writes outside the extraction root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix data-race warning and potential load/store tearing
Fix the following:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker / rxrpc_send_data_packet
which is reporting an issue with the reads and writes to ->last_tx_at in:
conn->peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
and:
keepalive_at = peer->last_tx_at + RXRPC_KEEPALIVE_TIME;
The lockless accesses to these to values aren't actually a problem as the
read only needs an approximate time of last transmission for the purposes
of deciding whether or not the transmission of a keepalive packet is
warranted yet.
Also, as ->last_tx_at is a 64-bit value, tearing can occur on a 32-bit
arch.
Fix both of these by switching to an unsigned int for ->last_tx_at and only
storing the LSW of the time64_t. It can then be reconstructed at need
provided no more than 68 years has elapsed since the last transmission. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: mmp_pdma: Fix race condition in mmp_pdma_residue()
Add proper locking in mmp_pdma_residue() to prevent use-after-free when
accessing descriptor list and descriptor contents.
The race occurs when multiple threads call tx_status() while the tasklet
on another CPU is freeing completed descriptors:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
mmp_pdma_tx_status()
mmp_pdma_residue()
-> NO LOCK held
list_for_each_entry(sw, ..)
DMA interrupt
dma_do_tasklet()
-> spin_lock(&desc_lock)
list_move(sw->node, ...)
spin_unlock(&desc_lock)
| dma_pool_free(sw) <- FREED!
-> access sw->desc <- UAF!
This issue can be reproduced when running dmatest on the same channel with
multiple threads (threads_per_chan > 1).
Fix by protecting the chain_running list iteration and descriptor access
with the chan->desc_lock spinlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: improve shutdown sequence
Alexander Sverdlin presents 2 problems during shutdown with the
lan9303 driver. One is specific to lan9303 and the other just happens
to reproduce there.
The first problem is that lan9303 is unique among DSA drivers in that it
calls dev_get_drvdata() at "arbitrary runtime" (not probe, not shutdown,
not remove):
phy_state_machine()
-> ...
-> dsa_user_phy_read()
-> ds->ops->phy_read()
-> lan9303_phy_read()
-> chip->ops->phy_read()
-> lan9303_mdio_phy_read()
-> dev_get_drvdata()
But we never stop the phy_state_machine(), so it may continue to run
after dsa_switch_shutdown(). Our common pattern in all DSA drivers is
to set drvdata to NULL to suppress the remove() method that may come
afterwards. But in this case it will result in an NPD.
The second problem is that the way in which we set
dp->conduit->dsa_ptr = NULL; is concurrent with receive packet
processing. dsa_switch_rcv() checks once whether dev->dsa_ptr is NULL,
but afterwards, rather than continuing to use that non-NULL value,
dev->dsa_ptr is dereferenced again and again without NULL checks:
dsa_conduit_find_user() and many other places. In between dereferences,
there is no locking to ensure that what was valid once continues to be
valid.
Both problems have the common aspect that closing the conduit interface
solves them.
In the first case, dev_close(conduit) triggers the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN
event in dsa_user_netdevice_event() which closes user ports as well.
dsa_port_disable_rt() calls phylink_stop(), which synchronously stops
the phylink state machine, and ds->ops->phy_read() will thus no longer
call into the driver after this point.
In the second case, dev_close(conduit) should do this, as per
Documentation/networking/driver.rst:
| Quiescence
| ----------
|
| After the ndo_stop routine has been called, the hardware must
| not receive or transmit any data. All in flight packets must
| be aborted. If necessary, poll or wait for completion of
| any reset commands.
So it should be sufficient to ensure that later, when we zeroize
conduit->dsa_ptr, there will be no concurrent dsa_switch_rcv() call
on this conduit.
The addition of the netif_device_detach() function is to ensure that
ioctls, rtnetlinks and ethtool requests on the user ports no longer
propagate down to the driver - we're no longer prepared to handle them.
