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Search Results (363555 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-46456 | 1 Apache | 1 Camel | 2026-07-06 | N/A |
| Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel AWS2-SQS Component. The camel-aws2-sqs component map inbound message attributes into the Camel Exchange through a component-specific HeaderFilterStrategy. Sqs2HeaderFilterStrategy configured only an outbound filter (setOutFilterPattern, which blocks Camel*, breadcrumbId and org.apache.camel.* headers being written to the broker) but did not configure an inbound filter. As a result, when Sqs2Consumer copies each SQS MessageAttribute into the Exchange via HeaderFilterStrategy.applyFilterToExternalHeaders, DefaultHeaderFilterStrategy applied no inbound rule and treated every header name as not filtered - including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName or CamelSqlQuery - copying them unmodified onto the Camel message. Any principal able to send messages to the consumed SQS queue (for example a cross-account sender or a lower-privileged in-account component holding sqs:SendMessage) could therefore set arbitrary Camel control headers that influence the behaviour of downstream producers in the route (for example redirecting an HTTP producer, changing a file name, or overriding a query); the injected headers also persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops. The concrete downstream impact depends on which producers the route uses. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix adds an inbound HeaderFilterStrategy rule to Sqs2HeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so sender-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from inbound messages before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), and restrict who may send to the consumed SQS queue by applying least-privilege sqs:SendMessage permissions on the queue resource policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46457 | 1 Apache | 1 Camel | 2026-07-06 | N/A |
| Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel NATS component. The camel-nats component maps inbound NATS message headers into the Camel Exchange but defaulted its headerFilterStrategy to a bare new DefaultHeaderFilterStrategy() with no inbound rules configured (NatsConfiguration). With no inFilter, inFilterPattern or inFilterStartsWith set, DefaultHeaderFilterStrategy.applyFilterToExternalHeaders returns not filtered for every header name, so NatsConsumer copies every NATS message header - including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName or CamelSqlQuery - unmodified onto the Camel message. A client able to publish to the consumed NATS subject can therefore inject arbitrary Camel control headers that influence the behaviour of downstream producers in the route (for example redirecting an HTTP producer, changing a file name, or overriding a query); the injected headers also persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops. The concrete downstream impact depends on which producers the route uses. NATS message headers require NATS 2.2 or later, and the issue is reachable without credentials when the NATS server is configured without authentication (the NATS server default). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes camel-nats default to a dedicated NatsHeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so client-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from inbound NATS messages before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), and enable authentication on the NATS server so that only trusted clients can publish to the consumed subject. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48204 | 1 Apache | 1 Camel | 2026-07-06 | N/A |
| Improper Input Validation, Improper Access Control vulnerability in Apache Camel in Camel Mongodb Gridfs component. The camel-mongodb-gridfs producer selects the GridFS operation to perform from the gridfs.operation Exchange header when the endpoint's operation parameter is not set - which is the default. The control-header constants (GridFsConstants.GRIDFS_OPERATION, GRIDFS_OBJECT_ID, GRIDFS_METADATA, GRIDFS_CHUNKSIZE, GRIDFS_FILE_ID_PRODUCED) were the plain strings gridfs.operation, gridfs.objectid, gridfs.metadata, gridfs.chunksize and gridfs.fileid. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a mongodb-gridfs: producer with no explicit operation, any HTTP client could therefore set the gridfs.operation header to override the route's intended operation - switching, for example, a file upload to remove (deleting a file identified by the attacker-supplied gridfs.objectid), listAll (enumerating every file in the bucket) or findOne (reading a file) - and supply a gridfs.metadata value that is parsed as a MongoDB document, enabling NoSQL operator injection. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive GridFS operations or metadata via the raw header names must use CamelGridFsOperation / CamelGridFsObjectId / CamelGridFsMetadata / CamelGridFsChunkSize / CamelGridFsFileId instead of the gridfs.* names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set an explicit operation on the mongodb-gridfs: endpoint so the operation is not taken from a header, and strip the gridfs.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the producer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-49098 | 1 Apache | 1 Camel | 2026-07-06 | N/A |
| Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Kafka Component. The camel-kafka producer can override its configured target topic at runtime from the kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC Exchange header: KafkaProducer.evaluateTopic() returns the header value in preference to the topic configured on the endpoint. The control-header constants in KafkaConstants (for example OVERRIDE_TOPIC = kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC, OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP = kafka.OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP, PARTITION_KEY = kafka.PARTITION_KEY) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. camel-kafka's own KafkaHeaderFilterStrategy does filter the kafka.* namespace, but only on the Kafka-to-Exchange serialization boundary (reading Kafka record headers into the Exchange, and writing Exchange headers into a Kafka record); it does not apply to headers that arrive from an upstream consumer in a multi-component route. The upstream HTTP consumer uses HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, which blocks only the Camel / camel namespace, so a kafka.* header passes through unfiltered. As a result, in a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a kafka: producer, any HTTP client could set the kafka.OVERRIDE_TOPIC header and cause the message to be published to an arbitrary Kafka topic instead of the configured one - redirecting it to a sensitive internal topic, or injecting attacker-crafted messages into a topic consumed by a critical downstream service. The related kafka.OVERRIDE_TIMESTAMP and kafka.PARTITION_KEY headers could likewise be injected to backdate messages or target specific partitions. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set or read Kafka headers via the raw header names must use the CamelKafka* names (for example CamelKafkaOverrideTopic and CamelKafkaTopic) instead of the old kafka.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the kafka.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the kafka: producer (for example removeHeaders('kafka.*') at the start of the route), and set the target topic from a trusted source. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44269 | 1 Dell | 1 Powerprotect Data Domain | 2026-07-06 | 4.4 Medium |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.6, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper link resolution before file access ('link following') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-54483 | 1 Dell | 1 Powerprotect Data Domain | 2026-07-06 | 6.7 Medium |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.6, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS command Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Command execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46464 | 1 Dell | 1 Powerprotect Data Domain | 2026-07-06 | 4.9 Medium |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper link resolution before file access ('Link following') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53478 | 1 Dell | 1 Powerprotect Data Domain | 2026-07-06 | 7.2 High |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS command Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to command execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53361 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-06 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc(). Igor Ushakov reported that unix_gc() could run with gc_in_progress being false if the work is scheduled while running: Thread 1 Thread 2 Thread 3 -------- -------- -------- unix_schedule_gc() unix_schedule_gc() `- if (!gc_in_progress) `- if (!gc_in_progress) |- gc_in_progress = true | `- queue_work() | unix_gc() <----------------/ | | |- gc_in_progress = true ... `- queue_work() | | `- gc_in_progress = false | | unix_gc() <---------------------------------------------' | ... /* gc_in_progress == false */ | `- gc_in_progress = false unix_peek_fpl() relies on gc_in_progress not to confuse GC by MSG_PEEK. Let's set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-53362 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-06 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken (MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero. The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing skb_shared_info. An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix __ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption triggerable. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-9165 | 1 Redhat | 1 Advanced Cluster Security | 2026-07-06 | 7.7 High |
| A flaw was found in Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes (RHACS). Central does not limit the depth of GraphQL queries served on the authenticated GraphQL API. An authenticated user with a valid API token can send deeply nested queries that cause excessive resource consumption in Central, resulting in a denial of service for the management plane. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56140 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel AWS SNS component. The camel-aws2-sns component filters Camel headers through a component-specific HeaderFilterStrategy, Sns2HeaderFilterStrategy. Like the sibling Sqs2HeaderFilterStrategy, it originally configured only an outbound filter (setOutFilterPattern, which blocks Camel*, breadcrumbId and org.apache.camel.* headers from being written out) and did not configure an inbound filter rule. For the related camel-aws2-sqs component this inbound gap was exploitable, because the Sqs2Consumer maps inbound SQS message attributes into the Camel Exchange via HeaderFilterStrategy.applyFilterToExternalHeaders, allowing a message sender to inject Camel control headers (tracked as CVE-2026-46456). camel-aws2-sns, by contrast, is producer-only: Sns2Endpoint does not support consumers (createConsumer throws UnsupportedOperationException, 'You cannot receive messages from this endpoint'), so no externally-supplied message attributes are ever mapped inbound into a Camel Exchange through SNS, and the missing inbound filter rule on Sns2HeaderFilterStrategy was therefore not reachable by an attacker. As part of the same fix (CAMEL-23506), an inbound filter rule (setInFilterStartsWith for the Camel namespace) was added to Sns2HeaderFilterStrategy so that its configuration matches the corrected Sqs2HeaderFilterStrategy and the other sibling strategies. This is a defense-in-depth alignment with no known exploit path in camel-aws2-sns. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. This is a defense-in-depth hardening change with no known exploit path in camel-aws2-sns, which is producer-only, so no urgent action or workaround is required. Users who want the aligned behaviour can upgrade to version 4.21.0, or to 4.14.8 on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, or to 4.18.3 on the 4.18.x releases stream, which contain the change. As a general best practice, operators should continue to apply least-privilege IAM permissions on their SNS topics. | ||||
