| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| XS::Parse::Infix versions from 0.40 through 0.49 for Perl treat a number as an array reference.
The wrapper function XS::Parse::Infix generates for a list-associative infix operator checks whether arguments are array references, but it tests using SvRV() rather than SvROK(). SvRV() reads a union slot that only holds a referent once SvROK(sv) is true, so the guard never validates that it is a reference. For an IV or NV that slot holds the number itself, SvRV() returns the caller's value and SvTYPE() dereferences it at offset 12. This will generally result in a segmentation fault.
An application that hands the wrapper a list built from decoded input (for example, from JSON) lets whoever supplies a number in that list choose the address that the interpreter dereferences.
An ordinary string's byte 12 is rarely SVt_PVAV so the guard croaks by luck, but an attacker-crafted string carrying 0x0b there passes, and the buffer is then used as an AV head, with AvARRAY taken from bytes 16-23 and its entries pushed onto the Perl stack as live SVs.
A simple proof-of-concept uses the zip operator:
use Syntax::Operator::Zip 'zip';
my @args = ([1], 2);
zip(@args); |
| Access of resource using incompatible type ('type confusion') in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| The native BSD-socket layer recorded a pending asynchronous socket error by type-punning it into struct net_context's void user_data field (ctx->user_data = INT_TO_POINTER(-status) in zsock_accepted_cb(), zsock_received_cb(), zsock_connected_cb() and zsock_close_ctx() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_inet.c), reading it back with POINTER_TO_INT(). That same field is owned by the network stack for listening TCP contexts: net_tcp_accept() stores the parent context pointer there and the TCP core passes it back to the registered accept callback. A failed accept therefore left a small integer (an errno value) where the stack expected a struct net_context .
When the network interface carrying a listening TCP socket goes down, close_tcp_conn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c invokes the accept callback with -ENETDOWN and the context's user_data. In v4.3.0 the callback was not disarmed afterwards, so a second interface-down event forwarded the previously stored errno to zsock_accepted_cb(), which dereferenced it as the parent context and performed several stores through it (sock_set_error()'s read-modify-write of socket_data, k_fifo_cancel_wait(&parent->recv_q)) — the crash described in the fix's commit message. v4.3.1 and v4.4.x carry a later change clearing conn->accept_cb after the error callback (269cb8823d3 on the v4.3 branch, 913fae5169425550f2364655298fceb79b320066 on main), which closes that repeat path; on those releases the poisoned cookie remains reachable only by a narrower race, a handshake completing alongside the interface-down still passing the stale cookie to k_fifo_put(&parent->accept_q, ...), and by getsockopt(SO_ERROR), which reads the field back unconditionally.
On v4.3.0 an application that keeps a listening TCP socket open across repeated link-down events is sufficient to reach the defect; the triggering condition is a network-interface state change, not attacker-supplied packet data, so the practical attacker is one able to force the link down repeatedly (for example an adjacent attacker disrupting a wireless link) or one with local/physical access. Because both the faulting address and the stored data are fixed small constants derived from the errno value, the outcome is a wild-pointer access leading to a kernel fatal error — a denial of service (device crash or reset) rather than an attacker-directed memory corruption.
The fix stores the pending error in a dedicated net_context.sock_error field and converts every producer and consumer to sock_set_error()/sock_get_error(), leaving user_data untouched. As a side effect it also stops getsockopt(SO_ERROR) — which is evaluated unconditionally — from returning the kernel address held in user_data to a userspace application. |
| ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the isInSubnet and isHostInSubnet methods in src/common.ts compare masked binary strings without validating that both operands use the same IP family. A cross-family containment check whose leading address bits match makes the masked strings compare equal even though IPv4 and IPv6 do not share an address space. An allowlist or denylist decision can therefore classify an address outside the intended range as contained. This issue is fixed in version 10.7.1. |
| DBI versions before 1.654 for Perl incorrectly treat numeric values as strings in sql_type_cast_svpv.
