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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80583 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int). This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type") and commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed. On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL: snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow | ||||
| CVE-2026-80581 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout Ignore IPC errors for pipeline state change if the firmware state is crashed or the IPC has timed out. If the firmware has crashed the kernel still needs to go through the state changes to reset its internal to be able to correctly work the next time the DSP is booted up. The case with IPC timeout is a bit more problematic, but it has been rootcaused to be the result of system scheduling blockage and the firmware did actually received and handled the message, but the reply handling got blocked by issues outside of the SOF stack. So far the best way to handle this is to continue with setting the state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80577 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: skip zero-sized firmware sections panthor_fw_load_section_entry() skips BO creation when the firmware section VA range is empty. If such a section is added to the firmware section list, section->mem is left as NULL. Later reload and unplug paths iterate over all firmware sections and dereference section->mem, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Zero-sized firmware sections are valid, so accept them as no-op entries but skip adding them to the section list. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80574 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: focaltech - fix array out-of-bounds in focaltech_process_rel_packet Make finger2 (and also finger1) unsigned, so that if the finger index in the packet is 0 then subtracting 1 creates an array index which overflows above the existing check for FOC_MAX_FINGERS, as the existing comment says it should, instead of writing to state->fingers[-1]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80570 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - zero report size on F54 work error In rmi_f54_work(), if an error occurs during report request or command verification, the code jumped directly to the 'error' label, bypassing the 'abort' label where f54->report_size was normally zeroed out. This left f54->report_size containing its previous successful payload size. If a user then altered the V4L2 format to a smaller size, and a subsequent run failed, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() would copy the stale, larger payload size into the shrunken V4L2 buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow. Fix this by merging the 'abort' and 'error' labels into a single 'out' exit path, and ensuring that f54->report_size is always set to 0 on failure by checking for error and zeroing the local report_size first. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80567 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - propagate F54 worker errors to V4L2 queue Previously, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() waited for the worker thread to finish but ignored whether it succeeded. If the worker failed (e.g., due to a timeout or register read failure), the queue thread would silently return success, delivering stale or uninitialized memory to userspace. Add a 'report_error' field to struct f54_data to store the worker's exit status. Check this field in rmi_f54_buffer_queue() after the worker finishes, and mark the buffer as VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR if an error occurred. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80562 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock ioh_irq_type() is registered as the irq_chip .irq_set_type callback and takes chip->spinlock with spin_lock_irqsave(). This callback is reached from __setup_irq() -> __irq_set_trigger() -> chip->irq_set_type() while the caller holds desc->lock, a raw_spinlock_t, with hardirqs disabled. That context is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t is an rtmutex-backed sleeping lock, so acquiring it there is invalid. ioh_irq_enable() and ioh_irq_disable() take the same lock from the .irq_enable/.irq_disable callbacks, which are likewise invoked with desc->lock held. Convert the register lock to raw_spinlock_t. The same lock also serializes the GPIO direction/value callbacks and the suspend/resume register save/restore, and those critical sections only perform short sequences of MMIO register accesses (ioread32()/iowrite32()); the .irq_set_type callback additionally emits a dev_warn() on an unsupported type. None of these are sleepable operations, so keeping this register lock non-sleeping is appropriate for the irqchip callbacks and does not change the GPIO-side locking contract. This is the same fix as commit a02b8950d619 ("gpio: pch: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock"); this driver shares the same structure as gpio-pch. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80561 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim changelog ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80560 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space. All other SR bits are left under user control. An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME. With the data MMU disabled the CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local privilege escalation. SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way. The ptrace GPR regset already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason. Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on signal entry. Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80559 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: sur40 - fix input device registration ordering In sur40_probe(), input_register_device() was previously called early before the V4L2 video device and vb2_queue components were fully initialized. If userspace opened the input device immediately upon registration, sur40_open() would trigger and start the sur40_poll() worker thread. This worker thread invokes sur40_process_video() and accesses the uninitialized vb2_queue structure, leading to a data race and potential system crash. Furthermore, if V4L2 or video registration failed after input_register_device() succeeded, the error path fell through to calling input_free_device() on a successfully registered device instead of input_unregister_device(), corrupting input core state. Move input_register_device() to the very end of sur40_probe(). This ensures the V4L2 and video queue structures are fully initialized before polling can start, and naturally resolves the error path bug since input_free_device() is now only called when input registration has not yet occurred. To maintain strict LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) teardown ordering, also move input_unregister_device() to the very beginning of sur40_disconnect(). This guarantees that the input polling worker thread is stopped before V4L2 video components or control handlers are unregistered. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80558 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target(). While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this (potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request. Because the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain max_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to out-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays. This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that only valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to using the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid. [ idryomov: changelog ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80557 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid: ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end, leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads. The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count. The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants (ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32) after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight. Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: trim changelog ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80553 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Cancel existing workqueues The initialization of the io_work and crw_work workqueues begs the question of whether they should be un-initialized. Add the corresponding cleanup tags in _release_dev to ensure work isn't dispatched after the private struct is free'd. | ||||
| CVE-2026-7770 | 1 Ibm | 2 I Access Client Solutions, I Access Family | 2026-08-26 | 8.8 High |
| IBM i Access Family 1.1.5.0 through 1.1.9.12 IBM i Access Client Solutions (ACS) is vulnerable to remote code execution when configured to listen for requests from IBM i Navigator. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80551 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant The first IDAW in a list does not need to be on a 2K/4K boundary like all others, and so is read separately to accurately calculate the size of the buffer needed to read the full IDAL. Verify that the address found in the first IDAW is unchanged between reads, to ensure a consistent set of IDAWs being worked with. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80550 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Fix out of bounds check on CCW array The routine ccwchain_calc_length() counts the number of channel command words (CCWs) that are chained together in a single channel program, and rejects anything larger than CCWCHAIN_LEN_MAX (256) CCWs. The loop itself is "do..while (count < 257)", and while the logic in is_cpa_within_range() correctly adjusts between the 0-index array of CCWs and the count of CCWs starting at 1, this means it would look at a possible 257th CCW before ending the loop and (correctly) returning an error. Fix this by restructuring the loop to break as soon as 256 CCWs (thus indexes 0-255) are examined, without looking at memory outside the range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80548 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Selectively expand io_mutex The io_mutex was defined to serialize the io_regions, but then has also sort of been associated with the I/O themselves because of the close relationship they share. With the handful of races that are possible, the choices are either to: A) expand the scope of io_mutex to close these remaining windows, or B) reduce the scope of io_mutex to just io_region, and introduce a new lock mechanism for the remaining I/O resources This patch implements A, since B brings with it a lot more interactions that would need to be tracked and kept in a correct hierarchy. It also takes advantage of the workqueue element for cp_free() that now gets called out of fsm_notoper(), which could be invoked out of an interrupt context and thus cannot acquire a mutex itself. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80547 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Implement a crw lock Unlike the channel_program struct, which covers synchronous I/O submissions and asynchronous interrupts, the CRW region relies exclusively on asynchronous events coming from hardware. Implement a lock to manage the list of those payloads, to ensure they are read cohesively. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80546 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Improve CCA CPRB length and overflow checks The xcrb_msg_to_type6cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input validation, creating security vulnerabilities: 1. Integer overflow after CEIL4 alignment: Signed int variables could overflow during 4-byte boundary alignment, causing undersized buffer allocations or incorrect bounds checking. 2. Missing minimum size validation: The CPRBX structure is copied from userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length. Undersized buffers cause uninitialized memory access when reading structure fields like cprbx.cprb_len and cprbx.domain. 3. Arithmetic overflow in sum calculations: Adding control block and data block sizes could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows. Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary checks after alignment, validating minimum control block size before copying from userspace, and detecting sum calculation overflows. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80545 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks The xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input validation, creating security vulnerabilities: 1. Missing minimum size validation: The ep11_cprb structure and subsequent payload fields (pld_tag, pld_lenfmt) are copied from userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length. 2. Arithmetic overflow in length calculations: CEIL4 alignment could overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows. 3. The payload is asn1 encoded but the function just uses a simple c struct overlay to access some fields of the payload. Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary checks after alignment, and validating minimum request size and minimum reply size before copying from userspace. Do a very simple asn1 parsing of the payload up to the function value field. | ||||