| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix using untrusted value of pkt_len in ice_vc_fdir_parse_raw()
Fix using the untrusted value of proto->raw.pkt_len in function
ice_vc_fdir_parse_raw() by verifying if it does not exceed the
VIRTCHNL_MAX_SIZE_RAW_PACKET value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't clobber ret in btrfs_validate_super()
Commit 2a9bb78cfd36 ("btrfs: validate system chunk array at
btrfs_validate_super()") introduces a call to validate_sys_chunk_array()
in btrfs_validate_super(), which clobbers the value of ret set earlier.
This has the effect of negating the validity checks done earlier, making
it so btrfs could potentially try to mount invalid filesystems. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Mask the bd_cnt field in the TX BD properly
The bd_cnt field in the TX BD specifies the total number of BDs for
the TX packet. The bd_cnt field has 5 bits and the maximum number
supported is 32 with the value 0.
CONFIG_MAX_SKB_FRAGS can be modified and the total number of SKB
fragments can approach or exceed the maximum supported by the chip.
Add a macro to properly mask the bd_cnt field so that the value 32
will be properly masked and set to 0 in the bd_cnd field.
Without this patch, the out-of-range bd_cnt value will corrupt the
TX BD and may cause TX timeout.
The next patch will check for values exceeding 32. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix kernel panic during FW release
This fixes a kernel panic seen during release FW in a stress test
scenario where WLAN and BT FW download occurs simultaneously, and due to
a HW bug, chip sends out only 1 bootloader signatures.
When driver receives the bootloader signature, it enters FW download
mode, but since no consequtive bootloader signatures seen, FW file is
not requested.
After 60 seconds, when FW download times out, release_firmware causes a
kernel panic.
[ 2601.949184] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000312e6f006573
[ 2601.992076] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000111802000
[ 2601.992080] [0000312e6f006573] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 2601.992087] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 2601.992091] Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg btnxpuart(O) pciexxx(O) mlan(O) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce snd_soc_fsl_easrc snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card imx8_media_dev(C) snd_soc_fsl_micfil polyval_generic snd_soc_fsl_xcvr snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_imx_audmux snd_soc_fsl_asrc snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_imx_hdmi snd_soc_fsl_aud2htx snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma dw_hdmi_cec flexcan can_dev
[ 2602.001825] CPU: 2 PID: 20060 Comm: hciconfig Tainted: G C O 6.6.23-lts-next-06236-gb586a521770e #1
[ 2602.010182] Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
[ 2602.010185] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 2602.010191] pc : _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x68
[ 2602.010201] lr : free_fw_priv+0x20/0xfc
[ 2602.020561] sp : ffff800089363b30
[ 2602.020563] x29: ffff800089363b30 x28: ffff0000d0eb5880 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 2602.020570] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000d728b330 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 2602.020577] x23: ffff0000dc856f38
[ 2602.033797] x22: ffff800089363b70 x21: ffff0000dc856000
[ 2602.033802] x20: ff00312e6f006573 x19: ffff0000d0d9ea80 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 2602.033809] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000aaaad80dd480
[ 2602.083320] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000000001b9 x12: 0000000000000002
[ 2602.083326] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff800089363a30
[ 2602.083333] x8 : ffff0001793d75c0 x7 : ffff0000d6dbc400 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 2602.083339] x5 : 00000000410fd030 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
[ 2602.083346] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ff00312e6f006573
[ 2602.083354] Call trace:
[ 2602.083356] _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x68
[ 2602.083364] release_firmware+0x48/0x6c
[ 2602.083370] nxp_setup+0x3c4/0x540 [btnxpuart]
[ 2602.083383] hci_dev_open_sync+0xf0/0xa34
[ 2602.083391] hci_dev_open+0xd8/0x178
[ 2602.083399] hci_sock_ioctl+0x3b0/0x590
[ 2602.083405] sock_do_ioctl+0x60/0x118
[ 2602.083413] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x374
[ 2602.091430] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf0
[ 2602.091437] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
[ 2602.091445] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
[ 2602.091452] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 2602.091457] el0_svc+0x40/0xe4
[ 2602.091465] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
[ 2602.091470] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm/pat: Fix VM_PAT handling when fork() fails in copy_page_range()
If track_pfn_copy() fails, we already added the dst VMA to the maple
tree. As fork() fails, we'll cleanup the maple tree, and stumble over
the dst VMA for which we neither performed any reservation nor copied
any page tables.
