| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid touching checkpointed data in get_victim()
In CP disabling mode, there are two issues when using LFS or SSR | AT_SSR
mode to select victim:
1. LFS is set to find source section during GC, the victim should have
no checkpointed data, since after GC, section could not be set free for
reuse.
Previously, we only check valid chpt blocks in current segment rather
than section, fix it.
2. SSR | AT_SSR are set to find target segment for writes which can be
fully filled by checkpointed and newly written blocks, we should never
select such segment, otherwise it can cause panic or data corruption
during allocation, potential case is described as below:
a) target segment has 'n' (n < 512) ckpt valid blocks
b) GC migrates 'n' valid blocks to other segment (segment is still
in dirty list)
c) GC migrates '512 - n' blocks to target segment (segment has 'n'
cp_vblocks and '512 - n' vblocks)
d) If GC selects target segment via {AT,}SSR allocator, however there
is no free space in targe segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Fix potential null dereference on pointer status
There are calls to idxd_cmd_exec that pass a null status pointer however
a recent commit has added an assignment to *status that can end up
with a null pointer dereference. The function expects a null status
pointer sometimes as there is a later assignment to *status where
status is first null checked. Fix the issue by null checking status
before making the assignment.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Explicit null dereferenced") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethernet:enic: Fix a use after free bug in enic_hard_start_xmit
In enic_hard_start_xmit, it calls enic_queue_wq_skb(). Inside
enic_queue_wq_skb, if some error happens, the skb will be freed
by dev_kfree_skb(skb). But the freed skb is still used in
skb_tx_timestamp(skb).
My patch makes enic_queue_wq_skb() return error and goto spin_unlock()
incase of error. The solution is provided by Govind.
See https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/4/30/961. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: always set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during entry
Zenghui reports that booting a kernel with "irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1"
on the command line hits a warning during kernel entry, due to the way
we manipulate the PMR.
Early in the entry sequence, we call lockdep_hardirqs_off() to inform
lockdep that interrupts have been masked (as the HW sets DAIF wqhen
entering an exception). Architecturally PMR_EL1 is not affected by
exception entry, and we don't set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in the PMR early in
the exception entry sequence, so early in exception entry the PMR can
indicate that interrupts are unmasked even though they are masked by
DAIF.
If DEBUG_LOCKDEP is selected, lockdep_hardirqs_off() will check that
interrupts are masked, before we set GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET in any of the
exception entry paths, and hence lockdep_hardirqs_off() will WARN() that
something is amiss.
We can avoid this by consistently setting GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET during
exception entry so that kernel code sees a consistent environment. We
must also update local_daif_inherit() to undo this, as currently only
touches DAIF. For other paths, local_daif_restore() will update both
DAIF and the PMR. With this done, we can remove the existing special
cases which set this later in the entry code.
We always use (GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET) for consistency with
local_daif_save(), as this will warn if it ever encounters
(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET), and never sets this itself. This
matches the gic_prio_kentry_setup that we have to retain for
ret_to_user.
The original splat from Zenghui's report was:
| DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled())
| WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 125 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4258 lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 3 PID: 125 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.12.0-rc8+ #463
| Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
| pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
| pc : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| lr : lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| sp : ffff80002a39bad0
| pmr_save: 000000e0
| x29: ffff80002a39bad0 x28: ffff0000de214bc0
| x27: ffff0000de1c0400 x26: 000000000049b328
| x25: 0000000000406f30 x24: ffff0000de1c00a0
| x23: 0000000020400005 x22: ffff8000105f747c
| x21: 0000000096000044 x20: 0000000000498ef9
| x19: ffff80002a39bc88 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800011c61eb0
| x15: ffff800011700a88 x14: 0720072007200720
| x13: 0720072007200720 x12: 0720072007200720
| x11: 0720072007200720 x10: 0720072007200720
| x9 : ffff80002a39bad0 x8 : ffff80002a39bad0
| x7 : ffff8000119f0800 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
| x5 : ffff8000119f07a8 x4 : 0000000000000001
| x3 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x2 : ffff800011730538
| x1 : 9bcdab23f2432800 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
| lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xd4/0xe8
| enter_from_kernel_mode.isra.5+0x7c/0xa8
| el1_abort+0x24/0x100
| el1_sync_handler+0x80/0xd0
| el1_sync+0x6c/0x100
| __arch_clear_user+0xc/0x90
| load_elf_binary+0x9fc/0x1450
| bprm_execve+0x404/0x880
| kernel_execve+0x180/0x188
| call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xdc/0x158
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nftables: Fix a memleak from userdata error path in new objects
Release object name if userdata allocation fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_probe(): fix an error pointer dereference in probe
When we converted this code to use dev_err_probe() we accidentally
removed a return. It means that if devm_clk_get() it will lead to an
Oops when we call clk_get_rate() on the next line. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: mcp251x: fix resume from sleep before interface was brought up
Since 8ce8c0abcba3 the driver queues work via priv->restart_work when
resuming after suspend, even when the interface was not previously
enabled. This causes a null dereference error as the workqueue is only
allocated and initialized in mcp251x_open().
