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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74523 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: qede: sync udp_tunnel ports outside qede_lock in the recovery path A TX timeout on a qede NIC that has VXLAN/GENEVE tunnel ports configured wedges the rtnetlink control plane of the whole machine: NETDEV WATCHDOG: ens6f1 (qede): transmit queue 2 timed out 10226 ms [qede_tx_timeout:586(ens6f1)]TX timeout on queue 2! [qede_recovery_handler:2665(ens6f0)]Starting a recovery process The recovery path deadlocks on the driver's own mutex: qede_sp_task rtnl_lock() mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- taken qede_recovery_handler qede_load udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf __udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync info->sync_table == qede_udp_tunnel_sync mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- same task: deadlock The mutex is not recursive, so the kworker blocks on itself with rtnl_lock held, and neither lock is ever released. Every task that calls rtnl_lock() afterwards (ip, ovs-vswitchd, lldpad, IPv6 addrconf, sshd) blocks forever while the node still answers ping. In a vmcore from an affected production node rtnl_mutex.owner decodes to the very kworker blocked at the innermost mutex_lock() above. Re-sync the tunnel ports from qede_sp_task() after the internal lock is dropped, still under rtnl_lock as the udp_tunnel API requires. This mirrors qede_open(), which calls udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf() under rtnl without the internal lock. qede_recovery_handler() now returns whether it has successfully reloaded an open device, and the caller re-syncs the ports only in that case. This keeps the old gating exactly: a device that was down or a failed recovery returns false, as those paths never reached the udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf() call before either. This was the only user of the qede_lock()/qede_unlock() helpers, so remove them. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74516 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Update x2APIC MSR intercepts if AVIC is inhibited while L2 is active Always update x2APIC MSR intercepts for L1 when AVIC is deactivated, even if L2 is active and KVM is using a separate MSR bitmap to run L2. If AVIC is fully enabled prior to running L2, and is then inhibited while L2 is active (for a VM-scoped inhibit), then KVM will run L1 with AVIC disabled, but with x2APIC MSR intercepts disabled, i.e. will allow L1 to read most of the host's APIC state, send arbitrary interrupts, change task priority, and ultimately trivially DoS the host. E.g. sending a self-IPI in L1 on HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR, 0xee, with CONFIG_HYPERV=n in the host kernel as a "safe" PoC, yields: Spurious interrupt (vector 0xee) on CPU#425. Acked And hacking KVM to abuse kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler() to register a handler and WARN on POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR yields: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:5594 at pi_wakeup_handler+0x9/0x10 [kvm_amd], CPU#156: nested_x2apic_t/316940 CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 316940 Comm: nested_x2apic_t Tainted: G S U Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Google Astoria-Turin/astoria, BIOS 0.20260209.0-0 02/09/2026 RIP: 0010:pi_wakeup_handler+0x9/0x10 [kvm_amd] Call Trace: <IRQ> sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x64/0x80 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_wakeup_ipi+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:vcpu_run+0x1430/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2c1/0x600 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x580/0x6b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x46ff4b </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-74515 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: Reject adapter interrupt forwarding if already enabled The MPCIFC instruction doesn't allow registering adapter interrupts without first unregistering. So reject any request to enable interrupt forwarding if its already enabled for the zPCI device. This also fixes overwriting and thus leaking resources when the ioctl is called multiple times for the same device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74512 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: fix potential use-after-free in audit_del_rule() `audit_del_rule()` destroys `e->rule.exe` via `audit_remove_mark_rule()` before unlinking the rule from RCU-visible filter lists and waiting for a grace period. Concurrent readers in `audit_filter()` and `audit_filter_rules()` still dereference `e->rule.exe`, while the fsnotify mark can be freed on an independent lifetime path. This creates a use-after-free window during rule deletion. Fix this by unlinking the rule from the RCU-visible lists and invoking `synchronize_rcu()` before calling `audit_remove_mark_rule()` (and other rule removal helpers). This ensures that all existing RCU readers have exited the critical section before any underlying resources are