Consequently untrack_pfn() will see VM_PAT and try obtaining the
PAT information from the page table -- which fails because the page
table was not copied.
The easiest fix would be to simply clear the VM_PAT flag of the dst VMA
if track_pfn_copy() fails. However, the whole thing is about "simply"
clearing the VM_PAT flag is shaky as well: if we passed track_pfn_copy()
and performed a reservation, but copying the page tables fails, we'll
simply clear the VM_PAT flag, not properly undoing the reservation ...
which is also wrong.
So let's fix it properly: set the VM_PAT flag only if the reservation
succeeded (leaving it clear initially), and undo the reservation if
anything goes wrong while copying the page tables: clearing the VM_PAT
flag after undoing the reservation.
Note that any copied page table entries will get zapped when the VMA will
get removed later, after copy_page_range() succeeded; as VM_PAT is not set
then, we won't try cleaning VM_PAT up once more and untrack_pfn() will be
happy. Note that leaving these page tables in place without a reservation
is not a problem, as we are aborting fork(); this process will never run.
A reproducer can trigger this usually at the first try:
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/raw/main/reproducers/pat_fork.c
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 11650 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:983 get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 11650 Comm: repro3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5+ #92
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
untrack_pfn+0x52/0x110
unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
unmap_vmas+0x105/0x1f0
exit_mmap+0xf6/0x460
__mmput+0x4b/0x120
copy_process+0x1bf6/0x2aa0
kernel_clone+0xab/0x440
__do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
Likely this case was missed in:
d155df53f310 ("x86/mm/pat: clear VM_PAT if copy_p4d_range failed")
... and instead of undoing the reservation we simply cleared the VM_PAT flag.
Keep the documentation of these functions in include/linux/pgtable.h,
one place is more than sufficient -- we should clean that up for the other
functions like track_pfn_remap/untrack_pfn separately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spufs: fix gang directory lifetimes
prior to "[POWERPC] spufs: Fix gang destroy leaks" we used to have
a problem with gang lifetimes - creation of a gang returns opened
gang directory, which normally gets removed when that gets closed,
but if somebody has created a context belonging to that gang and
kept it alive until the gang got closed, removal failed and we
ended up with a leak.
Unfortunately, it had been fixed the wrong way. Dentry of gang
directory was no longer pinned, and rmdir on close was gone.
One problem was that failure of open kept calling simple_rmdir()
as cleanup, which meant an unbalanced dput(). Another bug was
in the success case - gang creation incremented link count on
root directory, but that was no longer undone when gang got
destroyed.
Fix consists of
* reverting the commit in question
* adding a counter to gang, protected by ->i_rwsem
of gang directory inode.
* having it set to 1 at creation time, dropped
in both spufs_dir_close() and spufs_gang_close() and bumped
in spufs_create_context(), provided that it's not 0.
* using simple_recursive_removal() to take the gang
directory out when counter reaches zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: Fix qid report in airoha_tc_get_htb_get_leaf_queue()
Fix the following kernel warning deleting HTB offloaded leafs and/or root
HTB qdisc in airoha_eth driver properly reporting qid in
airoha_tc_get_htb_get_leaf_queue routine.