To fix this we move the workqueue init to mcp251x_can_probe() as there
is no reason to do it later and repeat it whenever mcp251x_open() is
called.
[mkl: fix error handling in mcp251x_stop()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix use-after-free in i40e_client_subtask()
Currently the call to i40e_client_del_instance frees the object
pf->cinst, however pf->cinst->lan_info is being accessed after
the free. Fix this by adding the missing return.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Read from pointer after free") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
userfaultfd: release page in error path to avoid BUG_ON
Consider the following sequence of events:
1. Userspace issues a UFFD ioctl, which ends up calling into
shmem_mfill_atomic_pte(). We successfully account the blocks, we
shmem_alloc_page(), but then the copy_from_user() fails. We return
-ENOENT. We don't release the page we allocated.
2. Our caller detects this error code, tries the copy_from_user() after
dropping the mmap_lock, and retries, calling back into
shmem_mfill_atomic_pte().
3. Meanwhile, let's say another process filled up the tmpfs being used.
4. So shmem_mfill_atomic_pte() fails to account blocks this time, and
immediately returns - without releasing the page.
This triggers a BUG_ON in our caller, which asserts that the page
should always be consumed, unless -ENOENT is returned.
To fix this, detect if we have such a "dangling" page when accounting
fails, and if so, release it before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: gadget: Free gadget structure only after freeing endpoints
As part of commit e81a7018d93a ("usb: dwc3: allocate gadget structure
dynamically") the dwc3_gadget_release() was added which will free
the dwc->gadget structure upon the device's removal when
usb_del_gadget_udc() is called in dwc3_gadget_exit().
However, simply freeing the gadget results a dangling pointer
situation: the endpoints created in dwc3_gadget_init_endpoints()
have their dep->endpoint.ep_list members chained off the list_head
anchored at dwc->gadget->ep_list. Thus when dwc->gadget is freed,
the first dwc3_ep in the list now has a dangling prev pointer and
likewise for the next pointer of the dwc3_ep at the tail of the list.
The dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints() that follows will result in a
use-after-free when it calls list_del().
This was caught by enabling KASAN and performing a driver unbind.
The recent commit 568262bf5492 ("usb: dwc3: core: Add shutdown
callback for dwc3") also exposes this as a panic during shutdown.
There are a few possibilities to fix this. One could be to perform
a list_del() of the gadget->ep_list itself which removes it from
the rest of the dwc3_ep chain.
Another approach is what this patch does, by splitting up the
usb_del_gadget_udc() call into its separate "del" and "put"
components. This allows dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints() to be
called before the gadget is finally freed with usb_put_gadget(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: scan: Fix a memory leak in an error handling path
If 'acpi_device_set_name()' fails, we must free
'acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id' or there is a (potential) memory leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kyber: fix out of bounds access when preempted
__blk_mq_sched_bio_merge() gets the ctx and hctx for the current CPU and
passes the hctx to ->bio_merge(). kyber_bio_merge() then gets the ctx
for the current CPU again and uses that to get the corresponding Kyber
context in the passed hctx. However, the thread may be preempted between
the two calls to blk_mq_get_ctx(), and the ctx returned the second time
may no longer correspond to the passed hctx. This "works" accidentally
most of the time, but it can cause us to read garbage if the second ctx
came from an hctx with more ctx's than the first one (i.e., if
ctx->index_hw[hctx->type] > hctx->nr_ctx).
