Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| strapi | strapi | affected |
|
||||||
| strapi | @strapi/plugin-users-permissions | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment is a feature of OpenCVE that uses AI to automatically link vendors and products to CVEs. Learn more on GitHub.
No data.
Project Subscriptions
No data.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
 Github GHSA |
GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw | Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 14 May 2026 19:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled. | |
| Title | Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-307 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-14T18:33:56.463Z
Reserved: 2025-11-05T21:15:39.401Z
Link: CVE-2025-64526
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-05-14T19:16:29.233
Modified: 2026-05-14T19:16:29.233
Link: CVE-2025-64526
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-14T20:30:04Z
Weaknesses