Description
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with extract-zip@2.0.1 into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. extract-zip@2.0.1 preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-w7mq-r738-x278 | Budibase has arbitrary file read by workspace-builder via PWA-zip symlink upload |
References
History
Sat, 27 Jun 2026 01:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Budibase
Budibase budibase |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Budibase
Budibase budibase |
Fri, 26 Jun 2026 21:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with extract-zip@2.0.1 into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. extract-zip@2.0.1 preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9. | |
| Title | Budibase: Arbitrary file read by workspace-builder via PWA-zip symlink upload | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 CWE-59 |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-27T03:12:11.845Z
Reserved: 2026-06-12T19:23:22.317Z
Link: CVE-2026-54352
No data.
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-27T01:30:09Z
Github GHSA