This manifested as this UBSAN array index out of bounds error reported
by Jakub:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:130:9
index 13106 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [128]'
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xa4/0xe5
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold.13+0x2a/0x34
queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x476/0x480
do_raw_spin_lock+0x1c2/0x1d0
kyber_bio_merge+0x112/0x180
blk_mq_submit_bio+0x1f5/0x1100
submit_bio_noacct+0x7b0/0x870
submit_bio+0xc2/0x3a0
btrfs_map_bio+0x4f0/0x9d0
btrfs_submit_data_bio+0x24e/0x310
submit_one_bio+0x7f/0xb0
submit_extent_page+0xc4/0x440
__extent_writepage_io+0x2b8/0x5e0
__extent_writepage+0x28d/0x6e0
extent_write_cache_pages+0x4d7/0x7a0
extent_writepages+0xa2/0x110
do_writepages+0x8f/0x180
__writeback_single_inode+0x99/0x7f0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x34e/0x790
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x9e/0x120
wb_writeback+0x4d2/0x660
wb_workfn+0x64d/0xa10
process_one_work+0x53a/0xa80
worker_thread+0x69/0x5b0
kthread+0x20b/0x240
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Only Kyber uses the hctx, so fix it by passing the request_queue to
->bio_merge() instead. BFQ and mq-deadline just use that, and Kyber can
map the queues itself to avoid the mismatch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix race condition of overwrite vs truncate
pos_fsstress testcase complains a panic as belew:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/compress.c:1082!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 4 PID: 2753477 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G OE 5.12.0-rc1-custom #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-252:16)
RIP: 0010:prepare_compress_overwrite+0x4c0/0x760 [f2fs]
Call Trace:
f2fs_prepare_compress_overwrite+0x5f/0x80 [f2fs]
f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x468/0x8a0 [f2fs]
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x2a4/0x2f0 [f2fs]
do_writepages+0x38/0xc0
__writeback_single_inode+0x44/0x2a0
writeback_sb_inodes+0x223/0x4d0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x56/0xf0
wb_writeback+0x1dd/0x290
wb_workfn+0x309/0x500
process_one_work+0x220/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x53/0x420
kthread+0x12f/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
The root cause is truncate() may race with overwrite as below,
so that one reference count left in page can not guarantee the
page attaching in mapping tree all the time, after truncation,
later find_lock_page() may return NULL pointer.
- prepare_compress_overwrite
- f2fs_pagecache_get_page
- unlock_page
- f2fs_setattr
- truncate_setsize
- truncate_inode_page
- delete_from_page_cache
- find_lock_page
Fix this by avoiding referencing updated page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Retrieve all the PDOs instead of just the first 4
commit 4dbc6a4ef06d ("usb: typec: ucsi: save power data objects
in PD mode") introduced retrieval of the PDOs when connected to a
PD-capable source. But only the first 4 PDOs are received since
that is the maximum number that can be fetched at a time given the
MESSAGE_IN length limitation (16 bytes). However, as per the PD spec
a connected source may advertise up to a maximum of 7 PDOs.
If such a source is connected it's possible the PPM could have
negotiated a power contract with one of the PDOs at index greater
than 4, and would be reflected in the request data object's (RDO)
object position field. This would result in an out-of-bounds access
when the rdo_index() is used to index into the src_pdos array in
ucsi_psy_get_voltage_now().
With the help of the UBSAN -fsanitize=array-bounds checker enabled
this exact issue is revealed when connecting to a PD source adapter
that advertise 5 PDOs and the PPM enters a contract having selected
the 5th one.
[ 151.545106][ T70] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 151.545112][ T70] Internal error: BRK handler: f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[ 151.545499][ T70] pc : ucsi_psy_get_prop+0x208/0x20c
[ 151.545507][ T70] lr : power_supply_show_property+0xc0/0x328
...
[ 151.545542][ T70] Call trace:
[ 151.545544][ T70] ucsi_psy_get_prop+0x208/0x20c
[ 151.545546][ T70] power_supply_uevent+0x1a4/0x2f0
[ 151.545550][ T70] dev_uevent+0x200/0x384
[ 151.545555][ T70] kobject_uevent_env+0x1d4/0x7e8
[ 151.545557][ T70] power_supply_changed_work+0x174/0x31c
[ 151.545562][ T70] process_one_work+0x244/0x6f0
[ 151.545564][ T70] worker_thread+0x3e0/0xa64
We can resolve this by instead retrieving and storing up to the
maximum of 7 PDOs in the con->src_pdos array. This would involve
two calls to the GET_PDOS command. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: core: fix ioctl handlers removal
Currently ioctl handlers are removed twice. For the first time during
iio_device_unregister() then later on inside
iio_device_unregister_eventset() and iio_buffers_free_sysfs_and_mask().
