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Search Results (6 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-34726 | 1 Copier-org | 1 Copier | 2026-04-03 | 4.4 Medium |
| Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.14.1, Copier's _subdirectory setting is documented as the subdirectory to use as the template root. However, the current implementation accepts parent-directory traversal such as .. and uses it directly when selecting the template root. As a result, a template can escape its own directory and make Copier render files from the parent directory without --UNSAFE. This issue has been patched in version 9.14.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-34730 | 1 Copier-org | 1 Copier | 2026-04-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.14.1, Copier's _external_data feature allows a template to load YAML files using template-controlled paths. If untrusted templates are in scope, a malicious template can read attacker-chosen YAML-parseable local files that are accessible to the user running Copier and expose their contents in rendered output. This issue has been patched in version 9.14.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-23968 | 1 Copier-org | 1 Copier | 2026-02-02 | 5.5 Medium |
| Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.11.2, Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with `_preserve_symlinks: false` (which is Copier's default setting). Version 9.11.2 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-23986 | 1 Copier-org | 1 Copier | 2026-02-02 | 7.1 High |
| Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.11.2, Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with `_preserve_symlinks: true` and a generated directory structure whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user's write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc. Version 9.11.2 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2025-55214 | 1 Copier-org | 1 Copier | 2025-08-18 | N/A |
| Copier library and CLI app for rendering project templates. From 7.1.0 to before 9.9.1, Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write files outside the destination path where a project shall be generated or updated. This is possible when rendering a generated directory structure whose rendered path is either a relative parent path or an absolute path. Constructing such paths is possible using Copier's builtin pathjoin Jinja filter and its builtin _copier_conf.sep variable, which is the platform-native path separator. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user's write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.9.1. | ||||
| CVE-2025-55201 | 1 Copier-org | 1 Copier | 2025-08-18 | N/A |
| Copier library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to 9.9.1, a safe template can currently read and write arbitrary files because Copier exposes a few pathlib.Path objects in the Jinja context which have unconstrained I/O methods. This effectively renders the security model w.r.t. filesystem access useless. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.9.1. | ||||
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