The race condition actually did not exist when commit 0650bf52b31f
("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")
first introduced dsa_switch_shutdown(). It was created later, when we
stopped unregistering the user interfaces from a bad spot, and we just
replaced that sequence with a racy zeroization of conduit->dsa_ptr
(one which doesn't ensure that the interfaces aren't up). |
| A race condition was found in the QXL driver in the Linux kernel. The qxl_mode_dumb_create() function dereferences the qobj returned by the qxl_gem_object_create_with_handle(), but the handle is the only one holding a reference to it. This flaw allows an attacker to guess the returned handle value and trigger a use-after-free issue, potentially leading to a denial of service or privilege escalation. |
| OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an approval bypass vulnerability in system.run execution that allows attackers to execute commands from unintended filesystem locations by rebinding writable parent symlinks in the current working directory after approval. An attacker can modify mutable parent symlink path components between approval and execution time to redirect command execution to a different location while preserving the visible working directory string. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Check for NOT_READY flag state after locking
Currently the check for NOT_READY flag is performed before obtaining the
necessary lock. This opens a possibility for race condition when the flow
is concurrently removed from unready_flows list by the workqueue task,
which causes a double-removal from the list and a crash[0]. Fix the issue
by moving the flag check inside the section protected by
uplink_priv->unready_flows_lock mutex.
[0]:
[44376.389654] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] SMP
[44376.391665] CPU: 7 PID: 59123 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.4.0-rc4+ #1
[44376.392984] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[44376.395342] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[44376.396857] Code: 00 48 8b b8 68 ce 02 00 e8 8a 4d 02 00 4c 8d a8 a8 01 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 8b 79 88 e1 48 8b 83 98 06 00 00 48 8b 93 90 06 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 89 83 90 06
[44376.399167] RSP: 0018:ffff88812cc97570 EFLAGS: 00010246
[44376.399680] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff8881088e3800 RCX: ffff8881881bac00
[44376.400337] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff88812cc97500 RDI: ffff8881242f71b0
[44376.401001] RBP: ffff88811cbb0940 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001
[44376.401663] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88812c944000
[44376.402342] R13: ffff8881242f71a8 R14: ffff8881222b4000 R15: 0000000000000000
[44376.402999] FS: 00007f0451104800(0000) GS:ffff88852cb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[44376.403787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[44376.404343] CR2: 0000000000489108 CR3: 0000000123a79003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
[44376.405004] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[44376.405665] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[44376.406339] Call Trace:
[44376.406651] <TASK>
[44376.406939] ? die_addr+0x33/0x90
[44376.407311] ? exc_general_protection+0x192/0x390
[44376.407795] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
[44376.408292] ? mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[44376.408876] __mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peer_flow+0xbc/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[44376.409482] mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x42/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[44376.410055] mlx5e_flow_put+0x25/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[44376.410529] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x24b/0x350 [mlx5_core]
[44376.411043] tc_setup_cb_reoffload+0x22/0x80
[44376.411462] fl_reoffload+0x261/0x2f0 [cls_flower]
[44376.411907] ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_ft_cb+0x160/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[44376.412481] ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_ft_cb+0x160/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[44376.413044] tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x76/0x170
[44376.413497] tcf_block_unbind+0x7b/0xd0
[44376.413881] tcf_block_setup+0x17d/0x1c0
[44376.414269] tcf_block_offload_cmd.isra.0+0xf1/0x130
[44376.414725] tcf_block_offload_unbind+0x43/0x70
[44376.415153] __tcf_block_put+0x82/0x150
[44376.415532] ingress_destroy+0x22/0x30 [sch_ingress]
[44376.415986] qdisc_destroy+0x3b/0xd0
[44376.416343] qdisc_graft+0x4d0/0x620
[44376.416706] tc_get_qdisc+0x1c9/0x3b0
[44376.417074] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x29c/0x390
[44376.419978] ? rep_movs_alternative+0x3a/0xa0
[44376.420399] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x120/0x120
[44376.420813] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
[44376.421192] netlink_unicast+0x1f6/0x2c0
[44376.421573] netlink_sendmsg+0x232/0x4a0
[44376.421980] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
[44376.422328] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x1e0
[44376.422709] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0
[44376.423127] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0
[44376.423495] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8b/0xc0
[44376.423869] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[44376.424226] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[44376.424587] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[44376.425046] RIP: 0033:0x7f045134f887
[44376.425403] Code: 0a 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00
---truncated--- |