Double free leads to kernel panic.
Fix this by not touching ioctl handlers list directly but rather
letting code responsible for registration call the matching cleanup
routine itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Always make an attempt to map eVMCS after migration
When enlightened VMCS is in use and nested state is migrated with
vmx_get_nested_state()/vmx_set_nested_state() KVM can't map evmcs
page right away: evmcs gpa is not 'struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_hdr'
and we can't read it from VP assist page because userspace may decide
to restore HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE after restoring nested state
(and QEMU, for example, does exactly that). To make sure eVMCS is
mapped /vmx_set_nested_state() raises KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
request.
Commit f2c7ef3ba955 ("KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
on nested vmexit") added KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES clearing to
nested_vmx_vmexit() to make sure MSR permission bitmap is not switched
when an immediate exit from L2 to L1 happens right after migration (caused
by a pending event, for example). Unfortunately, in the exact same
situation we still need to have eVMCS mapped so
nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow() reflects changes in VMCS12 to eVMCS.
As a band-aid, restore nested_get_evmcs_page() when clearing
KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES in nested_vmx_vmexit(). The 'fix' is far
from being ideal as we can't easily propagate possible failures and even if
we could, this is most likely already too late to do so. The whole
'KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES' idea for mapping eVMCS after migration
seems to be fragile as we diverge too much from the 'native' path when
vmptr loading happens on vmx_set_nested_state(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix crash in auto_retire
The retire logic uses the 2 lower bits of the pointer to the retire
function to store flags. However, the auto_retire function is not
guaranteed to be aligned to a multiple of 4, which causes crashes as
we jump to the wrong address, for example like this:
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804300Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876901] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804310Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876906] CPU: 7 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u16:6 Tainted: G U 5.4.105-13595-g3cd84167b2df #1
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804311Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876907] Hardware name: Google Volteer2/Volteer2, BIOS Google_Volteer2.13672.76.0 02/22/2021
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804312Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876911] Workqueue: events_unbound active_work
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804313Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876914] RIP: 0010:auto_retire+0x1/0x20
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804314Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876916] Code: e8 01 f2 ff ff eb 02 31 db 48 89 d8 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 f0 ff 87 c8 00 00 00 0f 88 ab 47 4a 00 31 c0 5d c3 0f <1f> 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 f0 ff 8f c8 00 00 00 0f 88 9a 47 4a 00 74
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804319Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876918] RSP: 0018:ffff9b4d809fbe38 EFLAGS: 00010286
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804320Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876919] RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff927915079600 RCX: 0000000000000007
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804320Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876921] RDX: ffff9b4d809fbe40 RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffff927915079600
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804321Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876922] RBP: ffff9b4d809fbe68 R08: 8080808080808080 R09: fefefefefefefeff
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804321Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876924] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: ffffffff92e44bd8 R12: ffff9279150796a0
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804322Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876925] R13: ffff92791c368180 R14: ffff927915079640 R15: 000000001c867605
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804323Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876926] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92791ffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804323Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876928] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804324Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876929] CR2: 0000239514955000 CR3: 00000007f82da001 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804325Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876930] PKRU: 55555554
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804325Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876931] Call Trace:
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804326Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876935] __active_retire+0x77/0xcf
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804326Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876939] process_one_work+0x1da/0x394
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804327Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876941] worker_thread+0x216/0x375
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804327Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876944] kthread+0x147/0x156
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804335Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876946] ? pr_cont_work+0x58/0x58
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804335Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876948] ? kthread_blkcg+0x2e/0x2e
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804336Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876950] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
2021-04-24T18:03:53.804336Z WARNING kernel: [ 516.876952] Modules linked in: cdc_mbim cdc_ncm cdc_wdm xt_cgroup rfcomm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg xt_MASQUERADE uinput snd_soc_rt5682_sdw snd_soc_rt5682 snd_soc_max98373_sdw snd_soc_max98373 snd_soc_rl6231 regmap_sdw snd_soc_sof_sdw snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_soc_dmic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_sof_pci snd_sof_intel_hda_common intel_ipu6_psys snd_sof_xtensa_dsp soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_ext_core soundwire_bus snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core intel_ipu6_isys videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videobuf2_memops mei_hdcp intel_ipu6 ov2740 ov8856 at24 sx9310 dw9768 v4l2_fwnode cros_ec_typec intel_pmc_mux roles acpi_als typec fuse iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_lid_angle cros_ec_sensors cros
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix leaked dentry
Since commit 6815f479ca90 ("ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in
ovl_lookup()"), overlayfs doesn't put temporary dentry when there is a
metacopy error, which leads to dentry leaks when shutting down the related
superblock:
overlayfs: refusing to follow metacopy origin for (/file0)
...
