| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| CTranslate2 before 4.8.1 contains a heap-based buffer overflow in the binary model loader that fails to validate payload length against allocated buffer size. Attackers can craft malicious model files with oversized payload lengths to write past heap allocation boundaries, causing crashes or arbitrary code execution. |
| A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in rpm. Parsing a symlink entry in an untrusted RPM package whose declared RPMTAG_LONGFILESIZES value is 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF causes an integer overflow in iterReadArchiveNext() that shrinks a buffer allocation to one byte, after which the payload's independently-controlled cpio filesize field is used to write attacker-controlled data past the end of that allocation. This is reachable via rpm2cpio, rpm2archive, and rpm -qlvp on an untrusted package. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability found in certain UniFi gateway devices to execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the device. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability found in certain UniFi gateway devices to execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the device. |
| A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability found in certain UniFi gateway devices to execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the device. |
| Wind River VxWorks 7 prior to 26.09, specific system call arguments can result in memory corruption within the memory management subsystem. Fixed in Version 26.09 |
| A flaw has been found in FastStone Image Viewer up to 8.3. The affected element is an unknown function of the component TGA Image Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to out-of-bounds write. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| Das U-Boot with CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG=y parameter fails to clear IP reassembly state after delivering a complete datagram. An attacker who can deliver fragmented IP traffic can execute arbitrary code by sending duplicated last-fragment IP packets.
This issue was fixed in commit b1aec609bb5e0d08c25c888c91935287ab4ee5fa in version 2026.07. |
| A flaw was found in dash. The printf builtin reserves four bytes before converting a Unicode \u or \U escape, but the multi-byte token can need five or six bytes. A local user who can supply such an escape to dash printf or echo %b, including through dash -c and a positional argument, can write one or two bytes past that reservation. |
| X11 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| Catapult DCT2000 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| CSN.1 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| Sharkd utility crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| SPDY protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.8 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.7.1 and iPadOS 26.7.1, macOS Sequoia 15.8.1, macOS Tahoe 26.7.1. Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to arbitrary code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals on versions of iOS before iOS 27. |
| QuickJS commit 04be24600 contains a heap out-of-bounds write condition in JS_ReadFunctionTag(). |
| A flaw was found in libsolv. This heap buffer overflow occurs during the decompression of attacker-controlled compressed data within `.solv` files due to insufficient input validation. An attacker can provide a specially crafted `.solv` file, which, when processed by a vulnerable application, can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. This could result in information disclosure, alteration of program execution, or a denial of service. |
| A potential out of bounds write vulnerability could allow a local privileged attacker to execute code in System Management Mode. |
| The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The ADI MAX32 driver did not honour that contract. start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_max32.c compared buffer_size, a byte count, against a sample count ((1 + extra_samplings) channels), ignoring sizeof(uint16_t), so it accepted a buffer half the required size. The samples are then stored through the uint16_t data->buffer by Wrap_MXC_ADC_GetData(), which writes two bytes per sample and advances the pointer by one uint16_t: in adc_max32_start_channel() for synchronous reads, and in adc_max32_isr() for asynchronous ones. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, passes the check and has its second sample written past the end of the buffer.
On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can make the driver write twice as many bytes as its buffer holds. Because the check scales with extra_samplings, the overrun equals the length of the buffer itself, up to channels * 65536 bytes past its end, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence.
The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the system call itself, the ADC context timer, or the ADC interrupt handler for asynchronous reads), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer.
The fix replaces that check in start_read() with a call to the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c, passing sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started. |
| The userspace verifier z_vrfy_rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0) validated the RTIO object handle and the sqes input array, but not the handle out-parameter. On the first loop iteration it executed *handle = sqe, storing the kernel address of the newly acquired submission-queue entry through a pointer taken verbatim from user mode, with no K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE check in front of it.
Any user-mode thread that has been granted a struct rtio kernel object can invoke the syscall with an arbitrary address in handle. That is the ordinary way an unprivileged thread uses the RTIO API, for example via sensor_read_async_mempool() or the async ADC helpers, which call rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() internally. The store happens in supervisor mode before any submission-entry validation, so it fires regardless of whether the SQE contents are subsequently rejected. Only builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_RTIO are affected; without CONFIG_USERSPACE the verifier is not compiled and the caller is already privileged.
The write address is fully attacker-chosen and the written value is a pointer into the caller's own RTIO ring, whose contents the caller controls (the following *sqe = sqes[i] copies an attacker-supplied struct rtio_sqe into that slot). This yields a write-what-where primitive placing a pointer to attacker-controlled data at any kernel address, sufficient to corrupt kernel function pointers, thread structures, or memory-domain partition tables, and thus to escalate from user mode to kernel mode, defeating the isolation boundary CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce. At minimum it is a reliable kernel memory-corruption and crash primitive. The reporter reproduced the write on qemu_x86: a K_USER thread changed a supervisor global from NULL to a live kernel SQE pointer.
The fix adds K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(handle, sizeof(*handle)) (guarded by the existing optional-NULL semantics) before the loop, so the destination must lie in the calling thread's writable memory domain or the thread is terminated by K_OOPS. The neighbouring verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer(), which checked its buff/buff_len out-parameters only for read although the implementation writes through them, was hardened separately by bea93400138 ("rtio: syscalls: validate output params as writable"); that residual was materially weaker, since a read check still confines the target to the caller's own memory domain. |
