In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for
a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each
iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis
before the array access.
When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer
bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG,
or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex
array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values
typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle()
rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same
connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(),
creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held.
Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup
properly.
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for
a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each
iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis
before the array access.
When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer
bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG,
or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex
array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values
typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle()
rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same
connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(),
creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held.
Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup
properly.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 28 May 2026 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-416 CWE-788 |
Thu, 28 May 2026 10:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis before the array access. When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG, or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle() rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(), creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held. Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup properly. | |
| Title | Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-28T09:35:54.467Z
Reserved: 2026-05-13T15:03:33.100Z
Link: CVE-2026-46138
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-05-28T10:16:29.357
Modified: 2026-05-28T10:16:29.357
Link: CVE-2026-46138
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-28T12:00:14Z