$tc qdisc replace dev eth1 root handle 10: htb offload
$tc class add dev eth1 arent 10: classid 10:4 htb rate 100mbit ceil 100mbit
$tc qdisc replace dev eth1 parent 10:4 handle 4: ets bands 8 \
quanta 1514 3028 4542 6056 7570 9084 10598 12112
$tc qdisc del dev eth1 root
[ 55.827864] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 55.832493] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2678 at 0xffffffc0798695a4
[ 55.956510] CPU: 3 PID: 2678 Comm: tc Tainted: G O 6.6.71 #0
[ 55.963557] Hardware name: Airoha AN7581 Evaluation Board (DT)
[ 55.969383] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 55.976344] pc : 0xffffffc0798695a4
[ 55.979851] lr : 0xffffffc079869a20
[ 55.983358] sp : ffffffc0850536a0
[ 55.986665] x29: ffffffc0850536a0 x28: 0000000000000024 x27: 0000000000000001
[ 55.993800] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff8008b19000 x24: ffffff800222e800
[ 56.000935] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff8008b19000
[ 56.008071] x20: ffffff8002225800 x19: ffffff800379d000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 56.015206] x17: ffffffbf9ea59000 x16: ffffffc080018000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 56.022342] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001
[ 56.029478] x11: ffffffc081471008 x10: ffffffc081575a98 x9 : 0000000000000000
[ 56.036614] x8 : ffffffc08167fd40 x7 : ffffffc08069e104 x6 : ffffff8007f86000
[ 56.043748] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001
[ 56.050884] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000250 x0 : ffffff800222c000
[ 56.058020] Call trace:
[ 56.060459] 0xffffffc0798695a4
[ 56.063618] 0xffffffc079869a20
[ 56.066777] __qdisc_destroy+0x40/0xa0
[ 56.070528] qdisc_put+0x54/0x6c
[ 56.073748] qdisc_graft+0x41c/0x648
[ 56.077324] tc_get_qdisc+0x168/0x2f8
[ 56.080978] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x230/0x330
[ 56.085076] netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x128
[ 56.088913] rtnetlink_rcv+0x14/0x1c
[ 56.092490] netlink_unicast+0x1e0/0x2c8
[ 56.096413] netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3c8
[ 56.100337] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c4/0x274
[ 56.104261] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0
[ 56.107924] __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x98
[ 56.111492] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x28
[ 56.115580] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x58/0xfc
[ 56.120285] do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xbc
[ 56.123592] el0_svc+0x18/0x4c
[ 56.126647] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x118/0x124
[ 56.131005] el0t_64_sync+0x150/0x154
[ 56.134660] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: decrease cached dst counters in dst_release
Upstream fix ac888d58869b ("net: do not delay dst_entries_add() in
dst_release()") moved decrementing the dst count from dst_destroy to
dst_release to avoid accessing already freed data in case of netns
dismantle. However in case CONFIG_DST_CACHE is enabled and OvS+tunnels
are used, this fix is incomplete as the same issue will be seen for
cached dsts:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff5aabf6b5c000
Call trace:
percpu_counter_add_batch+0x3c/0x160 (P)
dst_release+0xec/0x108
dst_cache_destroy+0x68/0xd8
dst_destroy+0x13c/0x168
dst_destroy_rcu+0x1c/0xb0
rcu_do_batch+0x18c/0x7d0
rcu_core+0x174/0x378
rcu_core_si+0x18/0x30
Fix this by invalidating the cache, and thus decrementing cached dst
counters, in dst_release too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Increase ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN up to 16
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 1 by default, but some LoongArch-specific devices
(such as APBDMA) require 16 bytes alignment. When the data buffer length
is too small, the hardware may make an error writing cacheline. Thus, it
is dangerous to allocate a small memory buffer for DMA. It's always safe
to define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN as L1_CACHE_BYTES but unnecessary (kmalloc()
need small memory objects). Therefore, just increase it to 16. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: BPF: Don't override subprog's return value
The verifier test `calls: div by 0 in subprog` triggers a panic at the
ld.bu instruction. The ld.bu insn is trying to load byte from memory
address returned by the subprog. The subprog actually set the correct
address at the a5 register (dedicated register for BPF return values).
But at commit 73c359d1d356 ("LoongArch: BPF: Sign-extend return values")
we also sign extended a5 to the a0 register (return value in LoongArch).
