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CVEs in KEV CVEs with EPSS >= 80% Crit. Microsoft High Apache SQL Injection (CWE-89) Linux Kernel High (CVSS 3.1) Apache Struts RCE (Remote Code Execution) XSS (CWE-79) Critical (CVSS 4.0) CVEs to check

Search Results (4 CVEs found)

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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2011-10043 1 Bingos 1 Module::load 2026-07-10 9.8 Critical
Module::Load versions before 0.22 for Perl allow arbitrary modules outside of @INC to be loaded. Module names starting with "::" could be passed to the load function to specify arbitrary module paths. Attackers able to influence module names passed to load could use that bug to execute arbitrary code.
CVE-2026-42496 2 Archive\, Bingos 2 \, Archive::tar 2026-05-28 9.1 Critical
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target. A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.
CVE-2026-9538 2 Archive\, Bingos 2 \, Archive::tar 2026-05-28 7.5 High
Archive::Tar versions before 3.10 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via attacker controlled entry size field in tar header. _read_tar() reads each entry's payload with $handle->read($$data, $block), where $block is derived from the entry's 12-byte size field in the tar header with no upper bound on that value. A crafted header declaring a multi-gigabyte size causes Perl to allocate a scalar of that size.
CVE-2026-42497 2 Archive\, Bingos 2 \, Archive::tar 2026-05-28 7.5 High
Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract hardlinks to attacker controlled paths outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to link() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments, creating a hardlink that shares the victim file's inode. A subsequent write through the extracted name modifies the victim file, and the post-extraction chmod, chown, and utime block in _extract_file() (guarded only against symlinks via -l) applies the tar header's mode, owner, and timestamps to the shared inode during extraction alone.