BUG: Dentry (____ptrval____){i=3f33,n=file3} still in use (1) [unmount of overlay overlay]
...
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 432 at umount_check.cold+0x107/0x14d
CPU: 1 PID: 432 Comm: unmount-overlay Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #1
...
RIP: 0010:umount_check.cold+0x107/0x14d
...
Call Trace:
d_walk+0x28c/0x950
? dentry_lru_isolate+0x2b0/0x2b0
? __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20
do_one_tree+0x33/0x60
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x78/0x1d0
generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x440
kill_anon_super+0x3e/0x70
deactivate_locked_super+0xc4/0x160
deactivate_super+0xfa/0x140
cleanup_mnt+0x22e/0x370
__cleanup_mnt+0x1a/0x30
task_work_run+0x139/0x210
do_exit+0xb0c/0x2820
? __kasan_check_read+0x1d/0x30
? find_held_lock+0x35/0x160
? lock_release+0x1b6/0x660
? mm_update_next_owner+0xa20/0xa20
? reacquire_held_locks+0x3f0/0x3f0
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x22/0x30
do_group_exit+0x135/0x380
__do_sys_exit_group.isra.0+0x20/0x20
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3c/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
...
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of overlay. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day...
This fix has been tested with a syzkaller reproducer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though
its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in
attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM,
it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.
SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current
task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission
("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means
that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored
generates a bogus permission check and audit record.
Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when
its result would be honored. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: pci_generic: Remove WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from state workqueue
A recent change created a dedicated workqueue for the state-change work
with WQ_HIGHPRI (no strong reason for that) and WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flags,
but the state-change work (mhi_pm_st_worker) does not guarantee forward
progress under memory pressure, and will even wait on various memory
allocations when e.g. creating devices, loading firmware, etc... The
work is then not part of a memory reclaim path...
Moreover, this causes a warning in check_flush_dependency() since we end
up in code that flushes a non-reclaim workqueue:
[ 40.969601] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM mhi_hiprio_wq:mhi_pm_st_worker [mhi] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events_highpri:flush_backlog
[ 40.969612] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 158 at kernel/workqueue.c:2607 check_flush_dependency+0x11c/0x140
[ 40.969733] Call Trace:
[ 40.969740] __flush_work+0x97/0x1d0
[ 40.969745] ? wake_up_process+0x15/0x20
[ 40.969749] ? insert_work+0x70/0x80
[ 40.969750] ? __queue_work+0x14a/0x3e0
[ 40.969753] flush_work+0x10/0x20
[ 40.969756] rollback_registered_many+0x1c9/0x510
[ 40.969759] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x94/0x120
[ 40.969761] unregister_netdev+0x1d/0x30
[ 40.969765] mhi_net_remove+0x1a/0x40 [mhi_net]
[ 40.969770] mhi_driver_remove+0x124/0x250 [mhi]
[ 40.969776] device_release_driver_internal+0xf0/0x1d0
[ 40.969778] device_release_driver+0x12/0x20
[ 40.969782] bus_remove_device+0xe1/0x150
[ 40.969786] device_del+0x17b/0x3e0
[ 40.969791] mhi_destroy_device+0x9a/0x100 [mhi]
[ 40.969796] ? mhi_unmap_single_use_bb+0x50/0x50 [mhi]
[ 40.969799] device_for_each_child+0x5e/0xa0
[ 40.969804] mhi_pm_st_worker+0x921/0xf50 [mhi] |
