| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tools/rtla: Fix clang warning about mount_point var size
clang is reporting this warning:
$ make HOSTCC=clang CC=clang LLVM_IAS=1
[...]
clang -O -g -DVERSION=\"6.8.0-rc3\" -flto=auto -fexceptions
-fstack-protector-strong -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
-fstack-clash-protection -Wall -Werror=format-security
-Wp,-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wp,-D_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS
$(pkg-config --cflags libtracefs) -c -o src/utils.o src/utils.c
src/utils.c:548:66: warning: 'fscanf' may overflow; destination buffer in argument 3 has size 1024, but the corresponding specifier may require size 1025 [-Wfortify-source]
548 | while (fscanf(fp, "%*s %" STR(MAX_PATH) "s %99s %*s %*d %*d\n", mount_point, type) == 2) {
| ^
Increase mount_point variable size to MAX_PATH+1 to avoid the overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: taprio: proper TCA_TAPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX check
taprio_parse_tc_entry() is not correctly checking
TCA_TAPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX attribute:
int tc; // Signed value
tc = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TAPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX]);
if (tc >= TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "TC entry index out of range");
return -ERANGE;
}
syzbot reported that it could fed arbitary negative values:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1722:18
shift exponent -2147418108 is negative
CPU: 0 PID: 5066 Comm: syz-executor367 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-syzkaller-00136-gc8a5c731fd12 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3c7/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:386
taprio_parse_tc_entry net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1722 [inline]
taprio_parse_tc_entries net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1768 [inline]
taprio_change+0xb87/0x57d0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1877
taprio_init+0x9da/0xc80 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2134
qdisc_create+0x9d4/0x1190 net/sched/sch_api.c:1355
tc_modify_qdisc+0xa26/0x1e40 net/sched/sch_api.c:1776
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6617
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f1b2dea3759
Code: 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d7 19 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd4de452f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1b2def0390 RCX: 00007f1b2dea3759
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000555500000000 R09: 0000555500000000
R10: 0000555500000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd4de45340
R13: 00007ffd4de45310 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffd4de45340 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Prevent potential buffer overflow in map_hw_resources
Adds a check in the map_hw_resources function to prevent a potential
buffer overflow. The function was accessing arrays using an index that
could potentially be greater than the size of the arrays, leading to a
buffer overflow.
Adds a check to ensure that the index is within the bounds of the
arrays. If the index is out of bounds, an error message is printed and
break it will continue execution with just ignoring extra data early to
prevent the buffer overflow.
Reported by smatch:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_wrapper.c:79 map_hw_resources() error: buffer overflow 'dml2->v20.scratch.dml_to_dc_pipe_mapping.disp_cfg_to_stream_id' 6 <= 7
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_wrapper.c:81 map_hw_resources() error: buffer overflow 'dml2->v20.scratch.dml_to_dc_pipe_mapping.disp_cfg_to_plane_id' 6 <= 7 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Sparse-Memory/vmemmap out-of-bounds fix
Offset vmemmap so that the first page of vmemmap will be mapped
to the first page of physical memory in order to ensure that
vmemmap’s bounds will be respected during
pfn_to_page()/page_to_pfn() operations.
The conversion macros will produce correct SV39/48/57 addresses
for every possible/valid DRAM_BASE inside the physical memory limits.
v2:Address Alex's comments |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: fsl-qdma: fix SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read
There is chip (ls1028a) errata:
The SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read transactions by QDMA.
Unaligned read transactions initiated by QDMA may stall in the NOC
(Network On-Chip), causing a deadlock condition. Stalled transactions will
trigger completion timeouts in PCIe controller.
Workaround:
Enable prefetch by setting the source descriptor prefetchable bit
( SD[PF] = 1 ).
Implement this workaround. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: arm64/neonbs - fix out-of-bounds access on short input
The bit-sliced implementation of AES-CTR operates on blocks of 128
bytes, and will fall back to the plain NEON version for tail blocks or
inputs that are shorter than 128 bytes to begin with.
It will call straight into the plain NEON asm helper, which performs all
memory accesses in granules of 16 bytes (the size of a NEON register).
For this reason, the associated plain NEON glue code will copy inputs
shorter than 16 bytes into a temporary buffer, given that this is a rare
occurrence and it is not worth the effort to work around this in the asm
code.
The fallback from the bit-sliced NEON version fails to take this into
account, potentially resulting in out-of-bounds accesses. So clone the
same workaround, and use a temp buffer for short in/outputs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Fix protection fault in iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova
Syzkaller reported the following bug:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000038: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000001c0-0x00000000000001c7]
Call Trace:
lock_acquire
lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x4f0
down_read+0x93/0x4a0
iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova+0x56/0x1f0
iommufd_test_access_rw.isra.0+0x2ec/0x390
iommufd_test+0x1058/0x1e30
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x381/0x510
vfs_ioctl
__do_sys_ioctl
__se_sys_ioctl
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x170/0x1e0
do_syscall_x64
do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140
This is because the new iommufd_access_change_ioas() sets access->ioas to
NULL during its process, so the lock might be gone in a concurrent racing
context.
