| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, he tooltip mouseover handler in app/src/block/popover.ts reads aria-label via getAttribute and passes it through decodeURIComponent before assigning to messageElement.innerHTML in app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41. The encoder used at the producer side, escapeAriaLabel in app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25, only handles HTML special characters (", ', <, literal <) — it leaves %XX URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing %3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E round-trips through escapeAriaLabel and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then decodeURIComponent on the consumer side converts %3C to a literal < character (a real <, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to innerHTML, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal <, parses the <img> element, and the onerror handler fires. Because the renderer runs with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), require('child_process') is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0. |
| SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the kernel stores Attribute View (AV / database) names without any HTML escape, then a render template uses raw strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, "${avName}", nodeAvName) to embed the name in HTML before pushing to all clients via WebSocket. Three independent client paths (render.ts:120 → outerHTML, Title.ts:401 → innerHTML, transaction.ts:559 → innerHTML) consume the value without escaping. Because the main BrowserWindow runs nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), HTML injection in the renderer becomes Node.js code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0. |
| `gh` is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 1.6.0 to before 2.92.0, a security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow terminal escape sequence injection when users view GitHub Actions workflow logs using gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed. The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles raw Actions log output. The gh run view --log and gh run view --log-failed commands stream workflow log lines to stdout or the configured pager without sanitizing terminal control sequences. An attacker who can influence GitHub Actions log content, for example via a PR triggered workflow, can embed escape sequences that are replayed in the user's terminal when they inspect the run. Depending on the victim's terminal emulator, injected sequences could change the window title, manipulate on screen content, or in some terminal emulators (such as screen) potentially execute arbitrary commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.92.0. |
| MCP Calculate Server is a mathematical calculation service based on MCP protocol and SymPy library. Prior to 0.1.1, the use of eval() to evaluate mathematical expressions without proper input sanitization leads to remote code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present
The DATA-packet handler in rxrpc_input_call_event() and the RESPONSE
handler in rxrpc_verify_response() copy the skb to a linear one before
calling into the security ops only when skb_cloned() is true. An skb
that is not cloned but still carries externally-owned paged fragments
(e.g. SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set by splice() into a UDP socket via
__ip_append_data, or a chained skb_has_frag_list()) falls through to
the in-place decryption path, which binds the frag pages directly into
the AEAD/skcipher SGL via skb_to_sgvec().
Extend the gate to also unshare when skb_has_frag_list() or
skb_has_shared_frag() is true. This catches the splice-loopback vector
and other externally-shared frag sources while preserving the
zero-copy fast path for skbs whose frags are kernel-private (e.g. NIC
page_pool RX, GRO). The OOM/trace handling already in place is reused. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: serialize sequence allocation under concurrent TLB invalidations
With concurrent TLB invalidations, completion wait randomly gets timed out
because cmd_sem_val was incremented outside the IOMMU spinlock, allowing
CMD_COMPL_WAIT commands to be queued out of sequence and breaking the
ordering assumption in wait_on_sem().
Move the cmd_sem_val increment under iommu->lock so completion sequence
allocation is serialized with command queuing.
And remove the unnecessary return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an
under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared
`ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;
The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds;
it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable.
An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare
ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at
offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header +
4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also
reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448);
smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL
on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel
walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the
OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the
attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are
possible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: meson-spicc: Fix double-put in remove path
meson_spicc_probe() registers the controller with
devm_spi_register_controller(), so teardown already drops the
controller reference via devm cleanup.
Calling spi_controller_put() again in meson_spicc_remove()
causes a double-put. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes
ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting
index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before
accessing path[k].p_idx->ei_block, there is no validation that
p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that
level.
If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted
eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated
buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at
both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent
with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent
tree code. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.5 before 18.9.7, 18.10 before 18.10.6, and 18.11 before 18.11.3 that could have allowed an unauthenticated user to cause denial of service by sending specially crafted payloads on certain API endpoints. |
| ** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A buffer overflow vulnerability in the formWep(), formWlAc(), formPasswordSetup(), formUpgradeCert(), and formDelcert() functions of the “webs” binary in Zyxel NWA1100-N customized firmware version 1.00(AACE.1)C0 could allow an attacker to trigger a denial-of-service (DoS) condition by sending a crafted HTTP request to a vulnerable device. |
| barebox prior to version 2026.04.0 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in DHCP option parsing within the dhcp_message_type() function that fails to verify the options pointer remains within received packet bounds. An attacker on the same broadcast domain can send a crafted DHCP Offer or ACK packet without a proper 0xff end marker to cause the parser to read past valid packet data and potentially crash the system. |
| libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. From to 1.8.7-r1, signed integer overflow in sixel_encode_highcolor's allocation size calculation can lead to a heap buffer overflow. The public sixel_encode entry point validates only that width and height are greater than zero, with no upper bound. width and height are multiplied as plain int when computing the allocation size for paletted_pixels and normalized_pixels. Any caller that asks libsixel to encode a pixel buffer with width times height greater than INT_MAX (about 2.15 billion) will hit a wrapped allocation size; under the right wrap, the malloc succeeds with a buffer much smaller than the encoder expects, and the encoder writes past the end of the heap allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.7-r2. |
| OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.18.0 and 3.1.13.0, the bounds check in TGAInput::decode_pixel computes k + palbytespp as unsigned 32-bit arithmetic. When k = 0xFFFFFFFC and palbytespp = 4, the addition wraps to 0, which compares less than palette_alloc_size and passes the check. The subsequent palette access uses the unwrapped k (0xFFFFFFFC) as the index, reading ~4 GB past the start of the palette buffer — SEGV. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.18.0 and 3.1.13.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: solo6x10: Check for out of bounds chip_id
Clang with CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y noticed a condition where a signed type
(literal "1" is an "int") could end up being shifted beyond 32 bits,
so instrumentation was added (and due to the double is_tw286x() call
seen via inlining), Clang decides the second one must now be undefined
behavior and elides the rest of the function[1]. This is a known problem
with Clang (that is still being worked on), but we can avoid the entire
problem by actually checking the existing max chip ID, and now there is
no runtime instrumentation added at all since everything is known to be
within bounds.
Additionally use an unsigned value for the shift to remove the
instrumentation even without the explicit bounds checking.
[hverkuil: fix checkpatch warning for is_tw286x] |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.2, Vvveb CMS does not validate the sign of the quantity parameter on the cart-add endpoint. Submitting a negative integer is accepted by the server and treated as a normal positive line-item, but with the sign carried through into every downstream computation: line total, sub-total, taxes, and grand total all become negative numbers. The customer-facing cart UI then displays a negative grand total to the user, the checkout flow accepts the negative cart, and the resulting order is persisted in the merchant's database with a negative total column. From the merchant's order management dashboard, this surfaces as a real order with a negative total — an "the merchant owes the customer money" record that no legitimate workflow ever creates. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.8.2. |
| Missing bounds validation in the MQTT v5.0 property parser in coreMQTT before 5.0.1 allows an MQTT broker to cause a denial of service by sending a crafted packet.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to v5.0.1. |
| Buffer overflow for some Intel(R) QAT software drivers for Windows before version 1.13 within Ring 3: User Applications may allow a denial of service. Unprivileged software adversary with an authenticated user combined with a low complexity attack may enable denial of service. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are not present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (low), integrity (low) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.3 before 18.9.7, 18.10 before 18.10.6, and 18.11 before 18.11.3 that could have allowed an authenticated user with developer-role permissions to bypass package protection rules due to improper access control. |