For function call insn, we later propagate the a0 register back to a5
register. This is right for native calls but wrong for bpf2bpf calls
which expect zero-extended return value in a5 register. So only move a0
to a5 for native calls (i.e. non-BPF_PSEUDO_CALL). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/microcode/AMD: Fix __apply_microcode_amd()'s return value
When verify_sha256_digest() fails, __apply_microcode_amd() should propagate
the failure by returning false (and not -1 which is promoted to true). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Fix flush_tlb_range() when used for zapping normal PMDs
On the following path, flush_tlb_range() can be used for zapping normal
PMD entries (PMD entries that point to page tables) together with the PTE
entries in the pointed-to page table:
collapse_pte_mapped_thp
pmdp_collapse_flush
flush_tlb_range
The arm64 version of flush_tlb_range() has a comment describing that it can
be used for page table removal, and does not use any last-level
invalidation optimizations. Fix the X86 version by making it behave the
same way.
Currently, X86 only uses this information for the following two purposes,
which I think means the issue doesn't have much impact:
- In native_flush_tlb_multi() for checking if lazy TLB CPUs need to be
IPI'd to avoid issues with speculative page table walks.
- In Hyper-V TLB paravirtualization, again for lazy TLB stuff.
The patch "x86/mm: only invalidate final translations with INVLPGB" which
is currently under review (see
<https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241230175550.4046587-13-riel@surriel.com/>)
would probably be making the impact of this a lot worse. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add bounds check for durable handle context
Add missing bounds check for durable handle context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add bounds check for create lease context
Add missing bounds check for create lease context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: reject FOLL_SPLIT_PMD with hugetlb VMAs
Patch series "mm: fixes for device-exclusive entries (hmm)", v2.
Discussing the PageTail() call in make_device_exclusive_range() with
Willy, I recently discovered [1] that device-exclusive handling does not
properly work with THP, making the hmm-tests selftests fail if THPs are
enabled on the system.
Looking into more details, I found that hugetlb is not properly fenced,
and I realized that something that was bugging me for longer -- how
device-exclusive entries interact with mapcounts -- completely breaks
migration/swapout/split/hwpoison handling of these folios while they have
device-exclusive PTEs.
The program below can be used to allocate 1 GiB worth of pages and making
them device-exclusive on a kernel with CONFIG_TEST_HMM.
Once they are device-exclusive, these folios cannot get swapped out
(proc$pid/smaps_rollup will always indicate 1 GiB RSS no matter how much
one forces memory reclaim), and when having a memory block onlined to
ZONE_MOVABLE, trying to offline it will loop forever and complain about
failed migration of a page that should be movable.
# echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state
# echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state
# ./hmm-swap &
... wait until everything is device-exclusive
# echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state
[ 285.193431][T14882] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000
index:0x7f20671f7 pfn:0x442b6a
[ 285.196618][T14882] memcg:ffff888179298000
[ 285.198085][T14882] anon flags: 0x5fff0000002091c(referenced|uptodate|
dirty|active|owner_2|swapbacked|node=1|zone=3|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 285.201734][T14882] raw: ...
[ 285.204464][T14882] raw: ...
[ 285.207196][T14882] page dumped because: migration failure
[ 285.209072][T14882] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[ 285.210915][T14882] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype
Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO),
id 14926, tgid 14926 (hmm-swap), ts 254506295376, free_ts 227402023774
[ 285.216765][T14882] post_alloc_hook+0x197/0x1b0
[ 285.218874][T14882] get_page_from_freelist+0x76e/0x3280
[ 285.220864][T14882] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x38e/0x2740
[ 285.223302][T14882] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fc/0x540
[ 285.225130][T14882] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x36/0x340
[ 285.227222][T14882] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xee/0x1a0
[ 285.229074][T14882] __handle_mm_fault+0x2b38/0x56a0
[ 285.230822][T14882] handle_mm_fault+0x368/0x9f0
...
This series fixes all issues I found so far. There is no easy way to fix
without a bigger rework/cleanup. I have a bunch of cleanups on top (some
previous sent, some the result of the discussion in v1) that I will send
out separately once this landed and I get to it.