When casting to SQL_NUMERIC, sql_type_cast_svpv passes the string pointer and length of the SV to grok_number without stringifying it first. An integer (IV) or floating-point (NV) value has no valid string pointer, so grok_number reads from an invalid address, triggering a segmentation fault.
This is reachable in Perl using the sql_type_cast function:
my $num = 42;
DBI::sql_type_cast( $num, DBI::SQL_NUMERIC, 0 ); |
| DBI versions before 1.654 for Perl incorrectly treat numeric values as strings in FetchHashKeyName.
fetchrow_hashref uses the string pointer of the FetchHashKeyName attribute as the key name without stringifying it first. When FetchHashKeyName has been set to an integer (IV) or floating-point (NV) value, that pointer is invalid, so reading the key name triggers a segmentation fault.
This can be triggered with the following code:
my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:ExampleP:", "", "",
{ RaiseError => 0, PrintError => 0 } );
$dbh->{FetchHashKeyName} = 42;
my $sth = $dbh->prepare("select mode, size, name from .");
$sth->execute;
$sth->fetchrow_hashref; |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. Prior to versions 7.0.16 and 8.0.5, Suricata's IP defragmentation tracker lookup did not verify that an existing tracker used the same IP address family as the packet being processed. Under crafted fragmented IPv4/IPv6 traffic, an IPv6 fragment could be associated with an IPv4 defragmentation tracker. This can lead to a remote packet-triggered crash and denial of service when Suricata performs the relevant defragmentation. Versions 7.0.16 and 8.0.5 contain a fix. As a workaround, if using Suricata as an IDS with AF_PACKET, enabling AF_PACKET's `defrag` option may prevent Suricata from seeing such fragmented packets. |
| libical 4.0.6 contains an incompatible function pointer in icalparameter_string_to_kind(). When parsing iCalendar data containing a parameterized property, the function passes icalparameter_compare_kind_map() to bsearch() through an incompatible comparator function pointer type. bsearch() invokes the callback through the mismatched type, resulting in undefined behavior and process termination, leading to denial of service. |
| libsndfile 1.2.2 contains a misaligned memory access issue in psf_binheader_readf() while parsing WAV fmt chunks. A specially crafted WAV file can cause the function to cast an unaligned destination address to unsigned int * and perform a 4-byte store. This results in undefined behavior leading to denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar
The signal_generate and signal_deliver tracepoints declare their info
argument as a struct kernel_siginfo pointer. btf_ctx_access() therefore
treats it as a trusted pointer for tp_btf programs.
Signal delivery also uses SEND_SIG_NOINFO and SEND_SIG_PRIV as special
values for this argument. Those values are zero and one respectively,
and are not pointers. A tp_btf program can currently dereference either
value and fault the kernel. In particular, signal_generate can run from
timer interrupt context, turning the fault into a kernel panic.
Record both tracepoints in raw_tp_null_args[] and mark argument one as
a non-pointer. This preserves scalar access to the cookie while rejecting
direct and helper-mediated pointer use. Merely marking it nullable would
not suffice because SEND_SIG_PRIV is nonzero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark NULL kptr stores precise
check_map_kptr_access() permits a scalar store into an untrusted kptr
field only when the register is known to contain zero. Unlike other
verifier checks whose outcome depends on a scalar value, it does not mark
that register precise.
A state checkpoint reached with an imprecise zero can therefore prune a
second path that reaches the store with an arbitrary nonzero scalar. The
program can write attacker-controlled bits into the kptr field and load
them back as a PTR_TO_BTF_ID.
Call mark_chain_precision() before accepting a known-zero register. This
forces state equivalence to compare its scalar range and makes the verifier
visit and reject a path carrying a nonzero value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: don't rewrite bpf_fastcall patterns entered by a jump
mark_fastcall_pattern_for_call() must ensure that matched
"spill; call; fill" instruction series is not interrupted by a jump.
Otherwise the rewrite applied by bpf_remove_fastcall_spills_fills()
is not sound.