destroyed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74495 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igbvf: Fix leak in TX DMA error cleanup If an error is encountered while mapping TX buffers, the driver should unmap any buffers already mapped for that skb. Because count is incremented before each frag mapping, it will always match the correct number of unmappings needed when dma_error is reached. Decrementing count before the while loop in dma_error causes an off-by-one error. If any mapping was successful before an unsuccessful mapping, exactly one DMA mapping (the head) would leak. This bug was introduced by a 2010 fix for an endless loop in dma_error. All other affected drivers have already been fixed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74493 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix socket use-after-free during link group termination __smc_lgr_terminate() drops conns_lock after finding a connection in lgr->conns_all, but before taking a reference on its socket. The connection is embedded in the socket, and its registration reference protects it only while the connection remains in the tree. A concurrent close can unregister the connection and drop that reference, freeing the socket before the termination worker reaches sock_hold(). The race is reachable when close overlaps link group termination. Local stress testing reproduced the use-after-free and KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc] Write of size 4 by task kworker/3:3 Workqueue: events smc_lgr_terminate_work [smc] __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc] The socket was allocated by smc_create(), freed through slab_free_after_rcu_debug(), and was followed by: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0 [smc] Take the socket reference while conns_lock still protects the tree entry. The unregister path then cannot drop the last reference until termination has finished using the socket. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74488 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: use the subframe length when parsing A-MSDU TDLS frames mwifiex_11n_dispatch_amsdu_pkt() splits an A-MSDU with ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() and walks the resulting subframes. For each subframe it passes the subframe data pointer to mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(), but pairs it with skb->len, the length of the A-MSDU parent, instead of rx_skb->len: rx_skb = __skb_dequeue(&list); rx_hdr = (struct rx_packet_hdr *)rx_skb->data; if (ISSUPP_TDLS_ENABLED(priv->adapter->fw_cap_info) && ntohs(rx_hdr->eth803_hdr.h_proto) == ETH_P_TDLS) { mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(priv, (u8 *)rx_hdr, skb->len); } The parent is not a valid description of that buffer, and may not be valid memory at all. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() ends with if (!reuse_skb) dev_kfree_skb(skb); and it only sets reuse_skb when the parent is linear, is not a head_frag, and is being consumed as the *last* subframe. So when the parent does not qualify for reuse it has already been freed, and the read of skb->len is a use-after-free. When it is reused, skb->len is the length of the last subframe, applied to every earlier subframe, which over-states the buffer whenever an earlier subframe is shorter. The callee cannot absorb a wrong length, because it derives its own ceiling from the value it is given. Each frame type computes ies_len = len - sizeof(struct ethhdr) - TDLS_*_FIX_LEN; and the element walk is then bounded entirely against that ceiling, for (end = pos + ies_len; pos + 1 < end; pos += 2 + pos[1]) { u8 ie_len = pos[1]; if (pos + 2 + ie_len > end) break; so a too-large len moves end past the end of the subframe and the walk reads and copies beyond it. The A-MSDU layout is chosen by the sender, which makes the difference between the last subframe and a shorter earlier one remotely selectable. Reaching this requires TDLS support in firmware and the TDLS ethertype on the subframe. The other caller, mwifiex_process_rx_packet(), is correct: it passes a pointer and a length that describe the same region of the RX buffer. Pass rx_skb->len, the length of the subframe actually being parsed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74485 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that same delimiter: memset(buf + count, del, 8); Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan. If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is not a flag character. For example registering PaPEPPxPPiP with 'P' as the delimiter (name "a", type extension, magic "x", interpreter "i", empty flags) leaves the flag scan running off the end of the buffer. The registration is rejected in the end because the parser does not stop exactly at buf + count, but only after the out of bounds read has already happened. With an unlucky allocation layout the scan can walk into an unmapped page; under KASAN it is reported as a slab out of bounds read. binfmt_misc mounts are available to unprivileged users in a user namespace so the read is reachable without privileges. Reject a delimiter that is one of the flag characters up front. Such a registration was always rejected anyway, only after the out of bounds read, so no valid registration string changes meaning. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74482 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: unlock i_mmap_rwsem before releasing after-split folios __folio_split() keeps dereferencing the mapping after the split: shmem_uncharge(mapping->host) and remap_page() while the folios are still frozen/locked, and i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping) at the very end, after the after-split folios have been unlocked and freed. Nothing holds an inode reference across that. The split relies on @folio -- which the beyond-EOF drop loop never removes, as it starts at folio_next(folio) -- staying locked and in the page cache to hold off eviction. But the unlock loop unlocks @folio before i_mmap_unlock_read() runs. If the caller's @lock_at is a tail beyond EOF, as memory_failure() passes when splitting a poisoned tail of a shmem THP that reaches past i_size during truncation, it too is gone from the page cache; so once @folio is unlocked no locked, in-cache folio pins the inode, and a concurrent final iput() can evict and RCU-free it before i_mmap_unlock_read() touches i_mmap_rwsem: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __up_read+0x634/0x790 i_mmap_unlock_read include/linux/fs.h:537 [inline] __folio_split+0x732/0x1640 mm/huge_memory.c:4100 try_to_split_thp_page+0xab/0x390 mm/memory-failure.c:1675 memory_failure+0x1394/0x26e0 mm/memory-failure.c:2470 Freed by task 4601: shmem_free_in_core_inode+0x54/0xb0 mm/shmem.c:5177 evict+0x57f/0xac0 fs/inode.c:870 Do every mapping dereference while @folio still pins the inode: drop i_mmap_rwsem right after remap_page(), before the loop that unlocks and frees the after-split folios, and clear @mapping so the exit path does not unlock it again. shmem_uncharge() and remap_page() already run before that point, so after this nothing past the unlock loop touches the inode or the mapping. This is now a rule the split depends on, alongside keeping @folio frozen until the page cache is updated: no inode or mapping dereference once the after-split folios start being unlocked. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: um: vector: fix use-after-free in vector_mmsg_rx() When vector_mmsg_rx() discards a packet whose overlay header fails verify_header(), it frees the skb and continues the loop: if (header_check < 0) { dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); vp->estats.rx_encaps_errors++; continue; } The normal and short-packet paths fall through to the bottom of the loop body, which clears the consumed slot and advances the cursors: (*skbuff_vector) = NULL; mmsg_vector++; skbuff_vector++; The verify_header() < 0 path skips that via continue, so the freed skb is left in skbuff_vector[] and the cursors do not advance. The next iteration reads the same slot, gets the freed skb, and frees it again, producing a refcount underflow / use-after-free in the RX path. Discard the slot the same way the other paths do before continuing. Only transports whose verify_header() can return negative are affected: GRE and L2TPv3 do so on a cookie/session-id mismatch (raw/tap do not), so any peer on such a transport can trigger it without authentication. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74473 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74472 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev() ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses ->state and ->ublksrv_pid. A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the "->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an unrelated task as the ublk server. Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing. ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than ->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74469 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to zero. SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload, then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list. After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes 8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail. Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues to return its existing transport at the limit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74465 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix potential UAF on meter attach failure While attaching a newly created meter attach_meter() function makes the new meter visible to other CPUs but can still fail afterwards. On failure, it detaches the meter back and returns an error. However, this is an unexpected behavior for the ovs_meter_cmd_set() that uses a plain kfree(meter) on attach failure without waiting for RCU readers to stop using it, assuming it was never visible. This is never a problem for ovs-vswitchd as it always creates meters before creating any flows that use them. But the UAF can be triggered with a custom application using uAPI: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovs_meter_execute (net/openvswitch/meter.c:653) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810d152650 by task meter/2508 