The handle_data/4 function in ssh_sftpd contains a catch-all clause that accepts channel data of any type. When channel data with a non-zero type code (SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) arrives with an empty pending buffer and a payload at or below the SFTP packet size limit, the clause tail-calls itself with identical arguments, creating an infinite loop.
The SFTP protocol operates exclusively on normal channel data (type 0). Extended data (non-zero type) is meaningless for SFTP and is never sent by conforming clients. However, the SSH protocol permits any channel participant to send extended data on an open channel, so an authenticated SFTP client can trigger the loop by sending SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA with any data_type_code and any non-empty payload at or below the size limit.
The targeted ssh_sftpd process enters an infinite tail-recursive loop. It never processes another message, its message queue grows without bound, and it can only be stopped by killing the process. BEAM's reduction-based scheduler preemption continues to function, so other processes on the node are not starved, but each stuck channel process consumes its full CPU time share continuously and accumulates unbounded message queue memory. Opening many channels amplifies the CPU and memory impact.
Erlang/OTP SSH configurations using the default max_channels setting (infinity) allow an authenticated user to open unlimited channels per connection, amplifying the attack without requiring multiple TCP connections or authentications.
No file contents, credentials, or write access are obtainable through this issue. The impact is limited to denial of service on targeted SFTP channels, with secondary CPU degradation and memory growth.
This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl and program routine ssh_sftpd:handle_data/4.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 until OTP 29.0.3, 28.5.0.3, and 27.3.4.14 corresponding to ssh from 3.0.1 until 6.0.2, 5.5.2.2, and 5.2.11.9.
Analysis
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Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| Erlang | OTP | unaffected |
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| Erlang | OTP | unaffected |
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Vendor Workaround
* Set the max_channels daemon option to a finite value (e.g., {max_channels, 10}) to limit the number of channels an attacker can open per connection. * Set the max_sessions daemon option to limit total concurrent SSH connections to the daemon. * Use external process monitoring to detect and kill ssh_sftpd processes with abnormally high reduction counts and growing message queues. * Ensure that the SFTP server port is not reachable from untrusted machines.
Tracking
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Thu, 02 Jul 2026 18:30:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Thu, 02 Jul 2026 16:45:00 +0000
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| Description | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows an authenticated SFTP user to render an SFTP channel permanently unresponsive. The handle_data/4 function in ssh_sftpd contains a catch-all clause that accepts channel data of any type. When channel data with a non-zero type code (SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) arrives with an empty pending buffer and a payload at or below the SFTP packet size limit, the clause tail-calls itself with identical arguments, creating an infinite loop. The SFTP protocol operates exclusively on normal channel data (type 0). Extended data (non-zero type) is meaningless for SFTP and is never sent by conforming clients. However, the SSH protocol permits any channel participant to send extended data on an open channel, so an authenticated SFTP client can trigger the loop by sending SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA with any data_type_code and any non-empty payload at or below the size limit. The targeted ssh_sftpd process enters an infinite tail-recursive loop. It never processes another message, its message queue grows without bound, and it can only be stopped by killing the process. BEAM's reduction-based scheduler preemption continues to function, so other processes on the node are not starved, but each stuck channel process consumes its full CPU time share continuously and accumulates unbounded message queue memory. Opening many channels amplifies the CPU and memory impact. Erlang/OTP SSH configurations using the default max_channels setting (infinity) allow an authenticated user to open unlimited channels per connection, amplifying the attack without requiring multiple TCP connections or authentications. No file contents, credentials, or write access are obtainable through this issue. The impact is limited to denial of service on targeted SFTP channels, with secondary CPU degradation and memory growth. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl and program routine ssh_sftpd:handle_data/4. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 until OTP 29.0.3, 28.5.0.3, and 27.3.4.14 corresponding to ssh from 3.0.1 until 6.0.2, 5.5.2.2, and 5.2.11.9. | |
| Title | SSH SFTP server denial of service via extended channel data infinite loop | |
| First Time appeared |
Erlang
Erlang erlang\/otp |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-400 CWE-835 |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\/otp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Erlang
Erlang erlang\/otp |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-02T17:27:30.648Z
Reserved: 2026-06-16T10:47:13.914Z
Link: CVE-2026-54886
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-07-02T17:27:27.846Z
NVD
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Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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