Record the instructions targeted by jumps in
insn_aux_data[*].jump_target when the CFG is built and use this flag
to stop growing a pattern at such an instruction. Jumps to the first
spill are fine.
Note that existing insn_aux_data[*].jmp_point field can't be reused,
as it marks subprogram return instructions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Require MEM_PERCPU for percpu kptr stores
map_kptr_match_type() treats perm_flags as the set of register type flags
that a kptr field permits. Adding MEM_PERCPU to that set for
BPF_KPTR_PERCPU does not require the source register to carry it, however.
The subset test consequently accepts both a plain bpf_obj_new() allocation
and a referenced kernel pointer into a __percpu_kptr map field.
Loads from the field are always marked MEM_PERCPU. Consumers then treat the
stored value as the cookie returned by bpf_percpu_obj_new(): per-CPU pointer
helpers relocate it, and map teardown selects the per-CPU free path. A plain
allocation can therefore provide an arbitrary kernel read/write, while a
kernel pointer can be relocated into an invalid address or sent through a
missing destructor.
Require the source MEM_PERCPU flag to match the destination field kind.
This preserves valid bpf_percpu_obj_new() stores and rejects both the
program-BTF and kernel-BTF variants. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: don't downgrade half-dead scalar zero spills to STACK_ZERO
states.c:__clean_func_state() can downgrade scalar zero spill to
STACK_ZERO in the following case:
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;
... checkpoint ...
r1 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4);
... no reads from r10-8 ...
Here 4 bytes at r10-8 are dead and verifier changes scalar spill to a
combination: 0000pppp (p stands for poison). Such a change breaks
precision propagation chains. All places that produce STACK_ZERO
should call bpf_mark_chain_precision() for the zero source.
This patch fixes the bug in a simplest way possible:
avoids converting stack spills of zero to STACK_ZERO.
Two smarter approaches are possible:
- do bpf_mark_chain_precision() from __clean_func_state()
- check slot liveness information in check_stack_write_fixed_off()
I investigated both and the changes required are a bit tricky,
hence go with a simple fix for the time being. |
| RouterOS SSH enters the connection protocol after a client-requested rekey even though user authentication was never attempted, allowing an unauthenticated client to open a session channel and send an exec request. On affected builds the server dispatches the command, enabling unauthenticated creation, overwrite, and reconstruction of files in the RouterOS managed file namespace, including support files containing configuration and diagnostic data.This issue was fixed in versions: 6.49.21 (Long-term), 7.23.4 (Long-term) and 7.24.2 (Stable) |
| In Wakapi before 2.17.6, the user caching service allows a lookup to be resolved in an unintended lookup context, leading to account takeover. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack: use get_unaligned_be32() in tcp_sack()
The timestamp-only fast path dereferences the option stream as
*(__be32 *)ptr, which assumes 4-byte alignment that the TCP option
stream does not guarantee. Use get_unaligned_be32() instead, which
reads the value safely and already returns host byte order, so the
htonl() on the comparison constant can be dropped.
This matches the existing get_unaligned_be32() use later in the same
function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: wait for rcu grace period before freeing pernet state
sashiko reports: "nfnl_log_net_exit() calls nf_log_unset(), which
clears the logger pointer without an RCU grace period. Immediately after,
ops_free_list() frees the per-net state while concurrent packets might
still be executing nf_log_packet() under rcu_read_lock()."
Clear the pointer via .pre_exit to make sure rcu readers have completed
before pernet storage is free'd. The change in nf_log_syslog.c is only
done for consistency: it doesn't use pernet data. |
| Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.82 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| pgcollection is an open source extension to PostgreSQL. A type confusion issue in AWS pgcollection 2.0.0 through 2.1.1 might allow an authenticated remote user to execute arbitrary code as the postgres operating system user via crafted SQL statements that rely on mismatched type metadata in collection value retrieval and array conversion functions.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 2.1.2 or later. |