Fix this by doing the same access->ioas sanity as iommufd_access_rw() and
iommufd_access_pin_pages() functions do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: nvidia-shield: Add missing null pointer checks to LED initialization
devm_kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
[jkosina@suse.com: tweak changelog a bit] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Change acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS] to acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC]
With default config, the value of NR_CPUS is 64. When HW platform has
more then 64 cpus, system will crash on these platforms. MAX_CORE_PIC
is the maximum cpu number in MADT table (max physical number) which can
exceed the supported maximum cpu number (NR_CPUS, max logical number),
but kernel should not crash. Kernel should boot cpus with NR_CPUS, let
the remainder cpus stay in BIOS.
The potential crash reason is that the array acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS] can
be overflowed when parsing MADT table, and it is obvious that CORE_PIC
should be corresponding to physical core rather than logical core, so it
is better to define the array as acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC].
With the patch, system can boot up 64 vcpus with qemu parameter -smp 128,
otherwise system will crash with the following message.
[ 0.000000] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000420000004259, era == 90000000037a5f0c, ra == 90000000037a46ec
[ 0.000000] Oops[#1]:
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2+ #192
[ 0.000000] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[ 0.000000] pc 90000000037a5f0c ra 90000000037a46ec tp 9000000003c90000 sp 9000000003c93d60
[ 0.000000] a0 0000000000000019 a1 9000000003d93bc0 a2 0000000000000000 a3 9000000003c93bd8
[ 0.000000] a4 9000000003c93a74 a5 9000000083c93a67 a6 9000000003c938f0 a7 0000000000000005
[ 0.000000] t0 0000420000004201 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000001 t3 0000000000000001
[ 0.000000] t4 0000000000000003 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000030 t7 0000000000000063
[ 0.000000] t8 0000000000000014 u0 ffffffffffffffff s9 0000000000000000 s0 9000000003caee98
[ 0.000000] s1 90000000041b0480 s2 9000000003c93da0 s3 9000000003c93d98 s4 9000000003c93d90
[ 0.000000] s5 9000000003caa000 s6 000000000a7fd000 s7 000000000f556b60 s8 000000000e0a4330
[ 0.000000] ra: 90000000037a46ec platform_init+0x214/0x250
[ 0.000000] ERA: 90000000037a5f0c efi_runtime_init+0x30/0x94
[ 0.000000] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
[ 0.000000] PRMD: 00000000 (PPLV0 -PIE -PWE)
[ 0.000000] EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
[ 0.000000] ECFG: 00070800 (LIE=11 VS=7)
[ 0.000000] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0)
[ 0.000000] BADV: 0000420000004259
[ 0.000000] PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
[ 0.000000] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000] Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____))
[ 0.000000] Stack : 9000000003c93a14 9000000003800898 90000000041844f8 90000000037a46ec
[ 0.000000] 000000000a7fd000 0000000008290000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000019d8000 000000000f556b60
[ 0.000000] 000000000a7fd000 000000000f556b08 9000000003ca7700 9000000003800000
[ 0.000000] 9000000003c93e50 9000000003800898 9000000003800108 90000000037a484c
[ 0.000000] 000000000e0a4330 000000000f556b60 000000000a7fd000 000000000f556b08
[ 0.000000] 9000000003ca7700 9000000004184000 0000000000200000 000000000e02b018
[ 0.000000] 000000000a7fd000 90000000037a0790 9000000003800108 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 000000000e0a4330 000000000f556b60 000000000a7fd000
[ 0.000000] 000000000f556b08 000000000eaae298 000000000eaa5040 0000000000200000
[ 0.000000] ...
[ 0.000000] Call Trace:
[ 0.000000] [<90000000037a5f0c>] efi_runtime_init+0x30/0x94
[ 0.000000] [<90000000037a46ec>] platform_init+0x214/0x250
[ 0.000000] [<90000000037a484c>] setup_arch+0x124/0x45c
[ 0.000000] [<90000000037a0790>] start_kernel+0x90/0x670
[ 0.000000] [<900000000378b0d8>] kernel_entry+0xd8/0xdc |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/pci: Skip to handle RAS errors if CXL.mem device is detached
The PCI AER model is an awkward fit for CXL error handling. While the
expectation is that a PCI device can escalate to link reset to recover
from an AER event, the same reset on CXL amounts to a surprise memory
hotplug of massive amounts of memory.
