Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails to perform
sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields of
AuthEnvelopedData containers, leading to various potential compromises.

Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve
key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass integrity
validation for a given message.

In one use case, an attacker may send a CMS message containing
AuthEnvelopedData with the cipher specified as a non-AEAD cipher. OpenSSL
erroneously allows this selection, and attempts to decrypt and validate the
message.

An on-path attacker who captures one legitimate AES-GCM AuthEnvelopedData
addressed to the victim can re-emit it with the recipientInfos set left
byte-for-byte intact, so the victim's private key still unwraps the genuine CEK
(the content-encryption key), but with the inner OID rewritten to AES-256-OFB
(Output Feedback Mode, an unauthenticated keystream mode) and with an
attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. The victim initializes AES-256-OFB under the
real CEK, never consults the MAC field, and CMS_decrypt() returns success.

If the application under attack responds to the attacker with any indicator
showing success or failure of the decryption effort, it is possible for the
attacker to use this as an oracle to obtain key equivalent functionality for the
CEK used for the chosen recipient of the message.

In another use case, an attacker can reduce the tag length of the chosen AEAD
cipher for a given AuthEnvelopedData container to be a single byte long,
allowing an attacker to brute force CMS decryption, producing an integrity
bypass for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject modified content.

The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.

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Source ID Title
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6335-1 openssl security update
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8414-1 OpenSSL vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8414-2 OpenSSL vulnerabilities
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-130
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Moderate


Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Wed, 10 Jun 2026 08:30:00 +0000


Wed, 10 Jun 2026 08:15:00 +0000


Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Openssl
Openssl openssl
Vendors & Products Openssl
Openssl openssl

Tue, 09 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails to perform sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields of AuthEnvelopedData containers, leading to various potential compromises. Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass integrity validation for a given message. In one use case, an attacker may send a CMS message containing AuthEnvelopedData with the cipher specified as a non-AEAD cipher. OpenSSL erroneously allows this selection, and attempts to decrypt and validate the message. An on-path attacker who captures one legitimate AES-GCM AuthEnvelopedData addressed to the victim can re-emit it with the recipientInfos set left byte-for-byte intact, so the victim's private key still unwraps the genuine CEK (the content-encryption key), but with the inner OID rewritten to AES-256-OFB (Output Feedback Mode, an unauthenticated keystream mode) and with an attacker-chosen IV and ciphertext. The victim initializes AES-256-OFB under the real CEK, never consults the MAC field, and CMS_decrypt() returns success. If the application under attack responds to the attacker with any indicator showing success or failure of the decryption effort, it is possible for the attacker to use this as an oracle to obtain key equivalent functionality for the CEK used for the chosen recipient of the message. In another use case, an attacker can reduce the tag length of the chosen AEAD cipher for a given AuthEnvelopedData container to be a single byte long, allowing an attacker to brute force CMS decryption, producing an integrity bypass for applications that trust CMS_decrypt() to reject modified content. The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.
Title CMS AuthEnvelopedData Processing May Accept Forged Messages
Weaknesses CWE-354
References

Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: openssl

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-10T15:58:52.695Z

Reserved: 2026-03-26T09:29:36.013Z

Link: CVE-2026-34182

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-10T15:56:46.661Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-06-09T17:17:04.857

Modified: 2026-06-10T17:16:32.480

Link: CVE-2026-34182

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-06-09T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-34182 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-06-11T02:30:02Z

Weaknesses