Call Trace: ovs_meter_execute (net/openvswitch/meter.c:653) do_execute_actions (net/openvswitch/actions.c:1407) ovs_execute_actions (net/openvswitch/actions.c:1584) ovs_packet_cmd_execute (net/openvswitch/datapath.c:703) ... netlink_sendmsg (af_netlink.c:1900) Allocated by task 2519: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) ovs_meter_cmd_set (net/openvswitch/meter.c:422) ... netlink_sendmsg (af_netlink.c:1900) Freed by task 2519: kfree (mm/slub.c:2705 mm/slub.c:6405 mm/slub.c:6720) ovs_meter_cmd_set (net/openvswitch/meter.c:479) ... netlink_sendmsg (af_netlink.c:1900) Fix that by making sure attach_meter() doesn't make the meter visible until all the checks are done and the function can't fail anymore. This also makes sure the "hash" value is calculated after the potential re-sizing of the table. Reported by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-31642. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74461 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: imx: Cancel hrtimer before clearing slave pointer In i2c_imx_unreg_slave(), the slave pointer is set to NULL after disabling interrupts. However, a pending interrupt might already have started the hrtimer (i2c_imx_slave_timeout) before the pointer was cleared. If the hrtimer fires after i2c_imx->slave is set to NULL, the timer callback i2c_imx_slave_finish_op() will call i2c_imx_slave_event() with a NULL slave pointer, which results in a use-after-free / NULL pointer dereference. Fix by canceling the hrtimer and waiting for it to complete after disabling interrupts, before clearing the slave pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74460 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ems_usb: validate CPC message lengths ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() walks CPC messages packed in one USB receive buffer. Check that each declared message fits in the URB payload. Also require the type-specific payload to cover the fields used by the CAN, state, error and overrun handlers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74453 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job The binner BO is a single 16MB buffer split into 512KB slots that are handed out to jobs at submission time and recycled as jobs complete, without ever being cleared. Each slot holds the job's Tile State Data Array (TSDA) at its start, followed by the tile allocation pool. While the tile allocation pool is only walked by the render thread through branches the binner generated during the current job, the TSDA is the PTB's own per-tile bookkeeping and is consumed by the hardware itself. Although the kernel sets the "Auto-initialise Tile State Data Array" flag in the tile binning mode configuration, the PTB demonstrably still acts on stale tile state left by the slot's previous user: the binner ends up creating invalid command streams with invalid primitive streams and branches, which can cause GPU hangs as observed in [1][2]. Zero the TSDA when the job's binning slot is configured. This clears 48 bytes per tile (~24KB for a 1080p frame) in the submission path, and guarantees the PTB never sees another job's tile state. The tile count is only checked for being non-zero today, so the 8-bit fields it comes from can describe a tile state array almost six times larger than the slot it has to live in. Bound it before the slot is handed out, since such size decides how much of the slot is left for the tile alloc pool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division vmw_cmd_draw() computes maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl); where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum. Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory. Reject undersized headers up front. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72392 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fib6: fix NULL deref in fib6_walk_continue() on multi-batch dump inet6_dump_fib() saves its progress in cb->args[1] as a positional index within the current hash chain. Between batches, a concurrent fib6_new_table() can insert a new table at the chain head, shifting all existing entries. The saved index then lands on a different table, causing fib6_dump_table() to set w->root to the wrong table while w->node still points into the previous one. fib6_walk_continue() dereferences w->node->parent (NULL) and panics: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:fib6_walk_continue+0x6e/0x170 Call Trace: <TASK> fib6_dump_table.isra.0+0xc5/0x240 inet6_dump_fib+0xf6/0x420 rtnl_dumpit+0x30/0xa0 netlink_dump+0x15b/0x460 netlink_recvmsg+0x1d6/0x2a0 ____sys_recvmsg+0x17a/0x190 Fix by storing tb->tb6_id in cb->args[1] instead of a positional index. On resume, skip entries until the id matches; a concurrent head-insert can never match the saved id, so the walker always resumes on the correct table. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65675 | 1 Microsoft | 3 Github Copilot Chat, Visual Studio Code, Visual Studio Code Copilot Chat Extension | 2026-08-19 | 7.1 High |
| No cwe for this issue in Visual Studio Code CoPilot Chat Extension allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. | ||||