At present, the CXL error handler attempts some optimistic error
handling to unbind the device from the cxl_mem driver after reaping some
RAS register values. This results in a "hopeful" attempt to unplug the
memory, but there is no guarantee that will succeed.
A subsequent AER notification after the memdev unbind event can no
longer assume the registers are mapped. Check for memdev bind before
reaping status register values to avoid crashes of the form:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa00000195e9100
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[...]
RIP: 0010:__cxl_handle_ras+0x30/0x110 [cxl_core]
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x24/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160
? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110
? exc_page_fault+0x113/0x170
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? __pfx_dpc_reset_link+0x10/0x10
? __cxl_handle_ras+0x30/0x110 [cxl_core]
? find_cxl_port+0x59/0x80 [cxl_core]
cxl_handle_rp_ras+0xbc/0xd0 [cxl_core]
cxl_error_detected+0x6c/0xf0 [cxl_core]
report_error_detected+0xc7/0x1c0
pci_walk_bus+0x73/0x90
pcie_do_recovery+0x23f/0x330
Longer term, the unbind and PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT behavior might
need to be replaced with a new PCI_ERS_RESULT_PANIC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery()
mddev_suspend() never stop sync_thread, hence it doesn't make sense to
ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery(), which might cause
sync_thread can't be unregistered.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) suspend the array:
raid_postsuspend
mddev_suspend
2) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
__md_stop_writes
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
3) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
4) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (mddev->suspended)
return; -> return directly
md_read_sync_thread
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery);
-> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 2 hang;
This problem is not just related to dm-raid, fix it by ignoring
suspended array in md_check_recovery(). And follow up patches will
improve dm-raid better to frozen sync thread during suspend. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't suspend the array for interrupted reshape
md_start_sync() will suspend the array if there are spares that can be
added or removed from conf, however, if reshape is still in progress,
this won't happen at all or data will be corrupted(remove_and_add_spares
won't be called from md_choose_sync_action for reshape), hence there is
no need to suspend the array if reshape is not done yet.
Meanwhile, there is a potential deadlock for raid456:
1) reshape is interrupted;
2) set one of the disk WantReplacement, and add a new disk to the array,
however, recovery won't start until the reshape is finished;
3) then issue an IO across reshpae position, this IO will wait for
reshape to make progress;
4) continue to reshape, then md_start_sync() found there is a spare disk
that can be added to conf, mddev_suspend() is called;
Step 4 and step 3 is waiting for each other, deadlock triggered. Noted
this problem is found by code review, and it's not reporduced yet.
Fix this porblem by don't suspend the array for interrupted reshape,
this is safe because conf won't be changed until reshape is done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: virtio/akcipher - Fix stack overflow on memcpy
sizeof(struct virtio_crypto_akcipher_session_para) is less than
sizeof(struct virtio_crypto_op_ctrl_req::u), copying more bytes from
stack variable leads stack overflow. Clang reports this issue by
commands:
make -j CC=clang-14 mrproper >/dev/null 2>&1
make -j O=/tmp/crypto-build CC=clang-14 allmodconfig >/dev/null 2>&1
make -j O=/tmp/crypto-build W=1 CC=clang-14 drivers/crypto/virtio/
virtio_crypto_akcipher_algs.o |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Increase buffer size in afs_update_volume_status()
The max length of volume->vid value is 20 characters.
So increase idbuf[] size up to 24 to avoid overflow.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
[DH: Actually, it's 20 + NUL, so increase it to 24 and use snprintf()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().
syzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0]
When ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour
entry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data.
The arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so
the sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes.
In the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field,
arp_flags. We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's
not a problem.
However, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN),
arp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL)
in arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get().
To avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy().
Note that commit b5f0de6df6dc ("net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible
array in struct sockaddr") just silenced syzkaller.
[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "r->arp_ha.sa_data" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Code: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000
R13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010
FS: 00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261
inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981
sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204
sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce
RIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775) Fix access to temperature configuration registers
The number of temperature configuration registers does
not always match the total number of temperature registers.
