Description
OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (proto_tcp, proto_tls, proto_ws, proto_wss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection's authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.
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Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Tue, 04 Aug 2026 23:45:00 +0000
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| First Time appeared |
Opensips
Opensips opensips |
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| Vendors & Products |
Opensips
Opensips opensips |
Tue, 04 Aug 2026 22:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the TCP message framing layer parses the Content-Length header using unsigned int arithmetic with no overflow check. When an attacker sends a Content-Length value that overflows unsigned int (e.g., 4294967296), the framing layer computes a wrapped-around value (e.g., 0) and splits the TCP stream at the wrong boundary, causing the body of the first SIP message to be processed as a separate message and enabling SIP message smuggling. Because Content-Length is parsed in the transport layer before authentication, an unauthenticated, network-based attacker can smuggle arbitrary SIP messages over any TCP-based transport (proto_tcp, proto_tls, proto_ws, proto_wss) on any instance with TCP enabled, with no routing-script preconditions. This allows smuggled messages to bypass front-end SBC/proxy security policies, inherit the connection's authentication context, and evade rate limiting. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. | |
| Title | OpenSIPS: SIP Message Smuggling via TCP Content-Length Integer Overflow | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-190 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-04T21:56:57.422Z
Reserved: 2026-05-08T19:27:26.699Z
Link: CVE-2026-45103
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-04T23:30:15Z
Weaknesses