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Vendor Solution
Upgrade to Kimi Code 0.27.0 or later. The fix resolves hostnames via DNS and rejects addresses in loopback, RFC1918, link-local, CGNAT, and ULA ranges; follows redirects manually with per-hop revalidation; and pins connections to the validated resolved addresses to reduce DNS-rebinding (TOCTOU) races.
Tracking
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Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:30:00 +0000
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Mon, 27 Jul 2026 10:15:00 +0000
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| Description | Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode. | |
| Title | Kimi Code FetchURL SSRF protection bypass via DNS-resolving hostnames and redirects | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: JFROG
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-27T10:24:05.709Z
Reserved: 2026-07-27T09:17:58.055Z
Link: CVE-2026-17534
Updated: 2026-07-27T10:24:00.330Z
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