| CVE-2026-13022 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-07-06 | 3.1 Low |
| Inappropriate implementation in Autofill in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.197 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-56139 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in Apache Camel Undertow Component. The camel-undertow HTTP server consumer exposes a muteException option that controls what is returned to the client when a route processing error occurs. This option defaulted to false, whereas the other Camel HTTP server components (camel-http / camel-jetty / camel-servlet and camel-platform-http) default it to true. With muteException=false, when a request triggers an exception during route processing the consumer writes the full Throwable stack trace into the HTTP response body as text/plain instead of returning an empty body. Any unauthenticated client that can reach the endpoint and cause a processing error - for example by sending a malformed request body, an invalid parameter, or otherwise triggering a route-internal failure - therefore receives a complete Java stack trace. Such a stack trace can disclose sensitive internal information, including credentials embedded in exception messages, internal host names and IP addresses, filesystem paths, dependency and version details, database and class names, and the application's internal structure, which an attacker can use to plan further attacks. In addition, for Rest DSL consumers the muteException option was not honoured at all: the RestUndertowHttpBinding was created with a hard-coded false, so the stack trace was returned even when muteException=true had been configured. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set muteException=true explicitly on the camel-undertow consumer (for example undertow: http://0.0.0.0:8080/api?muteException=true , or globally via the camel.component.undertow.mute-exception=true property), so that processing errors no longer return the stack trace to the client; note that on affected releases this workaround does not cover Rest DSL consumers, whose binding ignores the option until the fix is applied. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55994 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Iggy component. The camel-iggy consumer mapped the user-headers of inbound Iggy messages into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (IggyFetchRecords copied the message user-headers straight into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, an actor able to publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as message user-headers. In a route where the Iggy consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.17.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix adds a dedicated IggyHeaderFilterStrategy (and a headerFilterStrategy endpoint option) that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), restrict who can publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55993 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Atmosphere Websocket Component. The camel-atmosphere-websocket consumer mapped inbound WebSocket query parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (WebsocketConsumer.sendEventNotification() iterates the query-string map collected in WebsocketConsumer.service() and copies each entry into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, a client connecting to the WebSocket endpoint could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as query parameters. In a route where the WebSocket consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. When the WebSocket endpoint is exposed without authentication, this is reachable by an unauthenticated remote attacker. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes the consumer apply the HeaderFilterStrategy it already inherits from the HTTP/servlet stack, filtering the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), require authentication on the WebSocket endpoint, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53913 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Improper Authentication, Missing Authentication for Critical Function, Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') vulnerability in Apache Camel Keycloak Component. The KeycloakSecurityPolicy of camel-keycloak guards a route by running KeycloakSecurityProcessor.beforeProcess(), which performs three checks in sequence: it rejects a request that carries no access token, then - only if requiredRoles is non-empty - validates the roles, and - only if requiredPermissions is non-empty - validates the permissions. The actual cryptographic verification of the bearer access token (signature, issuer and expiry for a local JWT, or active-state and issuer for token introspection) is performed exclusively inside those role and permission checks. KeycloakSecurityPolicy defaults requiredRoles and requiredPermissions to empty - which is the documented 'Basic Setup' - so on a route configured that way the role and permission checks are