I wish we could just use some special present PROT_NONE PTEs instead of
these (non-present, non-none) fake-swap entries; but that just results in
the same problem we keep having (lack of spare PTE bits), and staring at
other similar fake-swap entries, that ship has sailed.
With this series, make_device_exclusive() doesn't actually belong into
mm/rmap.c anymore, but I'll leave moving that for another day.
I only tested this series with the hmm-tests selftests due to lack of HW,
so I'd appreciate some testing, especially if the interaction between two
GPUs wanting a device-exclusive entry works as expected.
<program>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/ioctl.h>
#define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd)
struct hmm_dmirror_cmd {
__u64 addr;
__u64 ptr;
__u64 npages;
__u64 cpages;
__u64 faults;
};
const size_t size = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024ul;
const size_t chunk_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024ul;
int m
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: socket: Lookup orig tuple for IPv6 SNAT
nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4 does the conntrack lookup for IPv4 packets to
restore the original 5-tuple in case of SNAT, to be able to find the
right socket (if any). Then socket_match() can correctly check whether
the socket was transparent.
However, the IPv6 counterpart (nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6) lacks this
conntrack lookup, making xt_socket fail to match on the socket when the
packet was SNATed. Add the same logic to nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6.
IPv6 SNAT is used in Kubernetes clusters for pod-to-world packets, as
pods' addresses are in the fd00::/8 ULA subnet and need to be replaced
with the node's external address. Cilium leverages Envoy to enforce L7
policies, and Envoy uses transparent sockets. Cilium inserts an iptables
prerouting rule that matches on `-m socket --transparent` and redirects
the packets to localhost, but it fails to match SNATed IPv6 packets due
to that missing conntrack lookup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcachefs: bch2_ioctl_subvolume_destroy() fixes
bch2_evict_subvolume_inodes() was getting stuck - due to incorrectly
pruning the dcache.
Also, fix missing permissions checks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Unconditionally save+flush host FPSIMD/SVE/SME state
There are several problems with the way hyp code lazily saves the host's
FPSIMD/SVE state, including:
* Host SVE being discarded unexpectedly due to inconsistent
configuration of TIF_SVE and CPACR_ELx.ZEN. This has been seen to
result in QEMU crashes where SVE is used by memmove(), as reported by
Eric Auger:
https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-68997
* Host SVE state is discarded *after* modification by ptrace, which was an
unintentional ptrace ABI change introduced with lazy discarding of SVE state.
* The host FPMR value can be discarded when running a non-protected VM,
where FPMR support is not exposed to a VM, and that VM uses
FPSIMD/SVE. In these cases the hyp code does not save the host's FPMR
before unbinding the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, leaving a stale
value in memory.
Avoid these by eagerly saving and "flushing" the host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME
state when loading a vCPU such that KVM does not need to save any of the
host's FPSIMD/SVE/SME state. For clarity, fpsimd_kvm_prepare() is
removed and the necessary call to fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state() is
placed in kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(). As 'fpsimd_state' and 'fpmr_ptr'
should not be used, they are set to NULL; all uses of these will be
removed in subsequent patches.
Historical problems go back at least as far as v5.17, e.g. erroneous
assumptions about TIF_SVE being clear in commit:
8383741ab2e773a9 ("KVM: arm64: Get rid of host SVE tracking/saving")
... and so this eager save+flush probably needs to be backported to ALL
stable trees. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix incorrect validation for num_aces field of smb_acl
parse_dcal() validate num_aces to allocate posix_ace_state_array.
if (num_aces > ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct smb_ace *))
It is an incorrect validation that we can create an array of size ULONG_MAX.
smb_acl has ->size field to calculate actual number of aces in request buffer
size. Use this to check invalid num_aces. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/netfs/read_collect: add to next->prev_donated
If multiple subrequests donate data to the same "next" request
(depending on the subrequest completion order), each of them would
overwrite the `prev_donated` field, causing data corruption and a
BUG() crash ("Can't donate prior to front"). |