This can result in access errors reported if KASAN is enabled.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nct6775_probe+0x5654/0x6fe9 nct6775_core |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fix null-pointer dereference on edid reading
Use i2c adapter when there isn't aux_mode in dc_link to fix a
null-pointer derefence that happens when running
igt@kms_force_connector_basic in a system with DCN2.1 and HDMI connector
detected as below:
[ +0.178146] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000004c0
[ +0.000010] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000005] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000004] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000006] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000006] CPU: 15 PID: 2368 Comm: kms_force_conne Not tainted 6.5.0-asdn+ #152
[ +0.000005] Hardware name: HP HP ENVY x360 Convertible 13-ay1xxx/8929, BIOS F.01 07/14/2021
[ +0.000004] RIP: 0010:i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100
[ +0.000011] Code: ea fc ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 <48> 8b 47 10 48 89 fb 48 83 38 00 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 83 3d 2f 80 16
[ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff9c4f89c0fad0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000080
[ +0.000003] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff9c4f89c0fb20 RDI: 00000000000004b0
[ +0.000003] RBP: ffff9c4f89c0fb80 R08: 0000000000000080 R09: ffff8d8e0b15b980
[ +0.000003] R10: 00000000000380e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000080
[ +0.000002] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff9c4f89c0fb0e R15: ffff9c4f89c0fb0f
[ +0.000004] FS: 00007f9ad2176c40(0000) GS:ffff8d90fe9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000004] CR2: 00000000000004c0 CR3: 0000000121bc4000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
[ +0.000003] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000003] Call Trace:
[ +0.000006] <TASK>
[ +0.000006] ? __die+0x23/0x70
[ +0.000011] ? page_fault_oops+0x17d/0x4c0
[ +0.000008] ? preempt_count_add+0x6e/0xa0
[ +0.000008] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000011] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
[ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100
[ +0.000010] drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0xc2/0x140 [drm]
[ +0.000067] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000006] ? _drm_do_get_edid+0x97/0x3c0 [drm]
[ +0.000043] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000042] edid_block_read+0x3b/0xd0 [drm]
[ +0.000043] _drm_do_get_edid+0xb6/0x3c0 [drm]
[ +0.000041] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm]
[ +0.000043] drm_edid_read_custom+0x37/0xd0 [drm]
[ +0.000044] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x129/0x1d0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000153] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x3b/0x60 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000000] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0xfe/0x3c0 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000000] ? amdgpu_dm_connector_get_modes+0xb6/0x520 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000000] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2ab/0x540 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000000] status_store+0xb2/0x1f0 [drm]
[ +0.000000] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x1d0
[ +0.000000] vfs_write+0x24d/0x440
[ +0.000000] ksys_write+0x6f/0xf0
[ +0.000000] do_syscall_64+0x60/0xc0
[ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000000] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40
[ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0
[ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0
[ +0.000000] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[ +0.000000] RIP: 0033:0x7f9ad46b4b00
[ +0.000000] Code: 40 00 48 8b 15 19 b3 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 80 3d e1 3a 0e 00 00 74 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89
[ +0.000000] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbd3bd6d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ +0.000000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9ad46b4b00
[ +0.000000] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f9ad48a7417 RDI: 0000000000000009
[ +0.000000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dsc: Fix the macro that calculates DSCC_/DSCA_ PPS reg address
Commit bd077259d0a9 ("drm/i915/vdsc: Add function to read any PPS
register") defines a new macro to calculate the DSC PPS register
addresses with PPS number as an input. This macro correctly calculates
the addresses till PPS 11 since the addresses increment by 4. So in that
case the following macro works correctly to give correct register
address:
_MMIO(_DSCA_PPS_0 + (pps) * 4)
However after PPS 11, the register address for PPS 12 increments by 12
because of RC Buffer memory allocation in between. Because of this
discontinuity in the address space, the macro calculates wrong addresses
for PPS 12 - 16 resulting into incorrect DSC PPS parameter value
read/writes causing DSC corruption.
This fixes it by correcting this macro to add the offset of 12 for PPS
>=12.
v3: Add correct paranthesis for pps argument (Jani Nikula)
(cherry picked from commit 6074be620c31dc2ae11af96a1a5ea95580976fb5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-crypt, dm-verity: disable tasklets
Tasklets have an inherent problem with memory corruption. The function
tasklet_action_common calls tasklet_trylock, then it calls the tasklet
callback and then it calls tasklet_unlock. If the tasklet callback frees
the structure that contains the tasklet or if it calls some code that may
free it, tasklet_unlock will write into free memory.
The commits 8e14f610159d and d9a02e016aaf try to fix it for dm-crypt, but
it is not a sufficient fix and the data corruption can still happen [1].
There is no fix for dm-verity and dm-verity will write into free memory
with every tasklet-processed bio.
There will be atomic workqueues implemented in the kernel 6.9 [2]. They
will have better interface and they will not suffer from the memory
corruption problem.
But we need something that stops the memory corruption now and that can be
backported to the stable kernels. So, I'm proposing this commit that
disables tasklets in both dm-crypt and dm-verity. This commit doesn't
remove the tasklet support, because the tasklet code will be reused when
atomic workqueues will be implemented.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/d390d7ee-f142-44d3-822a-87949e14608b@suse.de/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130091300.2968534-1-tj@kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: magnetometer: rm3100: add boundary check for the value read from RM3100_REG_TMRC
Recently, we encounter kernel crash in function rm3100_common_probe
caused by out of bound access of array rm3100_samp_rates (because of
underlying hardware failures). Add boundary check to prevent out of
bound access. |