skipped and the access token is therefore never verified. The token-presence check still rejects a missing token, but an invalid token is accepted: any non-null value in the Authorization: Bearer header - including an arbitrary string or a forged, unsigned JWT - passes the policy and the request reaches the protected route, with no signature, issuer or expiry check and no request to Keycloak. The token is read from the inbound request header because allowTokenFromHeader defaults to true. Because the normal reason to place a route behind this policy is that the route performs server-side work, the bypass results in unauthenticated access to that work; where the protected route forwards to a code-execution-capable producer, it can result in unauthenticated remote code execution. This defect is independent of CVE-2026-23552: that issue concerned the issuer claim and was fixed by adding a check inside the verification routine, but here the verification routine is not reached at all in the default configuration, so the defect remains. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a non-empty requiredRoles or requiredPermissions on every KeycloakSecurityPolicy so that the token-verification path is exercised, set allowTokenFromHeader to false where the token is not expected from the request header, or perform token verification at the framework layer ahead of the policy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-49365 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in Apache Camel Netty HTTP component. The camel-netty-http HTTP server consumer exposes a muteException option that controls what is returned to the client when a route processing error occurs. This option defaulted to false because the backing field was an uninitialised primitive boolean (Java's default of false), whereas the other Camel HTTP server components (camel-http / camel-jetty / camel-servlet and camel-platform-http) default it to true. With muteException=false, when a request triggers an exception during route processing the consumer writes the full Throwable stack trace into the HTTP response body as text/plain (via DefaultNettyHttpBinding) instead of returning an empty body. Any unauthenticated client that can reach the endpoint and cause a processing error - for example by sending a malformed request body, an invalid parameter, or otherwise triggering a route-internal failure - therefore receives a complete Java stack trace. Such a stack trace can disclose sensitive internal information, including credentials embedded in exception messages, internal host names and IP addresses, filesystem paths, dependency and version details, database and class names, and the application's internal structure, which an attacker can use to plan further attacks. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set muteException=true explicitly on the camel-netty-http consumer (for example netty-http: http://0.0.0.0:8080/api?muteException=true , or globally via the camel.component.netty-http.configuration.mute-exception=true property), so that processing errors no longer return the stack trace to the client. | ||||
| CVE-2026-49099 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component. The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id for CRUD operations, or redirecting an Apex REST call to a different endpoint and HTTP method (including destructive methods) with injected query parameters. All such operations run with the full permissions of the Salesforce connected (integration) user, which is typically broad. No credentials are required from the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via the raw header names must use the CamelSalesforce* names (for example CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery and CamelSalesforceApexUrl) instead of the old sObject* / apex* values; the endpoint-option spelling is unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Salesforce control headers from any untrusted ingress before the salesforce: producer (for example removeHeaders('sObject*') and removeHeaders('apex*') at the start of the route), and set the query, SObject and Apex parameters from a trusted source. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48206 | 2026-07-06 | N/A | ||
| Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel JIRA component. The camel-jira producers read their operation parameters - the issue key, project key, transition id, summary, type, assignee, components, watchers, link type, work-log minutes and others - from Exchange message headers. The header constants defined in JiraConstants (for example ISSUE_KEY = IssueKey, ISSUE_PROJECT_KEY = ProjectKey, ISSUE_TRANSITION_ID = IssueTransitionId, LINK_TYPE = linkType) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a jira: producer, any HTTP client could therefore supply these headers and override the values the route intended, driving JIRA operations against the configured JIRA instance with the endpoint's configured service-account credentials - for example deleting or transitioning an arbitrary issue (via IssueKey / IssueTransitionId), creating an issue in a different project (via ProjectKey), modifying issue fields, adding or removing watchers, or logging work. The operations are bounded by what the configured service account is permitted to do. No credentials are required from the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive JIRA operations via the raw header names must use the CamelJira* names (for example CamelJiraIssueKey) instead of the old values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the camel-jira control headers from any untrusted ingress before the jira: producer (for example removing the IssueKey, ProjectKey, IssueTransitionId and related headers at the start of the route), and set the required JIRA operation parameters from a trusted source. | ||||