{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-55524", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-06-16T22:44:22.284Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-367", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-918", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.5, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "MervinPraison", "product": "PraisonAI", "versions": [{"version": "< 1.6.58", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

{}

{}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "generic", "value": "[0,1.6.58)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "PraisonAI", "source": "cna", "vendor": "MervinPraison"}, "product": "praisonai", "vendor": "mervinpraison"}], "created": "2026-08-05T21:30:16.209093+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-05T21:30:16.209111+00:00", "vendors": ["mervinpraison", "mervinpraison$PRODUCT$praisonai"]}